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Abstract 
The uptake of university education in Australia has increased in recent years. At the 
same time, studies in Australia and elsewhere have indicated that substantial 
imbalances exist between the labour demand for, and supply of, highly qualified 
individuals, and that this may result in unfavourable labour market outcomes. This 
thesis explores these types of issues in the Australian graduate labour market, using 
data on Australian university graduates from 1999 to 2009, with a focus on 
education-job mismatch and its consequences.  
 
In the empirical analyses, the incidence, determinants and labour market outcomes of 
education-job mismatch are explored. The research also examines the earnings 
impacts of education-job mismatch on segments of the Australian graduate labour 
market. Specifically, the gender, institutional and length of job tenure differences in 
education-job mismatch and earnings effects are explored. The research in these 
areas will be of help in providing information on issues such as the gender wage gap, 
and the deregulation of university fees. This thesis makes valuable contributions to 
the literature in at least two aspects. First, the increase in university education 
attainment in Australia has been fuelled by policy changes in the higher education 
sector in recent years. The findings of the thesis will, therefore, be timely in adding 
to the debate on these changes, at least from a labour market perspective. Second, the 
methodology used in the examination of education-job mismatch and graduate 
earnings has not been used in any other studies, as far as the author is aware.  
 
A substantial proportion of Australian graduates are found to be mismatched, in that 
they possess qualifications higher than that required for their jobs. This has been 
shown to lead to adverse earnings consequences, particularly for those with large 
extents of education-job mismatch. Policy implications arising from the findings of 
the analyses are provided, and directions for future research are given in the 
concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Issues and Trends in the Australian Graduate Sector 
1.1 Changes in the Australian Graduate Labour Market 
A number of changes have occurred in the composition of the higher education 
labour market in Australia since the 1970s. For instance, there are now many more 
Australians attaining a higher education qualification than in earlier decades. 
Statistics from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) show that only three percent 
of Australians aged 20-64 years held a higher education qualification in 1971 (ABS 
2004). Over 30 years, this increased five-fold, to 16 percent in 2001 (ABS 2008). In 
2006, 24 percent of Australians held a bachelor’s degree or above educational 
qualification (ABS 2008). The rate of growth for higher education does not show any 
signs of slowing; if anything, the statistics suggest that higher education 
qualifications are being obtained at an increasing rate. In terms of higher educational 
attainment, Australia ranks favourably compared to other developed countries. For 
instance, in 1999, 27 percent of Australians held a tertiary qualification, as compared 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) mean of 
22 percent. These trends are continuing, as indicated by more recent data from the 
OECD (2011). Specifically, the following are observed. First, around 45 percent of 
Australians aged 25 to 34 years old have attained tertiary levels of education 
compared to the OECD mean of around 38 percent.
1
 Second, this is much higher 
than the corresponding figure of 29 percent for older Australians in the 55 to 64 years 
old age group. This points to a rapid acceleration in the uptake of higher education 
within these three decades.
2
  
 
Apart from the sharp increase in higher educational attainment over the years, and 
the corresponding shift in educational attainment within the younger age groups, 
there have also been other shifts in the demographic attributes of the higher educated. 
For instance in 2004, Australian females were more likely to hold higher education 
qualifications than Australian males, with 17 percent of women holding a higher 
                                                 
1
 Tertiary education refers to post-school education, and includes university and vocational 
qualifications. 
2
 To be precise, the OECD (2011) figures look at individuals born from 1933 to 1975. 
 2 
 
education qualification, compared to 15 percent of men (ABS 2004).
3
 This is a 
reversal of the trend up to the 1970s, when the proportion of Australian men holding 
higher education qualifications was much higher than that of Australian women. 
Reasons that have been offered for the change in the gender proportion of higher 
education participation include demographic changes, increased labour market 
opportunities for women, and even increased divorce rates (Booth and Kee 2011). 
For example, with divorce rates on the rise, women need to invest more in their own 
education and training to ‘hedge’ against the unfavourable circumstance of divorce, 
so as to insure their own financial stability. These changes in the education and 
training decisions of Australian women are expected to impact greatly on the 
Australian labour market, and thus one of the aims of this thesis is to assess the 
impact of these changes on the labour market, and more specifically, among sub-
groups in the graduate labour market.   
 
1.2 The Expansion of Higher Education and Earnings 
The rapid increase in higher educational attainment brings forth another issue 
relating to the returns to higher education. There is widespread support for having a 
more educated population, as more education is associated with positive economic 
and social outcomes, and, in particular, with better labour force status. For example, 
in 2003, individuals aged 20-64 years with a higher qualification had an 
unemployment rate of three percent, compared with the higher six percent 
unemployment rate of those without. Additionally, 2001 data from the ABS showed 
that median earnings for the more educated group was almost 50 percent higher than 
the median earnings for the less educated group (ABS 2004). However, it is 
noteworthy that data from the Graduate Destination Surveys show a decline in 
earnings growth for holders of higher qualifications relative to average earnings for 
the entire labour market (ABS 2004). That is, the median annual salary of all workers 
has increased nearly three-fold from 1977 to 2003. In contrast, the median annual 
salary for university graduates, which was equivalent to average earnings in 1977, 
was only 82 percent of average earnings in 2003. These statistics point to a fact, 
albeit crudely, that is not readily obvious; while getting a degree is advantageous in 
terms of monetary pay-offs, the wage premium might be eroding over time, or might 
                                                 
3
 A higher education qualification is defined by the ABS as a qualification at the bachelor’s degree 
level or above. 
 3 
 
not be as high as expected. This has important implications for individuals in their 
consideration of further education.  
 
It is widely recognised that higher education is integral to economic growth, by 
increasing productivity and the supply of workers for highly skilled jobs. This is 
affirmed by the Australian Government’s commitment to the Australian higher 
education and research sectors in the form of its financial support of $5.4 billion over 
the next four years, with additional funding promised for the next ten years. The 
Australian Government has also set an ambitious target of having 40 percent of 
Australians aged 25-34 years attain a bachelor’s degree or above by the year 2025. 
Federal funding has also been committed to uncapping the number of government-
funded university places from 2012. These facts highlight the Australian 
Government’s recognition of the importance of education.  
 
However, it is unclear if such a highly educated workforce is required in Australia. 
As McGuinness (2006) puts it in the UK context, these sorts of governmental push 
towards more higher education “implicitly assume that there is some unmet demand 
for graduate labour or that employers hiring graduates will upgrade their production 
techniques in order to take advantage of a more educated workforce”.  This might put 
some graduates in a position where they are overeducated for their jobs, given that 
the supply of graduates has increased in the labour market while demand for 
graduates remains unchanged. Another study by Dolton and Silles (2008, pg. 125) 
argued, “Yet, as the average educational attainment of the workforce has increased, 
there is an indication that the occupational structure of the labour market does not 
have the capacity to absorb the increased number of educated workers into traditional 
graduate occupations”. These arguments suggest that the quick expansion of highly 
skilled workers, given the slower growth of demand for the same, might potentially 
impact unfavourably on the individual as well as the economy, at least in the short 
run. Moreover, the detrimental effects of education mismatch have the potential to 
persist even in the long run (Hartog 2000).  
 
 4 
 
1.3 Policy Implications 
There are policy implications for the issues raised above, particularly as they relate to 
education policy and funding. A paper by Coelli and Wilkins (2008), for example, 
highlights the differing views of the Australian political parties with regard to 
education and training. In particular, the current ruling Labor Government promised 
an ‘education revolution’ before they were elected into office in 2007. One of the 
rationales for their heavy support in increasing education and training is that these 
increase employment in Australia without fuelling inflation (Coelli and Wilkins 
2008). High inflationary pressures in 2008 were also often attributed to a chronic 
skills shortage by Treasurer Wayne Swan (Coelli and Wilkins 2008). Conversely, 
Opposition Member of Parliament Malcolm Turnbull acknowledges the existence of 
skills shortages in certain sectors, but rejects the idea that these skills shortages are 
prevalent in all sectors, and in all states and territories. In their study, Coelli and 
Wilkins (2008) found support for the view of the Labor Government, particularly, 
that a skills mismatch exists, but questioned if the current policy response of 
subsidising education and training is cost-effective. 
 
At the same time, a recent landmark change has occurred in the Australian university 
landscape. Prior to 2012, Commonwealth-supported undergraduate student places in 
Australian universities were capped and regulated by the federal government. This 
has now changed, with the introduction of the ‘demand-driven funding’ system 
(Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2012d). Under this 
system of ‘uncapped’ student places, the Commonwealth government guarantees 
funding to all undergraduate students who have secured a place in an Australian 
university, with the exception of students studying medicine. Student places are 
therefore constrained only by student demand and the capacity of the universities. 
This policy appears to have led to a surge in university enrolments, based on a news 
article from The Sydney Morning Herald (2012). Drawing on figures from the 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education, The 
Sydney Morning Herald (2012) reports enrolment increases of up to 14 percent for 
some Australian universities.  
 
 5 
 
1.4 Thesis Layout 
This thesis will therefore explore the central issue of overeducation in the Australian 
graduate labour market. Specifically, the study will focus on the incidence and 
earnings impact of overeducation amongst Australian university graduates. The 
analysis will also be centred on sub-groups of the graduate population, based on 
personal and institutional attributes. The thesis is organised in the following manner. 
Chapter 2 presents a general literature review of the studies on overeducation, with 
some references to the broader human capital theory literature. A data description is 
presented in the same chapter. Chapters 3 to 7 are the empirical studies in this thesis. 
These chapters are ‘stand-alone’ in the sense that they contain their own literature 
reviews and methodology sections. A description of these empirical chapters is as 
follows.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the determinants of overeducation status. This chapter offers a 
preliminary look at the incidence of overeducation, undereducation, and required 
education (ORU) amongst Australian university graduates, from 1999 to 2009. The 
incidence of ORU status analyses are also performed for sub-groups of the graduate 
population, such as gender and university groups. The latter part of this chapter 
examines the determinants of overeducation, utilising logit models.  
 
Chapters 4 to 7 look at the earnings impact of ORU. In Chapter 4, an examination of 
the ORU earnings effects for Australian university graduates is performed using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Specifically, a model suggested by Vahey 
(2000) is used. The analysis in this thesis is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, 
the first study to utilise such a specification.  
 
The gender differences in graduate earnings are explored in Chapter 5. This chapter 
looks at the gender wage gap amongst Australian university graduates, and whether 
ORU earnings impacts have widened, or narrowed the gap. The statistical analyses in 
this chapter also focus on two other gender-related issues of interest. First, the 
chapter looks at whether the ‘job search hypothesis’ proposed by Frank (1978) can 
be validated for the Australian graduate labour market. Second, gender differences in 
the occupational mobility of Australian graduates are explored. 
 
 6 
 
Chapter 6 explores the ORU earnings effects across groups of graduates with 
different amounts of work tenure. This analysis accommodates an interesting quirk in 
the dataset. That is, graduates who report having some work tenure have 
accumulated this work experience prior to the completion of their most recent 
qualification. The analysis of ORU earnings effects can therefore provide a unique 
perspective on how ORU impacts on the earnings of graduates with varying amounts 
of experience. For instance, it will be interesting to observe whether firm-specific 
experience is able to offset the earnings disadvantages of ORU.  
 
Chapter 7 shifts the focus from the differences in ORU earnings impacts for 
graduates with different personal characteristics to graduates with different 
institutional characteristics. This chapter thus examines the differences in ORU 
earnings impacts across university groups. This is done from the perspective of 
differences in quality across institutions.  
 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the empirical chapters in the thesis and concluding 
remarks. Some directions for future research are also provided.  
  
 7 
 
CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review and Data Description 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part will be devoted to a review of the 
literature. This literature review will briefly describe the link between education and 
earnings in section 2, and how the ORU literature fits into this broader literature. 
This is followed by a discussion of the methodology and theoretical framework in the 
ORU literature, in the same section. The second part of this chapter describes the 
data to be used in the empirical analyses in the thesis. Descriptive statistics are also 
presented and discussed.  These take place in section 3. Section 4 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Education and Earnings – What do We Know? 
There exists a large body of research in the human capital theory literature.
4
 An 
extensive part of this literature is dedicated to the documentation of the impact of 
education on an individual’s earnings. The early writers in this field recognised that 
acquiring education entails substantial costs, particularly when the indirect costs of 
education are taken into account. Thus, individuals were argued to only engage in 
further education to the extent that the appropriately discounted future income stream 
is increased by an amount on par or greater than the costs of education. In other 
words, the education decision was treated as an investment decision. This education 
decision could be undertaken at the individual or national levels. 
 
Studies in this area have been around for several decades. Friedman and Kuznets 
(1945), for example, were among the first to formalise human capital theory.
5
 
Subsequently, both empirical and theoretical developments of the topic have been 
made by other economists. In this regard, advancements by Gary Becker and Jacob 
Mincer (see, for example, Becker 1962, Mincer 1974) warrant a mention.  For 
example, Mincer contributed greatly to the research in this area, and is widely 
                                                 
4
 There are alternative theories and bodies of literature which link education to labour market 
earnings. These include the screening hypothesis (Arrow 1973), and job market signalling (Spence 
1973).  
5
 Polachek (2007) discusses some of the earliest roots of human capital theory. He argues that the 
notion dates as far back as the 1700s.  
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regarded as a groundbreaking pioneer in empirical labour economics.
6
 Significant 
contributions were made with his doctoral dissertation (Mincer 1958a), his seminal 
article (Mincer 1958b), and his book titled “Schooling, Experience and Earnings” 
(Mincer 1974), in which he formulated the Mincerian earnings function (alternatively 
known as the human capital earnings function), which is the dominant ‘workhorse’ 
of labour market analyses today.  
 
Empirically, the human capital earnings function has been proven to be sound. In 
Mincer (1974), more than 50 percent of the variation in earnings could be explained 
when schooling, experience and weeks worked were taken account of. Polachek 
(2007) notes that Mincer’s human capital earnings function has been applied “…in 
over 100 countries with the same resounding success…”, and has been used to 
establish a plethora of observations regarding the performance of individuals in the 
labour market. 
 
The empirical studies in the literature have shown strong links between education 
and earnings. Psacharopoulos (1981; 1985; 1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
(2004) provide a cross-country overview of studies, and report positive premiums to 
education. These premiums are high, and can be up to around 38 percent in the case 
of developing countries. Even OECD countries, which have the lowest returns to 
education, have reasonably high returns of at least 11 percent, which is higher than 
most alternative forms of investment. Education thus appears to be an attractive 
investment option, given its high rate of return.  
 
2.2.1 Education, Job Mismatch and Earnings 
In more recent times, however, a further development of, if not a challenge to, 
human capital theory is provided by the Overeducation, Required education and 
Undereducation (ORU) literature. This is distinguished from human capital theory by 
the attempts to introduce demand-side considerations into a model that is formulated 
with only supply-side perspectives in mind. In other words, the question this area of 
study seeks to address is: “How does educational mismatch affect the return to 
                                                 
6
 Jacob Mincer is often called the “father of modern labour economics” (see, for example, Grossbard 
2006), though he considers himself, if anything, ‘a’ father and not ‘the’ father of modern labour 
economics (pg. 19). 
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education?”. One of the earliest studies in this field was conducted by Freeman 
(1976), who found that the increased supply of college graduates was not met by a 
corresponding increase in demand in the US.
7
 Since the seminal study by Freeman 
(1976), the literature in this area has grown considerably, perhaps also due to the 
rapid expansion of higher education in the developed countries.  
 
These studies (Freeman 1975; 1976; 1977) observe the same outcome with regard to 
the earnings of these qualified individuals: the wage premium for college graduates 
over high school graduates has been eroding over time. For instance, Freeman (1977) 
observed that the starting salary of bachelor degree graduates decreased sharply in 
real terms. At the same time, the income of male college graduates relative to male 
high school graduates also fell.  
 
The expansion of higher education attainment carried on to the 1980s, and continued 
to be an area of great research interest. Duncan and Hoffman (1981) further 
developed and influenced the research into educational-job mismatch in the labour 
market, by changing the way overeducation is defined in Freeman’s (1975; 1976; 
1977) approach. Specifically, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) formally defined 
overeducation as the excess educational attainment beyond that required for the job 
an individual is in, whereas Freeman’s (1975; 1976; 1977) approach observed only 
the wage differential of college workers versus other graduates. The latter approach 
is inferior in that it fails to consider the match or mismatch of educational attainment 
and job requirements, which arguably would account for the differences in earnings 
under a human capital framework.  
 
2.2.2 Measurement Issues and Methodological Considerations  
The overeducation literature has generally used three approaches to define 
educational mismatch: i) job analysis; ii) worker self-assessment; and iii) realised 
matches. The job analysis and realised matches approaches rely on objective 
measures of overeducation, while the worker self-assessment uses the worker’s 
subjective assessment of educational (mis)match. Specifically, the job analysis 
                                                 
7
 Freeman (1977) notes that the supply of college graduates in the US changed considerably during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and college enrolments in 1970 had increased three-fold compared with 
1950. 
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approach requires the use of job dictionaries, whereby the level of education required 
to perform a job is analysed and defined by professional job analysts. This is then 
compared to the acquired level of education to determine if the individual is 
overeducated, undereducated or correctly matched. 
 
The worker self-assessment method relies on the individual worker to specify the 
education required for the job. As Hartog (2000) notes, this self-assessment may be 
direct or indirect. In the direct case, the worker is required to state the level of 
education required for the job, such as a ‘high school education’, or a ‘bachelor’s 
degree’. In the indirect case, the worker simply reports whether a higher or lower 
level of education is required relative to the actual attained level of education.   
 
The realised matches approach, also known as the ‘empirical’ approach, uses the 
mean or modal level of education within the data as the benchmark. For instance, 
where the mean level of education for nurses is observed to be a ‘bachelor’s degree’, 
a ‘bachelor’s degree’ will be used as the required level of education to be a nurse. 
Nurses who have a higher level of education will then be classified as overeducated, 
while those with lower levels of education will be considered undereducated. In 
cases where education is measured in years rather than levels, an arbitrary cut-off 
point, such as one standard deviation above or below the mean, is used.
8
 There are 
advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of each approach (see Hartog 
2000, pg. 132-133 for a discussion). Nevertheless, Hartog (2000) notes that the 
adoption of a certain approach is typically determined by data availability.
9
  
 
From an empirical viewpoint, the choice of approach has a small impact on the 
incidence of educational mismatch, while having no material influence on ORU 
earnings effects. McGuinness (2006), for instance, reviews a number of studies 
which assess the incidences of overeducation under different definitions (see, for 
instance, Battu, Belfield and Sloane 2000; McGoldrick and Robst 1996). Generally, 
it can be said that the realised matches approach generates lower incidences of 
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 As a result, the realised matches approach typically yields symmetrical incidences of overeducation 
and undereducation.  
9
 Hartog (2000) does argue that the job analysis method is conceptually superior. Due to the high costs 
involved in employing the job analysis approach, however, the worker self-assessment method may be 
the best practical measure.  
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overeducation compared to the other two approaches. This can be reasonably 
expected due to the requirement for mismatched workers to be one standard 
deviation away from the reference mean - there is thus, by definition, a two standard 
deviation ‘safety’ zone under which workers will not be considered mismatched to 
their jobs.  
 
In comparison, estimated ORU earnings effects are robust to the choice of approach. 
Groot and van den Brink (2000), for example, conducted a cross-country meta-
analysis of 25 studies, and reported no substantial difference in estimated earnings 
effects across the various definitions of education-job mismatch. Reviews of the 
literature by Hartog (2000) and McGuinness (2006) report consistent estimates of 
ORU earnings effects by various studies, across the various definitions employed.  
 
There are methodological differences in the estimation models used in analyses of 
ORU earnings effects. Generally speaking, these can be separated into two broad 
forms, and the methodological frameworks for both are discussed in McGuinness 
(2006).
10
 The first uses continuous measures of education, such as years of 
schooling. The years of surplus schooling is then distinguished from the years of 
education that are usual for the worker’s occupation, and both schooling concepts are 
entered into the estimating equation. This permits quantification of the returns to 
correctly matched and years of surplus education.  
 
The second form relies on dichotomous measures of education-job match or 
mismatches. For instance, Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) entered both the education 
level and education-job match status of the workers into the estimating equation as 
dummy variables. McGuinness and Bennett (2007) utilised a continuous measure of 
the years of schooling in their estimation model, while using dichotomous variables 
to represent the overeducated and undereducated. Vahey (2000) proposed the use of 
vectors of dichotomous variables to examine the earnings effect of vertical extents of 
education-job mismatch(es). The empirical findings yielded by each of these 
specifications are consistent. That is, returns to overeducation tend to be positive, but 
are less than the returns to matched or required levels of education.  
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 Note that where the analysis is focused on the graduate labour market, the concept of 
undereducation is of limited relevance.  
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Overeducation has vast implications on both the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
scales. On a microeconomic basis, overeducation is detrimental to firms in that 
overeducation has been found to lower productivity (McGuinness 2006). As a result 
of this lower productivity, overeducated employees may suffer wage losses, 
diminishing the returns to their education. Alternatively, individuals who are 
overeducated tend to report lower job satisfaction (for instance, see Battu, Belfield 
and Sloane 2000) or higher rates of turnover (for example, see Alba-Ramirez 1993). 
On a macroeconomic level, McGuinness (2006) suggests that tax revenues might be 
wasted on educating individuals if the level of education does not increase their 
productivity. This is particularly true for developed countries such as Germany and 
Australia which have substantial public funding of higher education. Overeducation, 
therefore, has far-reaching implications on many levels. As such, empirical research 
on overeducation would be useful in informing individuals making investments on 
their human capital, and to policy makers in the allocation of national resources.  
 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) suggest two different frameworks can be used to 
account for the decline in higher education returns. In the first scenario, the 
production techniques and demand for skilled labour is fixed, and does not change in 
response to changes in the educational attainment of the labour force. Therefore, as 
the number of better educated workers grows faster than the skill requirements of the 
jobs, a large number of workers becomes overeducated. As a consequence, some 
workers will be assigned to jobs below their educational level. At the same time, 
these overqualified workers do not secure a higher wage relative to those in the same 
job, but earn the same amount as those who are correctly matched by educational 
level. Under this situation of inelastic production techniques and fixed wages, skills 
mismatch has the potential to become a long-term problem.  
 
The alternative scenario allows for change in production techniques and skills 
requirements. As average educational attainment increases, firms adapt their 
production technique to take advantage of the highly skilled labour which is 
relatively abundant and also increasingly cheaper. As a result, workers do not work 
below their skill levels, and are appropriately matched to their jobs in terms of 
education level. This explanation treats overeducation as a short-run disequilibrium 
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which arises temporarily due to a lack of (or insufficiently fast) adjustment by firms 
and individuals. Both frameworks explain the rationale behind the declining returns 
to higher education, but are at odds in their interpretation of educational mismatch as 
a long- or short-run problem. Many empirical studies have analysed the ORU labour 
market outcomes in the context of the various theoretical frameworks (see Hartog 
2000 and McGuinness 2006 for a review of the literature). In McGuinness (2006), a 
description of human capital theory, the job competition model and assignment 
theory, as well as their consistency with regards to the labour market outcomes in 
empirical analyses of ORU, is given. McGuinness’s (2006) survey of the 
international literature found that, generally, the empirical evidence supports the 
assignment theory perspective of the labour market, though it is also conceded that 
other labour market interpretations, such as human capital theory, could very well 
remain relevant under certain conditions (see McGuinness 2006, pg. 410).  
 
2.3 Data Description 
The data for the analysis are drawn from the Graduate Destination Surveys (GDS) 
conducted by Graduate Careers Australia (GCA), for the years 1999 to 2009.
11
 The 
GDS is an annual census of Australian university graduates, conducted with the aim 
of identifying the main destinations of higher education students in Australia post-
graduation, and has been conducted annually by GCA since 1974.
12
 The target 
population of the GDS is graduates who have completed the requirements for a 
higher education award from an Australian institution. All students, including 
international students, are included in the survey. The graduates are sent a copy of 
the questionnaire about four months after they have completed the requirements for 
their course. Hence, two rounds of the survey are conducted every year, in April and 
October.  
 
The survey is a rich source of information regarding graduates who studied in 
Australia, as well as their outcomes in the labour market. In particular, the survey 
contains information about the individual graduate’s personal, employment and 
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 This survey has also come to be known as the Australian Graduate Survey, but will be referred to as 
the Graduate Destination Survey for the remainder of this thesis.  
12
 The term ‘graduate’ technically requires a formal recognition of course completion. For the purpose 
of this thesis, however, students who have fulfilled the requirements of their course (graduands) will 
be referred to as graduates.   
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schooling characteristics, all of which are important determinants of labour market 
outcomes. One shortcoming of the GDS data is that it contains little or no 
information on the graduates’ marital status, number of children and other 
socioeconomic indicators. As these are potentially strong predictors of an 
individual’s participation, attachment, and performance in the labour market, more 
priority could be given to procuring this information. Nevertheless, the GDS contains 
a wealth of other information which can be used for the analysis of the graduate 
labour market.  
 
2.3.1 Questionnaire and Collection Methods 
The questions asked in the survey have progressively grown over the years. In 1974, 
the survey comprised of around 25 individual questions. In 2009, the GDS had over 
50 questions, including the original 25. Each institution is responsible for the 
administering of the survey for their own graduates, although the survey format, 
standard recommended methodology and code of practice are provided by GCA. In 
the first instance, a copy of the GDS (together with the Course Experience 
Questionnaire) is mailed out to the graduates.
 13
 If the questionnaire is not returned to 
the institution within four weeks, an email reminder is sent. Subsequent methods of 
follow-up, such as telephone calls or further reminder emails can be made, at the 
discretion of the respective institution’s survey manager. The survey manager at each 
institution is responsible for the collection, coding and data entry of the survey on top 
of the administration, in accordance with the coding instructions from GCA. The 
dataset from each institution is then collected by GCA, who collates and analyses the 
data, before providing all institutions with a complete dataset. GCA produces two 
annual publications, namely, GradStats and GradFiles. These may be viewed on the 
GCA website (Graduate Careers Australia 2011).  
 
2.3.2 Code of Practice 
The use of the GDS data is governed by a Code of Practice set by GCA and the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee. The Code of Practice provides guidelines 
for the use and public disclosure of information from the GDS. In particular, 
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 This Course Experience Questionnaire collects information from undergraduates, primarily with 
regards to course satisfaction. Students who have completed a postgraduate course receive the 
Postgraduate Research Experience Questionnaire.  
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individual respondents may not be identified, and the data cannot be used to 
knowingly undermine the reputation and standing of institutions.
14
 Further, the Code 
of Practice stipulates that the GDS survey data should not be disclosed publicly 
where the response rate for that particular year is less than 50 percent, while also 
stating that a total response rate of 70 percent is desirable. However, this target rate 
of 70 percent has not been achieved for close to two decades. The response rate over 
this period was highest in 1999, at about 66 percent, and has remained at around 62 
percent since. These response rates are far above the 50 percent required for reliable 
analysis, as stated by the GDS Code of Practice. The response rates for the years 
1999 to 2009 are given in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: GDS Response Rates, 1999 to 2009 
 
 
In addition, the sample sizes for the respective years are relatively large. Figure 2.2 
sets out the number of observations in each sample year. The lowest number of 
recorded observations is in the year 2000, with just over 90,000 observations. The 
year with the highest number of observations is the year 2009, with 122,380 
observations. Post 2003, all years had well in excess of 100,000 observations. There 
is a total number of 1,178,840 observations over this period. The large sample size of 
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 Therefore, the main sets of statistical analyses in the thesis do not distinguish between graduates 
from individual institutions, but focuses on differences between ‘university groups’. The rationale for 
drawing distinctions between university groups is elaborated in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 7.  
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the GDS and the reasonable response rates thus provides assurance of quality in the 
dataset.  
 
Figure 2.2: Number of Observations in the GDS, 1999 - 2009 
 
 
Guthrie and Johnson (1997) assessed the reliability of the GDS data by analysing the 
methodology used in data collection, and comparing the GDS data with the 
corresponding population parameters published by the Department of Employment, 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs. They report that a high degree of consistency 
can be found for respondents and non-respondents for full-time workforce related 
figures. Thus, Guthrie and Johnson (1997) concluded that the GDS data is nationally 
representative of the graduate labour market in Australia.   
 
The sample used for analysis in subsequent chapters was restricted to graduates who 
were employed in Australia at the time of the survey. In addition, graduates who had 
missing values in variables of interest were excluded from the sample. Following 
these exclusions, a ‘purged’ sample of 569,325 observations remained.  
 
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
A description of the variables used in the statistical analyses in the following 
chapters is presented in Table 2.1. This table also presents the means and standard 
deviations of the variables.  
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As the graduates in the sample could be either employed on a full-time or part-time 
basis, the use of the hourly wage as the dependent variable in examining graduate 
earnings is appropriate. The mean hourly wage of the graduates, in natural 
logarithmic form, is 2.824.
15
 This represents, in real dollar terms, an hourly wage of 
around $16.85.  
 
The data contained information about the university where the graduates completed 
their qualification, and this information was used to categorise the graduates by 
university groups. Around 28 percent of the graduates were from the Group of Eight 
universities, while 19 and 13 percent were from the Australian Technological 
Network and Innovative Research University groups, respectively. The remaining 40 
percent were categorised as All Other universities. These proportions appear to be 
reasonably consistent with statistics from the Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations (2010).  
 
The descriptive statistics on the personal characteristics of the graduates are in line 
with expectations. The average age of the graduates was 29 years. Around 17 percent 
came from a non-English speaking background, and roughly five percent were not of 
Australian residency status. The only anomaly here appears to be the high proportion 
of females in the sample, at 61 percent. While this figure appears to be higher than 
expected, this can be attributed to two reasons. First, a study of non-respondents by 
Guthrie and Johnson (1997) found that females were more likely to respond to the 
GDS survey. Second, the proportion of females engaged in higher education has 
been increasing steadily over the years (ABS 2004). More recent figures from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics indicate that among individuals who obtain an 
Australian university degree, around 60 percent are females. This would be just 
slightly less than that indicated by the descriptive statistics of the GDS. Thus, the 
overrepresentation of females in the sample is unlikely to be a problem.  
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 The mean hourly wage was computed by deflating wage figures in the data by the Australian CPI 
from 1999 to 2009. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics and Description of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
  Log hourly wage = Hourly wage, in real terms, expressed in logarithmic 
format 2.824 0.616 
   University Group 
  Group of Eight = Go8 university 0.279 0.449 
ATN = ATN university 0.190 0.393 
IRU = IRU university 0.130 0.336 
Other = Other university (omitted category) 0.400 0.490 
   Personal Characteristics 
  Female = Female graduates  (omitted category = Male graduates) 0.611 0.488 
Age = Age, expressed in years 29.409 9.428 
Age squared = Age squared, expressed in years 953.792 673.722 
NESB = Non-English speaking background  (omitted category = English-
speaking backgound) 0.174 0.379 
Non-Australian = No Australian residency status  (omitted category = 
Australian residency status) 0.045 0.208 
   Study Characteristics 
  Double degree = Double degree qualification (omitted category = No 
double degree) 0.091 0.287 
Part-time study = Studied on a part-time basis (omitted category = Studied 
full-time) 0.353 0.478 
Further study = Engaged in further study (omitted category = No further 
study) 0.196 0.397 
   Broad field of study 
  Natural and Physical Sciences  0.062 0.241 
Information Technology  0.050 0.217 
Engineering  0.054 0.226 
Architecture and Building  0.021 0.142 
Agriculture and Environment  0.021 0.144 
Nursing  0.071 0.258 
Medicine  0.100 0.300 
Education  0.145 0.353 
Society and Culture  0.171 0.376 
Creative Arts and Others  0.063 0.242 
Management and Commerce (omitted category) 0.242 0.428 
   
Employment Characteristics 
  Self-employed = Self-employed (omitted category = Not self-employed) 0.039 0.193 
Private sector = Employed in private sector (omitted category = Public 
sector) 0.597 0.490 
Short-term employment = Short-term employment (omitted category = 
Long-term employment) 0.306 0.461 
Tenure = Job tenure, expressed in years 2.371 3.998 
Tenure squared = Job tenure squared, expressed in years 21.606 80.220 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics and Description of Explanatory Variables (cont.) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Industry of Employment 
  Accounting 0.034 0.180 
Wholesale and retail 0.078 0.268 
Accommodation 0.033 0.178 
Manufacturing 0.041 0.198 
Forestry and mining 0.011 0.105 
Legal services 0.024 0.153 
Government 0.092 0.289 
Education 0.145 0.352 
Higher education 0.063 0.243 
Health and community services 0.158 0.365 
Medicine and dentistry 0.040 0.196 
Construction 0.013 0.112 
Other services 0.077 0.267 
Transport and communication 0.031 0.173 
Engineering consulting 0.021 0.143 
Financial services (omitted category) 0.139 0.345 
   Year of Graduation 
  1999 = Graduated in 1999 (omitted category) 0.075 0.264 
2000 = Graduated in 2000 0.078 0.268 
2001 = Graduated in 2001 0.065 0.247 
2002 = Graduated in 2002 0.069 0.253 
2003 = Graduated in 2003 0.085 0.279 
2004 = Graduated in 2004 0.095 0.294 
2005 = Graduated in 2005 0.098 0.297 
2006 = Graduated in 2006 0.089 0.284 
2007 = Graduated in 2007 0.109 0.311 
2008 = Graduated in 2008 0.116 0.321 
2009 = Graduated in 2009 0.120 0.325 
Note: Values of means in some categories may not sum to unity due to rounding.  
 
The statistics for degree characteristics are reasonably representative of a graduate 
population. While a rather large proportion, of close to 35 percent of graduates, had 
undertaken their studies on a part-time basis, note that the sample consists of both 
undergraduates and postgraduates, and it would be expected that a number of 
postgraduates undertake their studies whilst engaging in employment. Restricting the 
sample to just undergraduates lowers the proportion of students engaged in studies 
on a part-time basis to just one-fifth of the sample. A minority, of nine percent, of the 
graduates were enrolled in a double-degree program, and one-fifth of the graduates 
reported being engaged in further studies at the time of the survey.  
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The sample was also categorised by field of study. Management and Commerce was 
the most popular field of study, with close to a quarter of all graduates having been 
enrolled in this field. Society and Culture, Education and Medicine also accounted 
for substantial proportions of the graduates, with ten to 17 percent of the graduates 
enrolled in each field. The remaining fields each accounted for small proportions of 
the sample. 
 
Statistics on employment characteristics were also in line with expectations. Close to 
60 percent of the sample were employed by the private sector, with the remainder 
employed in the public sector. The majority of the graduates were employed on 
permanent bases. The mean length of tenure an average graduate had was around 2.4 
years. There is a reasonable spread of graduates across the various industries of 
employment. A large number of graduates were employed in the Education, Health 
and Community Services, and Financial Services industries. These industries each 
accounted for about 15 percent of graduates. The Mining and Construction industries 
accounted for the lowest share of employment, at about one percent each. These 
proportions do not seem to depart from the norm. 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided a general description of the studies in the ORU literature. 
It has also provided a commentary on some of the methodological frameworks that 
are used in studies of ORU earnings effects. More in-depth literature reviews will be 
provided in each of the empirical chapters that follow.  
 
The data that will be used in the subsequent statistical analyses have also been 
discussed. In particular, background information and collection methods of the GDS 
have been discussed, and the descriptive statistics of the data sample have been 
presented.  
 
The following points can be made regarding the data. First, the response rates for 
each of the years indicate a reasonable level of response, and the data can be 
considered to be of a standard which makes it reliable for robust analyses. This is 
further supported by Guthrie and Johnson’s (1997) study of non-response, which 
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concluded that the GDS provides a reasonable indication of the graduate labour 
market. Second, the dataset comprises a large number of observations. This is 
valuable to the analyses to be conducted in subsequent chapters due to the 
methodology employed, which requires disaggregation of the sample into very 
detailed categories.
16
 Third, an examination of the descriptive statistics indicated that 
the traits and characteristics of the sample were consistent with those expected of a 
graduate population. The dataset can therefore be considered to be reliable for 
analysis.  
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 This is explained more comprehensively in Chapter 4 in the study of ORU earnings effects.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Which Graduates are more Susceptible to Overeducation? 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the incidence and determinants of ORU status in the 
Australian graduate labour market. The organisation of this chapter is as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants of ORU status. Section 3 looks at 
the incidence of ORU in the labour market, starting with an examination of the entire 
labour market. This will be followed by an examination of the incidences of ORU 
status for various disaggregated groups, such as gender and university (group) 
attended. The analysis will then turn to the use of logit models to uncover the 
likelihoods of educational-job mismatch that are attributable to various graduate 
characteristics. In particular, section 4 presents the methodology. Sections 5 and 6 
present the results for the binary and multinomial logit models, respectively. Section 
7 offers summary comments for the chapter.  
 
3.2 Literature Review on the Determinants of ORU 
Studies in the ORU literature which inform on the incidence of ORU tend to do so 
through the descriptive statistics of their respective data samples. Hartog (2000) 
provides a summary of the reported incidence of ORU in 14 such studies, while 
McGuinness (2006) tabulates the incidences reported in 33 studies (some of which 
are covered in Hartog 2000). As noted earlier in Chapter 2, the incidence of ORU 
varies across studies, and it is difficult to detect any pattern. However, McGuinness 
(2006) indicated that the realised matches approach yields lower incidences of 
education-job mismatch, compared to the job analysis and worker self-assessment 
approaches. Further, estimates tend to differ by country, with studies on the US 
labour market yielding the highest incidences of educational mismatch. While studies 
of the ORU earnings effects have a consensus on the trend and magnitude of 
estimated effect (see Chapter 2), it appears that the incidence of ORU could be 
dependent on the features of the labour markets in each country.   
 
A smaller number of studies explore the characteristics (or determinants) of 
educationally mismatched individuals through the use of probit or logit models. 
Fleming and Kler (2008), for instance, used a bivariate probit model to examine the 
 23 
 
characteristics of the overeducated in Australia, as well as the impact of 
overeducation on job satisfaction. They found that those who were working on a 
casual basis, were employed in a small sized firm, had union membership or who 
worked in the manufacturing industry, were more likely to be overeducated. 
Conversely, migrants from English-speaking backgrounds and who had been in 
Australia for a substantial period of time, as well as those from the public services 
industry, were less likely to be overeducated.  
 
Dolton and Silles (2001) also estimated a probit model of the determinants of 
overeducation, using data on university graduates from the UK. This study found that 
some degree characteristics were important determinants of overeducation. 
Specifically, graduates with a higher degree class or postgraduate qualifications were 
more likely to be correctly matched to their occupation. However, the inclusion of 
the level of educational attainment in the estimating equation, particularly where the 
realised matches approach is used to define ORU, has been questioned by Chiswick 
and Miller (2009). Chiswick and Miller (2009) argue that as the definition of 
educational mismatch is inherently dependent on the level of educational attainment, 
the inclusion of the latter introduces a link between the dependent and the 
explanatory variables “based on this measurement issue, rather than on outcomes of 
worker behaviour” (Chiswick and Miller 2009, pg. 166). Further, they noted that the 
actual years of education variables dominated the estimating equation when these 
were included, and had large estimated coefficients and ‘t’ statistics.  
 
The faculty of degree (and hence field of study) was also found to be important in 
determining education-job (mis)match (Dolton and Silles 2001). Graduates in arts 
and humanities, and languages, for example, were found to be more likely to be 
overeducated.
17
 Some employment characteristics were also found to be important 
determinants of overeducation. Dolton and Silles (2001) reported that those 
employed on a part-time basis were more likely to be overeducated compared to 
those employed full-time. Those in the occupation categories of professionals and 
associate professionals, or who worked in the education sector, were less likely to be 
                                                 
17
 Robst (2007b) reported that graduates from these fields of study were also more likely to be 
mismatched to their occupations, due to the more generic nature of the skills learnt in these majors.  
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overeducated. Gender, however, was found to be unimportant in determining 
whether an individual was overeducated or not.  
 
McGoldrick and Robst (1996) used a multinomial logit model in their US study, and 
estimated the likelihood of being overeducated for the three different definitions of 
‘required schooling’.18 Females were more likely to be overeducated when the job 
analysis approach was employed. The reverse was true when the realised matches 
approach was used. Kiker et al. (1997), however, reported that males were more 
likely to be overeducated and less likely to be undereducated. This difference in the 
probability of educational mismatch reflects the findings in the ORU literature which 
reports on the incidence of educational mismatch using descriptive statistics, where 
there is no consensus on whether members of any gender are more likely to be 
overeducated or undereducated. As mentioned above, this is likely to be specific to 
the labour market being studied, and could be a reflection of social norms and culture 
of the respective labour markets.  
 
McGoldrick and Robst (1996) also found that union membership results in a lower 
likelihood of overeducation, a finding that is at odds with that of Fleming and Kler 
(2008). Marital status was found to have no statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of being educationally mismatched for males in Mexico (Quinn and Rubb 
2006), and likewise, the number of children was not found to have any impact on the 
likelihood of education-job match (McGoldrick and Robst 1996). There is much 
more agreement on the role labour market experience plays in determining 
educational mismatch, as workers with less tenure and experience are typically found 
to be more likely to be overeducated (Chiswick and Miller 2009; Kiker et al. 1997; 
Quinn and Rubb 2006). Conversely, older workers are usually found to be more 
likely to be undereducated (Chiswick and Miller 2009).  
 
Miller and Ren (2012) studied the determinants of ORU in the Chinese labour 
market, and found that while the incidence of ORU is as prevalent in 2006 as it was 
in 1993, actual educational attainment played a much more important role in the 
determination of ORU in 2006. Worker characteristics, on the other hand, were 
                                                 
18
 These definitions, namely, the job analysis, self-assessment, and realised matches approaches, are 
described in Chapter 2. 
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found to exert less influence in determining the incidence of ORU by 2006. They 
argued that this was a likely result of the higher education expansion in China. 
However, in 2006, labour market experience was found to decrease the likelihood of 
being overeducated while having no effect on undereducation. Females were found 
to be more likely to be undereducated relative to being correctly matched, but did not 
differ statistically from males in the probability of being overeducated relative to 
being correctly matched. Workers who held rural registration were less (more) likely 
to be overeducated (undereducated), relative to being correctly matched.   
 
One study, by McGuinness (2003), analysed the way in which the quality of 
Northern Ireland universities, as proxied by research scores, impacted on the 
overeducation status of their graduates in their first and subsequent jobs two to four 
years later. This study established that while university quality lowered the 
probability of overeducation in their first jobs for graduates from higher quality 
institutions, the impact was much higher for students with third class or pass degrees, 
and the estimated effects were negligible for graduates with better degree classes. 
Another way of interpreting this finding is that obtaining a better degree class can be 
used to compensate for the lower quality of the university attended. However, 
university quality was reported to have no statistically significant impact in 
determining overeducation for the graduates in their subsequent job two to four years 
after graduation. 
 
An earlier US study by Robst (1995) reported findings at odds with McGuinness 
(2003). While college quality in the US was not found to be an important factor in 
the determination of undereducation, the three measures of college quality used in 
Robst (1995) were all associated with large reductions in the probability of 
overeducation.
19
 For instance, a ten percent increase in the average aptitude test 
scores was associated with a 2.4 percentage point decline in the probability of 
overeducation. A recent study on Swedish graduates by Berggren (2010) found that 
graduates from older and more well-established universities were more likely to be 
matched to their jobs in terms of education levels and field of specialisation. 
                                                 
19
 The three measures used by Robst (1995) were: i) average aptitude test scores (ACT or SAT) for 
graduates in the freshmen class of the college; ii) expenditure per student; and iii) a prestige ranking.  
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Therefore, there are mixed findings on the role university quality plays in 
determining overeducation status in the labour market.  
 
There are, thus, a number of determinants of ORU which have been identified in the 
literature. Some personal characteristics, such as migrant status and English-speaking 
background, have been found to increase the likelihood of being overeducated. Those 
who were employed on a part-time or casual basis are also more likely to be 
overeducated, as are those employed in small sized firms. The probability of 
educational mismatch also decreased as the time spent in the labour market increases. 
The level of educational attainment, occupation, industry of employment and field of 
study have also been found to influence educational mismatch. However, the first 
two groups of these characteristics will not be included in the empirical analysis of 
the present study, for the reasons outlined in Chiswick and Miller (2009). Finally, the 
limited number of studies which have examined the effects of university quality on 
overeducation have reported inconsistent impacts. Thus, the focus of the present 
analysis will contribute to the literature in this area.   
 
3.3 Incidence of Educational Mismatch, 1999-2009 
This section examines the incidences of mismatch in the Australian graduate labour 
market and the sub-markets within. Thus far, the literature has generally found that 
only 60 percent of workers are appropriately trained for their jobs, leaving around 40 
percent of workers either overeducated or undereducated. The a priori expectation of 
the study at hand is that a larger incidence of overeducation than has been generally 
reported in the literature will be found, as the present study concentrates on the 
highly educated segment of the labour market. This high incidence of educational 
mismatch is also expected to be reflected in a lower incidence of undereducation, for 
the same reason.  
 
It would be valuable to start off with a consideration of the ‘vertical’ extent of 
overeducation, that is, “How overqualified are graduates in their jobs?”. This is 
presented in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Proportion of Educational Mismatch Across Qualifications 
Note: Rows may not sum to unity due to rounding.  
 
In Table 3.1, the required level of qualifications for the graduates’ occupations are 
presented in the rows, while the actual attained level of qualifications are set out in 
the columns. In total, there are 98 occupation categories. These are detailed in 
Appendix A. The required level of qualifications to perform each occupation is 
derived from the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO), which 
is managed and updated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2011). The GDS data from 1999 to 2005 had been coded according to the 
ASCO classification, while the data from 2006 to 2009 were coded based on the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), 
also managed by the ABS. The data from 2006 to 2009 were then recoded into the 
ASCO classification, using the ANZSCO to ASCO correspondence table published 
by the ABS. The required level of qualifications, as identified in the ASCO 
publication, consists of five types: 1) certificate ii, 2) certificate iii, 3) certificate iv, 
4) diploma, and 5) bachelor’s pass degree. However, the three certificate categories 
have been collapsed into one ‘certificate’ category, as the number of observations in 
each separate required-attained category (such as those who attained a diploma and 
worked in a job that required a certificate ii) was too small. The classification of 
occupations, as well as the required level of education for each, are listed in 
Appendix B.
20
  
                                                 
20
 This is the ‘job analysis’ approach to defining ORU, as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 
2. Unless otherwise stated, this is the approach utilised throughout the rest of the thesis.  
  
Required Level  
 
 
  
 
Certificate Diploma 
Bach. 
Pass 
Row total  
Relative 
Frequency 
 Diploma 0.29 0.33 0.39 1.00 0.70 
A
tt
ai
n
ed
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
Q
u
al
if
ic
at
io
n
s Assoc. Deg. 0.23 0.48 0.29 1.00 0.62 
Bach. Pass 0.26 0.11 0.63 1.00 58.48 
Bach. Honours 0.21 0.11 0.67 1.00 7.13 
Grad. Cert. 0.10 0.10 0.80 1.00 5.74 
Grad. Dip. 0.10 0.07 0.82 1.00 9.94 
 Masters 0.13 0.08 0.79 1.00 14.71 
 
PhD 0.04 0.06 0.91 1.00 2.68 
 
Relative Frequency 20.67 10.57 68.76 - 100.00 
 
N     569,325 
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In Table 3.1, the number of graduates in each corresponding required and attained 
field are given, expressed as a proportion of all those with the same attained 
qualification. The relative frequency in the last column indicates the proportion of 
the total sample that each level of attained qualification takes up.  
 
Note that there are two ‘matched’ categories and two ‘undereducated categories’, 
while the remaining 20 categories are for the ‘overeducated’. The ‘matched’ 
categories are of those who have attained a diploma or a bachelor’s pass degree, and 
who are working in a job that requires the same. The ‘undereducated’ categories are 
of those who have attained a diploma or associate degree, and who are working in 
jobs that require a bachelor’s pass degree.  
 
Looking at the relative frequencies for the columns, it can be observed that about 21 
percent of graduates work in jobs that require only a certificate qualification, and 
about 11 percent of graduates are in jobs that require a diploma. The majority of the 
graduates were working in bachelor’s pass level occupations.  
 
A large proportion of diploma holders were working in a job that required a 
bachelor’s pass degree. However, there are substantial numbers of diploma graduates 
working in jobs that require certificates and diplomas, with close to one-third being 
in each of the three categories. Diploma holders are therefore rather well-spread 
across the categories of overeducated, correctly-matched and undereducated. 
Associate degree graduates, in comparison, are heavily concentrated in diploma level 
jobs, with close to half of them being overeducated in this category. About one-third 
of them are undereducated in bachelor’s pass level jobs, and the remaining quarter 
overeducated in certificate level jobs.  
 
A sizable majority, of 63 percent, of bachelor’s pass degree graduates are correctly 
matched. However, a substantial 37 percent are overeducated, with 11 percent in 
diploma level jobs and 26 percent in certificate level jobs. Bachelor’s honours 
graduates share a similar pattern, as there are 67 percent in bachelor’s level jobs, 11 
percent in diploma level and 21 percent in certificate level jobs. Graduate certificate 
and graduate diploma graduates exhibit similar patterns to each other. Both have 
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about ten percent working in certificate level jobs, and about 80 percent in bachelor’s 
pass degree jobs. The incidences of overeducation are very similar, therefore, 
between: i) bachelor’s pass and honours graduates, and ii) graduate certificate and 
graduate diploma holders.  
 
Masters graduates mostly find jobs that require a bachelor’s pass degree, as there are 
close to 80 percent in this category. Eight percent procure diploma level jobs, and 13 
percent are in employment that requires a certificate. Doctoral graduates fare slightly 
better, as 91 percent are in employment with a minimum qualification of a bachelor’s 
pass degree. Six percent of the doctorate graduates are in diploma level jobs, and 
four percent are in certificate level jobs.  
 
Having considered the ‘vertical’ extent of ORU, an examination of the trend in ORU 
over the years would add value. This can be observed in Figure 3.1.  Figure 3.1 
charts the proportion of educational match and mismatch in the Australia graduate 
labour market, over the time period 1999 to 2009. A number of points can be drawn 
from this diagram. First, the overeducated and the correctly matched make up the 
vast majority of the graduate labour market. The undereducated accounted for less 
than one percent, across all years of the sample, and hence have not been plotted in 
the diagram. The latter point accords with the expectation that the incidence of 
undereducation will be quite low in this sample. This is also consistent with Kler 
(2005), who finds no incidence of undereducation in the Australian graduate labour 
market, using both job analysis and realised matches methodologies.  
 
Second, as expected, the number of workers who are appropriately qualified for their 
occupations is lower than the 60 percent that has generally been reported in the 
literature. Across all years, the average incidence of job-education match stands at 
around 37 percent. On the flip side, the incidence of overeducation, at around 63 
percent across all years, is higher, as expected.  
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Figure 3.1: ORU  in the Australian Graduate Labour Market, 1999-2009 
 
 
Third, general trends can be observed. Overall, overeducation has risen over the 
reference time period. From 1999 to 2007, the general trend has been a gradual 
increase in overeducation, with the exception of a slight dip in 2005, and a modest 
decrease in 2002. In particular, the rate of increase in overeducation seems especially 
marked from 2007 to 2009, perhaps as a consequence of declining labour market 
demand due to the global financial crisis. Graduates could be more adversely 
affected if firms decide to put hiring on hold and utilise existing human capital, 
instead of riding out the financial crisis by making existing staff redundant (see, for 
example, Bloomberg 2008). As a result, fresh graduates could have downgraded their 
job expectations. In the absence of demand shocks such as the global financial crisis, 
the steadily increasing incidence of overeducation could likely be attributed to the 
rapid expansion of higher education, and, therefore, expansion of labour market 
supply. The upward trend of overeducation is mirrored by the decreasing proportions 
of appropriately trained workers.  
 
3.3.1 Incidence of Overeducation by Gender 
Educational mismatch in the form of overeducation is highly prevalent in the 
graduate labour market. This can be further examined in terms of gender. The 
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differences by gender in education-occupation match and mismatch can be observed 
from Figure 3.2, which charts the proportion of workers who are appropriately 
trained for their professions, across the reference time period. Two items are 
apparent from this figure. First, females are more appropriately trained in all years, 
compared to males. Second, the degree of education-job match appears to be 
gradually decreasing for both males and females. It can thus be concluded that the 
growth of educational mismatch affects both sexes. Across all years, an average of 
34 percent of males are appropriately trained for their jobs, while the corresponding 
figure for females is 38 percent. There are, therefore, some gender differences in the 
incidence of overeducation, and further analysis of the ORU earnings effects by 
gender is warranted.  
 
Figure 3.2: Proportion of Appropriately Trained Workers by Gender, 1999-2009 
 
 
3.3.2 Incidence of Overeducation by University Grouping 
Another interesting question pertaining to overeducation lies in the differences by 
university grouping. An analysis on university groups is of interest for the following 
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reasons. Universities and university groups typically market themselves to 
prospective students on the basis of positive labour market outcomes.
21
 A cursory 
search on the World Wide Web on the websites of some Australian universities, for 
example, found frequent references to the salaries and employment rates of their 
graduates, which are potentially misleading, as these figures do not account for 
education-job mismatch, and the adverse earnings effects that accompany this 
mismatch. Other common references on university websites include statements on 
university rankings, accreditations or alumni endorsements. The Go8 universities, 
which are also typically perceived as being the most prestigious universities in 
Australia, for example, state that they are “consistently the first choice of the 
majority of highest qualified Australian school leavers” (Group of Eight 2011b). At 
the same time, it is also on the basis of ‘product differentiation’ that the Group of 
Eight universities are making their case for deregulation of student university fees 
(The Australian 2010c).
22
 
 
Some Australian universities have also grouped themselves into various alliances or 
consortiums, each with their own focuses and differences.
23
 Thus, given the large 
amount of federal funding into the higher education sector, an examination of the 
incidence and effects of overeducation for each institution group will be beneficial. 
The proportions of appropriately trained graduates, disaggregated by institution type, 
are presented in Figure 3.3. The university groups examined in the analysis are the 
Group of Eight (Go8), the Australian Technological Network (ATN), the Innovative 
Research Universities (IRU) and all other universities (Other).  
 
A cursory examination of Figure 3.3 reveals some interesting facts about the 
incidence of overeducation amongst the different university groups. The Go8 appear 
to perform the worst in this regard, having the lowest proportions of appropriately 
matched graduates in each year. On average, only 33 percent of Go8 graduates are 
correctly matched to their jobs. Naturally, this may simply be a reflection of the 
composition of the graduates. Specifically, the Go8 are the most research intensive 
                                                 
21
 The analyses are not disaggregated to individual institutions for two reasons. First, larger numbers 
are desirable, due to the more detailed specification of the ORU dummy variables used in many of the 
analyses in this thesis. Second, the GDS Code of Practice stipulates that individual institutions cannot 
be named in the analysis of the data.  
22
 At present, university fees in Australia are strictly regulated and apply to all universities.  
23
 A more detailed description of differences across university consortiums is presented in Chapter 7.  
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universities in Australia, and also account for a larger proportion of doctoral 
graduates, who by definition are overeducated. This is covered in the next sub-
section.  
 
Figure 3.3: Proportion of Appropriately Trained Workers by Institution Groups, 
1999-2009 
 
 
The ATN had the highest proportion of appropriately qualified graduates, across all 
years, and often outperformed other university groups by a large margin. Across all 
years, 45 to 50 percent of ATN graduates have the right amount of training for their 
work. When compared to the worst performing Go8 universities, the ATN 
universities had between seven to 18 percent more graduates who were correctly 
matched to their jobs.  
 
The IRU and Other universities have proportions that fall between the two groups 
mentioned above, with the IRU universities having a marginally higher proportion of 
correctly matched graduates. Both groups here have average proportions of matched 
graduates, at around 37 percent.  
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3.3.3 A Closer Examination - Bachelor’s Degree Graduates 
To accommodate the reservation expressed above relating to the graduate 
composition of the university groups, the Figure 3.3 analyses were repeated with the 
sample restricted to bachelor’s degree graduates. This change in focus improved the 
educational match for the Go8 universities, who were found to have, on average, 
about half of graduates who are appropriately trained for their work. However, this 
improvement was not confined to the Go8 universities. When the sample was 
restricted to bachelor’s degree graduates, the ATN university group had about two-
thirds of correctly matched graduates. Similarly, the proportion of appropriately 
qualified graduates rose to 53 and 56 percent for the IRU and Other university 
groups, respectively. In this regard, the ATN graduates seem to do well, whereas the 
performance of the other university groups seem to be similar.  
 
This section has examined the incidence of educational mismatch over 1999 to 2009. 
Overeducation has been found to gradually increase over the reference time period, 
and has increased at a faster rate over 2007 to 2009. The examination of samples 
disaggregated by gender and by university grouping has further uncovered 
differences within each of these sub-groups. Females were found to be more 
overeducated than males, and the current trend indicates a widening of this difference 
in educational mismatch. Amongst the various university groups, the ATN graduates 
were found to be the most appropriately qualified for their work. Go8 graduates were 
the least matched to their occupations.  
 
The descriptive analysis on the incidence of education-occupation match and 
mismatch in the Australian labour market has thus uncovered large incidences of 
overeducation. Thus, a more in-depth analysis into the characteristics of 
overeducated workers will be conducted in the next section. Specifically, logit 
models will be used to identify the characteristics of graduates which influence their 
education-occupation match or mismatch status. This analysis commences with a 
binary logit model. Subsequently, a multinomial logit model will be used to examine 
how graduate characteristics affect the vertical extent of overeducation.  
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3.4 Logit Models 
The empirical analysis of this section will start off with a binary logit model that 
estimates the determinants of overeducation. This can be expressed as:  
 
(3-1)     
        , i = 1,…,n 
 
where     
  is a latent index representing the propensity of the individual i to be 
overeducated,     denotes the set of characteristics hypothesised to have impacts on 
the propensity to be overeducated, and   is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
    
  is not observed, but rather a binary indicator variable      is measured, 
where: 
 
(3-2)                
    
               
   . 
 
The determinants of ORU are then estimated using the binary logit model: 
 
(3-3)(        |  )  
    
      
 . 
 
Note that in the current analysis, the undereducated will be excluded. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the concept of undereducation is of limited relevance in analyses of the 
graduate labour market. This is supported by the descriptive analyses above, which 
found very low incidences of undereducation for the Australian graduate population 
in this study, and its various sub-groups.  
 
Further, in order to arrive at more detailed conclusions regarding the determinants of 
the vertical extent of overeducation, a multinomial logit model is estimated. This 
model can be written as: 
 
(3-3)        |   
     
∑          
, i = 1,…,n; k = 0,…,6 
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where         denotes the probability that worker i is in the kth educational 
mismatch category, with k = 0 denoting the correctly matched, k = 1 denoting one 
level of educational attainment over the required level, and k = 2 denoting two levels 
of educational attainment over the required level, and so on. 
 
The values of k are determined by using ‘levels’ assigned to each qualification by the 
Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF), which is the national policy for 
regulating qualifications in Australian institutions of education and training (AQF 
2011). The AQF assigns each qualification a ‘level’ based on the complexity, depth 
of achievement, and autonomy required of graduates to demonstrate the 
achievement. The AQF levels for the qualifications of interest are presented in panel 
(iv) of Table 3.2, together with the calculated k values for the extent of overeducation 
in panels (i) to (iii). For example, doctoral graduates working in a diploma level job 
would be considered to be in the k = 5 category. This is calculated by using the AQF 
level of 10 for doctoral qualifications, and subtracting the corresponding AQF level 
of 5 for diplomas, thus yielding five levels of educational attainment over the 
required level (k = 5).  
 
Table 3.2: Extent of Overeducation and Australian Qualifications Framework Levels 
 
Required Levels  
Actual Educational Level 
Certificate 
(i) 
Diploma 
(ii) 
Bachelor's Pass 
(iii) 
AQF Level 
(iv) 
Certificate (a) (a) (a) 4 
Diploma 1 0 (a) 5 
Associate Degree 2 1 (a) 6 
Bachelor's Pass 3 2 0 7 
Bachelor's Honours 4 3 1 8 
Graduate Diploma 4 3 1 8 
Graduate Certificate 4 3 1 8 
Masters 5 4 2 9 
PhD 6 5 3 10 
AQF Level 4 5 7  
Notes: (a) denotes not applicable. k values are given in panels (i), (ii) and (iii), while AQF levels are 
presented in panel (iv). 
 
3.5 Results of the Binary Logit Model 
The results of the estimation of the binary logistic regression model, as expressed in 
equation (3-1), are presented in Table 3.3. This table lists both the log of the odds 
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ratio and the marginal effects of being overeducated relative to being correctly 
matched. Specifically, the log odds ratios are obtained from: 
 
(3-4)    [
  
  
]
̂
  ̂   
 
where O denotes the overeducated, and C denotes the correctly matched.  
 
All of the estimated log odds ratios in Table 3.3 are statistically significant, except 
for two of the year variables (2000 and 2001) and two of the variables for industry of 
employment (government and construction). This indicates that apart from the level 
of higher educational attainment and occupation, which are used to formulate the 
dependent variable, overeducation is determined by a number of other factors 
relating to the graduates’ themselves, or to their choices in the labour market. 
Females, for example, are slightly more likely to be overeducated in comparison to 
their male peers. This is different from the finding in the earlier section looking at the 
incidence of overeducation by gender, where the summary statistics for the data 
sample suggested that females were more appropriately trained. Hence, the finding 
here implies that, after taking account of other factors, such as field of study, females 
are more likely to be educationally mismatched. However, the marginal effect in 
panel (ii) on females has a very small value, of less than one percentage point. 
Therefore, while the log odds ratio indicates that females are more likely to be 
overeducated rather than appropriately trained, the increased probability is 
negligible.  
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Table 3.3: Estimates from the Logit Model of the Determinants of Overeducation 
Variable Log Odds Marginal Effect 
Constant -2.662*** (a) 
 (57.500) (a) 
Female 0.046*** 0.008*** 
 (6.484) (6.486) 
Age  0.141*** 0.025*** 
 (53.922) (54.462) 
Age squared/100 -0.145*** -0.026*** 
 (39.992) (40.218) 
Tenure 0.152*** 0.027*** 
 (63.960) (65.040) 
Tenure squared/100 -0.499*** -0.090*** 
 (44.187) (44.529) 
NESB 0.181*** 0.033*** 
 (20.257) (20.282) 
Non-Australian 0.706*** 0.127*** 
 (38.814) (38.971) 
Double degree -0.616*** -0.111*** 
 (56.424) (57.030) 
Go8 0.430*** 0.077*** 
 (52.409) (52.755) 
ATN -0.241*** -0.043*** 
 (27.876) (27.956) 
IRU 0.262*** 0.047*** 
 (25.869) (25.918) 
Natural and Physical Science 0.446*** 0.080*** 
 (27.553) (27.628) 
Information Technology -0.571*** -0.103*** 
 (37.249) (37.449) 
Engineering -0.397*** -0.071*** 
 (25.096) (25.161) 
Architecture -0.504*** -0.091*** 
 (22.593) (22.640) 
Agriculture and Environment 0.130*** 0.023*** 
 (5.262) (5.263) 
Nursing -1.270*** -0.228*** 
 (76.698) (77.993) 
Medicine -0.542*** -0.097*** 
 (39.018) (39.229) 
Education -0.240*** -0.043*** 
 (16.165) (16.182) 
Society and Culture 0.259*** 0.047*** 
 (21.717) (21.769) 
Creative Arts and Others -0.035** -0.006** 
 (2.373) (2.374) 
Self-employed -0.242*** -0.044*** 
 (13.615) (13.620) 
Private Sector 0.136*** 0.024*** 
 (16.526) (16.543) 
Short-term employment 0.256*** 0.046*** 
 (35.412) (35.511) 
Further study 0.183*** 0.033*** 
 (21.446) (21.469) 
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Table 3.3: Estimates from the Logit Model of the Determinants of Overeducation 
(cont.) 
Variable Log Odds Marginal Effect 
Part-time study 0.532*** 0.096*** 
 (61.554)) (62.424) 
Accounting -1.926*** -0.346*** 
 (96.391) (99.413) 
Retail and Wholesale 1.154*** 0.207*** 
 (66.783) (67.528) 
Accommodation 2.096*** 0.377*** 
 (61.403) (61.902) 
Manufacturing -0.170*** -0.031*** 
 (9.731) (9.734) 
Mining  -0.369*** -0.066*** 
 (12.414) (12.421) 
Legal services -0.169*** -0.030*** 
 (7.527) (7.528) 
Government 0.012 0.002 
 (0.808) (0.808) 
Education -0.694*** -0.125*** 
 (44.963) (45.276) 
Higher education 0.366*** 0.066*** 
 (20.298) (20.326) 
Health and Community services -0.480*** -0.086*** 
 (33.342) (33.470) 
Medicine and Dentistry -0.127*** -0.023*** 
 (6.855) (6.857) 
Construction 0.039 0.007 
 (1.362) (1.362) 
Other services 0.109*** 0.020*** 
 (7.363) (7.365) 
Transport and Communications 0.097*** 0.017*** 
 (4.930) (4.931) 
Engineering and Consulting -0.344*** -0.062*** 
 (15.167) (15.180) 
2000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
2001 0.008 0.001 
 (0.485) (0.485) 
2002 -0.073*** -0.013*** 
 (4.349) (4.349) 
2003 -0.035** -0.006** 
 (2.183) (2.183) 
2004 0.028* 0.005* 
 (1.798) (1.798) 
2005 0.043*** 0.008*** 
 (2.773) (2.773) 
2006 0.121*** 0.022*** 
 (7.688) (7.688) 
2007 0.037** 0.007** 
 (2.467) (2.467) 
2008 0.117*** 0.021*** 
 (7.777) (7.777) 
2009 0.208*** 0.037*** 
 (13.798) (13.800) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.188 
Observations  566,758 
Notes: Absolute values of robust ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. (a) denotes ‘not applicable’.  
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The estimates on the proxies for labour market experience, age and tenure, indicate 
that the odds of being overeducated, compared to being correctly matched, increase 
at a decreasing rate with increasing levels of labour market experience. These results 
differ from the typical finding in the literature that the incidence of educational 
mismatch falls as an individual accumulates labour market experience (see, for 
example, Chiswick and Miller 2009). The finding in the current analysis might be an 
indication that mature-aged graduates are not as successful as their younger peers, 
and are seen by the labour market as having some negative, but unobservable, 
characteristic. However, the observed higher log odds of being overeducated as 
labour market experience increases could also be due to our focus on recent 
graduates. Most of the younger graduates would hold a bachelor’s pass or honours 
degree, while a larger proportion of the older graduates would have obtained a 
postgraduate qualification, and hence be overeducated by definition as age increases. 
This can be tested by estimating equation (3-1) on a sample restricted to bachelor’s 
degree graduates in the following section.  
 
In the case of tenure, the graduates with positive tenure would have entered their jobs 
on the basis of any previous qualifications, and have now obtained a higher 
qualification. Thus, it is more likely than not that the most recent qualification would 
place them in the overeducated category, even if they were correctly matched 
previously. However, the estimates on tenure and its squared term indicate that the 
higher log odds associated with increasing tenure is positive up to 15 years of 
accumulated tenure. This points to an extremely inflexible labour market, where even 
workers who have been with their employers for long periods of time do not get 
moved into jobs more appropriate for their level of education.  
 
Graduates who did not have Australian residency status or citizenship have higher 
log odds of being overeducated relative to being correctly matched, as do those from 
a non-English speaking background.
24
 The latter finding is consistent with that in 
Fleming and Kler (2008), although they also found that migrants who have been in 
the country for a substantial period of time were more likely to be appropriately 
                                                 
24
 Australia has strict policies relating to the employment of foreign workers. Graduates who are not 
of Australian residency status are likely to be those who have just completed their degrees and are in 
the midst of their residency application. 
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matched to their jobs. The current analysis does not control for the year of arrival in 
Australia, as information on this is not available from 1999 to 2005, and was also not 
reported by about half of the non-Australian respondents from 2006 to 2009. It is 
easy, however, to envisage that educational match is one channel through which 
immigrant labour market adjustment takes place. The marginal impacts on the 
incidence of overeducation for the two abovementioned groups, however, are rather 
substantial. Thus, a graduate who is from a non-English speaking background, and 
does not possess Australian residency status, has a cumulative 16 percentage points 
higher probability of being overeducated, compared to an Australian and English 
speaking peer. 
 
Graduates with a double degree qualification have lower log odds of being 
overqualified for their jobs relative to being correctly matched, compared to 
graduates from a single degree program. That is, a double degree affords graduates 
some protection against being overeducated, by 11 percentage points. This indicates 
that the double degree program can be a good investment choice to insure against 
being overeducated in the labour market. Being self-employed decreases the 
likelihood of being overeducated, while working in the private sector brings the 
opposite effect of increasing the likelihood of overeducation. The latter finding is 
similar to that found in Fleming and Kler (2008), who reported that those in the 
public services industry were less likely to be overeducated relative to those in the 
private services industry. The marginal impacts for the latter two groups are modest.  
 
The field of study also plays an important role in determining the educational match 
status. There are a total of eleven fields of study defined for the analysis, with the 
field of Management and Commerce being the reference category. Relative to the 
base category, graduates in three fields of study are estimated to have higher log odds 
of being overeducated compared to being correctly matched, while those in the 
remaining eight are estimated to have lower log odds. Specifically, graduates who 
majored in the Natural and Physical Sciences, Agriculture and Environment, and 
Society and Culture studies are more likely to be overeducated relative to the 
benchmark group. This is consistent with the findings of Dolton and Silles (2001), 
who find that graduates majoring in languages or the arts were more likely to be 
overeducated. However, it is interesting to note that amongst these fields of study 
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which are associated with higher log odds of being overeducated, the graduates who 
majored in the Natural and Physical Sciences are estimated to have the strongest 
marginal effect, whereas the majors in languages and arts, most of which would be 
captured in the field of Society and Culture, have a relatively low estimated marginal 
effect.  
 
Graduates in the remaining seven fields of study have lower log odds of being 
overeducated in comparison to being correctly matched. However, one field of study 
that stands out is the field of Nursing, which has a very large, and negative estimated 
marginal impact, of almost 23 percentage points. This might be attributed to the high 
degree to specialisation in this field, which requires a bachelor’s pass degree as the 
minimum requirement for entry and accreditation (Australian Nursing and Midwifery 
Council 2009). At the same time, Nursing graduates are in high demand, and will 
therefore be able to secure employment in the health workforce with considerable 
ease.  
 
The empirical findings pertaining to the probability of overeducation for the 
respective fields of study are of importance due to their policy relevance. In 
Australia, a substantial amount of higher education funding is allocated through the 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). In particular, university fees are 
subsidised, and the amount of funding allocated varies according to the course of 
study undertaken (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
2011a). Courses such as law, accounting, economics and commerce, for example, are 
allocated a total of $1,793 by the Commonwealth for each Equivalent Full-Time 
Student Load. Other courses, such as nursing, attract a higher subsidy of $12,093 per 
Equivalent Full-Time Student Load due in part to the expected lower earnings for 
graduates (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2011b). 
In 2011, additional subsidies were allocated to the fields of mathematics, statistics, 
and science. These three fields form the Natural and Physical Sciences category in 
the empirical analysis, which was the field of study where graduates had the highest 
likelihood of being overeducated. Thus, as the probability of overeducation reflects, 
at least in part, the labour market demand in each field of study, the higher subsidies 
to these courses do not appear to be efficient. On a related note, agriculture is 
amongst the courses which attract the highest Commonwealth funding, at $19,542 
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per Equivalent Full-Time Student Load. At the same time, the marginal effect 
estimated for the Agriculture and Environment graduates indicates that they are more 
likely to be overeducated, albeit to a lesser extent compared to the Natural and 
Physical Sciences. The estimated likelihoods of overeducation could guide policy 
makers in the allocation of funding to university students.   
 
The estimated coefficients for industry of employment are all statistically significant 
at the one percent level, except for the government and construction industries, 
which do not differ statistically from the benchmark category of financial services. A 
striking feature of the estimated coefficients for the industries of employment lies in 
the size of the estimates for industries such as accounting, retail and wholesale and 
accommodation and hospitality. Graduates working in the accounting industry have 
much lower log odds of being overeducated, compared to being correctly matched. 
Specifically, graduates employed in the accounting industry are associated with a 35 
percentage points decrease in probability of being overeducated, relative to their 
counterparts in the financial services industry. The reverse holds true for graduates 
working in the retail and wholesale, or accommodation and hospitality industries, as 
they are more likely to be overeducated, by 21 and 38 percentage points, relative to 
the reference group. The industries where graduates have lower log odds of being 
overeducated appear to be those which are profession-based, whereas graduates 
employed in more general-type industries are associated with higher log odds of 
being overeducated. Therefore, the logit regression was estimated on a restricted 
sample of the Society and Culture graduates, whose field of study would not be 
expected to lead to employment in any particular industry, except for the legal 
industry. The results of the logit estimates for Society and Culture graduates are 
presented in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4: Estimates from the Logit Model, Society and Culture Graduates 
Variables Log Odds Marginal Effect 
Constant 0.365*** (a) 
 (3.342) (a) 
Female 0.006 0.001 
 (0.322) (0.322) 
Age  0.013** 0.002** 
 (2.242) (2.242) 
Age squared/100 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.532) (1.532) 
Tenure 0.089*** 0.015*** 
 (17.680) (17.778) 
Tenure squared/100 -0.003*** -0.000*** 
 (12.292) (12.324) 
NESB 0.073*** 0.012*** 
 (2.882) (2.882) 
Non-Australian 0.476*** 0.081*** 
 (5.669) (5.672) 
Double degree -0.910*** -0.154*** 
 (40.069) (41.340) 
Go8 0.172*** 0.029*** 
 (8.940) (8.945) 
ATN -0.267*** -0.045*** 
 (11.289) (11.318) 
IRU -0.040 -0.007 
 (1.604) (1.604) 
Accounting -0.773*** -0.131*** 
 (12.796) (12.840) 
Retail and Wholesale 1.839*** 0.311*** 
 (31.626) (31.852) 
Accommodation 2.337*** 0.395*** 
 (22.496) (22.559) 
Manufacturing -0.345*** -0.058*** 
 (6.274) (6.279) 
Mining  -0.442*** -0.075*** 
 (3.372) (3.373) 
Legal services -0.129*** -0.022*** 
 (4.011) (4.012) 
Government 0.074** 0.012** 
 (2.140) (2.141) 
Education -0.434*** -0.074*** 
 (12.136) (12.175) 
Higher education 0.576*** 0.098*** 
 (12.964) (12.999) 
Health and Community 
services 
-0.407*** -0.069*** 
 (13.442) (13.484) 
Medicine and Dentistry 0.081 0.014 
 (1.478) (1.478) 
Construction 0.271** 0.046** 
 (2.230) (2.230) 
Other services -0.020 -0.003 
 (0.585) (0.585) 
Transport and Communications 0.140** 0.024** 
 (2.417) (2.417) 
Engineering and Consulting 0.008 0.001 
 (0.066) (0.066) 
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Table 3.4: Estimates from the Logit Model, Society and Culture Graduates (cont.) 
Variables Log Odds Marginal Effect 
Part-time study 0.259*** 0.044*** 
 (12.963) (13.009) 
Further study 0.113*** 0.019*** 
 (6.018) (6.025) 
Self-employed -0.128*** -0.022*** 
 (3.022) (3.021) 
Private Sector 0.066*** 0.011*** 
 (3.176) (3.177) 
Short-term employment 0.267*** 0.045*** 
 (14.303) (14.344) 
2000 0.022 0.004 
 (0.590) (0.590) 
2001 -0.094** -0.016** 
 (2.451) (2.451) 
2002 -0.056 -0.009 
 (1.454) (1.454) 
2003 0.001 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
2004 0.124*** 0.021*** 
 (3.336) (3.336) 
2005 0.281*** 0.048*** 
 (7.513) (7.518) 
2006 0.189*** 0.032*** 
 (4.969) (4.970) 
2007 0.212*** 0.036*** 
 (5.827) (5.828) 
2008 0.242*** 0.041*** 
 (6.698) (6.701) 
2009 0.332*** 0.056*** 
 (9.118) (9.127) 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.0930 
Observations  96,936 
Notes: Absolute values of robust ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** and *** indicate 
significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. (a) denotes ‘not applicable’. 
 
The estimates listed in Table 3.4 are qualitatively similar to their corresponding 
estimates in Table 3.3, including those on the industry of employment. The estimated 
log odds ratios and marginal effects for the industries of employment were largely 
significant, with the exception of medicine and dentistry, other services and 
engineering consulting. These suggest that the industry of employment is an 
important determinant of overeducation in the labour market. Regardless of the field 
of study undertaken while in university, entering a ‘professional’ industry is 
associated with large and negative effects on the chances of being overeducated. The 
reverse is true for employment in industries which require generic skills, such as 
retail and wholesale or accommodation, as graduates employed in these industries 
have large and positive impacts on the probability of being overeducated. These 
reinforce the findings in Table 3.3. 
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Moving back to a discussion of the full sample in Table 3.3, the estimates on the 
years of graduation indicate that, relative to the reference category of graduates from 
1999, graduates from 2002 to 2009 have higher likelihoods of being overeducated, 
relative to being correctly matched. These estimates suggest that the increase in 
labour market demand for graduates is not keeping up with the greater supply of 
graduates generated by the relatively recent higher education expansion in Australia. 
However, the estimated marginal impacts were very small, reaching a high of only 
3.7 percentage points for graduates in the year 2009. The small estimated impacts are 
to be expected, since labour market demand and supply shifts are expected to adjust 
gradually. It would be useful to know though, whether the probability of 
overeducation across years is related to other trends in the labour market, such as 
unemployment rates. It would have been expected that as the unemployment rate 
increases, the probability of overeducation would increase in tandem due to the 
former being a sign of a tightening labour market. Graduates would therefore have to 
accept a job that might not be commensurate with their qualifications, as the climate 
in the labour market does not afford choice.  
 
Figure 3.4 charts the estimated impacts on years from 1999 to 2009, together with 
the unemployment rates for the graduates, taken from the GDS. The shapes of the 
curves do not seem to move together, although there are indications of a weak 
inverse relationship from 1999 to 2006. The pattern identified between 
unemployment rates and the probabilities of overeducation is rather strenuous, 
however, and there does not seem to be any influence from the unemployment rate 
onto the likelihood of overeducation, on the whole.
25
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The data for those who went overseas for work, and those who went for further studies were also 
examined in comparison with the estimated year effects. Again, there are no discernible patterns 
detected.  
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Figure 3.4: Unemployment Rates and ORU Year Estimates, 1999 to 2009 
 
 
The estimated log odds ratios for the various institutional groups are all statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Graduates from the Go8 or IRU universities have 
higher log odds of being overeducated, compared to being correctly matched, in 
comparison with the omitted category of graduates from Other universities. 
Graduates from the ATN, in contrast, are estimated to have lower log odds of being 
overeducated. Therefore, it appears that graduates from the ATN are afforded some 
modest protection from being educationally mismatched in the labour market, with 
an estimated four percentage points less chance of being overeducated in comparison 
to graduates from Other universities. While IRU graduates are associated with a five 
percentage points increase in the probability of overeducation, Go8 graduates have 
the largest estimated effect, at almost eight percentage points. However, the caveat 
from the earlier section on the incidence of ORU by university groups bears 
repeating. Universities in the research intensive Go8 group account for a large 
proportion of higher degree completions, such as doctorates, for instance, and thus 
should also account for a large proportion of the overeducated. This is examined in 
greater detail below.  
 
3.5.1 Analysis of Bachelor’s Pass Degree Graduates 
As mentioned above, the empirical findings from Table 3.3 have revealed a couple of 
anomalies or questions that warrant closer examination. First, the finding that 
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graduates with relatively higher amounts of labour market experience are more likely 
to be overeducated rather than correctly matched is at odds with the literature, 
although an explanation that this could be due to the nature of the dataset was offered 
above. Second, it was argued that the finding that Go8 graduates are more likely to 
be overeducated could be attributable to a larger number of higher degree 
completions by these research intensive universities. Thus, the binary logit model 
was estimated on a restricted sample of bachelor’s pass degree holders.  
 
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 3.5. Two empirical findings 
from this table are highlighted here. First, the estimate for Go8 graduates has 
changed in sign, from being positive in Table 3.3 to being negative in Table 3.5. This 
indicates that, relative to the reference group of graduates from Other universities, 
Go8 graduates have lower log odds of being overeducated, with equally pronounced 
marginal effects as graduates from the ATN. Further, the estimate on IRU graduates 
is now statistically insignificant. Thus, it can be concluded that graduates from Go8 
and ATN universities are afforded some protection from being allocated to a job that 
does not utilise the level of educational attainment possessed, in comparison to their 
counterparts from the IRU and Other universities.  
 
Second, the estimated coefficients on age and its square now exhibit the signs 
consistent with expectations and the findings in the broader literature. When looking 
only at bachelor’s degree graduates, labour market experience is found to be 
associated with lower log odds of overeducation, relative to being correctly matched. 
This is consistent with the findings of the literature (see for example, Chiswick and 
Miller 2009; Kiker et al. 1997; Miller and Ren 2012; Quinn and Rubb 2006). At the 
same time, this finding bodes well for mature-aged students in higher education, as it 
indicates that these older students will not be disadvantaged in the graduate labour 
market.  
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Table 3.5: Estimates from the Logit Model, Bachelor’s Degree Graduates 
Variable Log Odds Marginal Effect 
Constant 1.515*** (a) 
 (19.150) (a) 
Female 0.119*** 0.018*** 
 (11.608) (11.615) 
Age  -0.124*** -0.018*** 
 (25.863) (25.983) 
Age squared/100 0.140*** 0.021*** 
 (20.354) (20.409) 
Tenure 0.218*** 0.032*** 
 (49.844) (50.611) 
Tenure squared/100 -0.792*** -0.118*** 
 (27.654) (27.812) 
NESB 0.104*** 0.015*** 
 (8.050) (8.054) 
Non-Australian 0.283*** 0.042*** 
 (10.492) (10.499) 
Double degree -0.291*** -0.043*** 
 (20.057) (20.103) 
Go8 -0.476*** -0.071*** 
 (38.664) (39.009) 
ATN -0.548*** -0.082*** 
 (41.839) (42.415) 
IRU -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.192) (0.192) 
Natural and Physical Science 0.343*** 0.051*** 
 (17.006) (17.021) 
Information Technology -0.821*** -0.122*** 
 (38.946) (39.451) 
Engineering -0.994*** -0.148*** 
 (41.174) (41.665) 
Architecture -0.632*** -0.094*** 
 (21.284) (21.362) 
Agriculture and Environment 0.138*** 0.021*** 
 (4.500) (4.500) 
Nursing -2.769*** -0.412*** 
 (71.708) (72.874) 
Medicine -1.011*** -0.150*** 
 (47.578) (48.298) 
Education -0.983*** -0.146*** 
 (34.908) (34.905) 
Society and Culture 0.441*** 0.066*** 
 (28.889) (28.994) 
Creative Arts and Others 0.029 0.004 
 (1.523) (1.523) 
Self-employed -0.699*** -0.104*** 
 (24.292) (24.396) 
Private Sector 0.300*** 0.045*** 
 (21.727) (21.761) 
Short-term employment 0.797*** 0.119*** 
 (75.447) (78.230) 
Further study 0.354*** 0.053*** 
 (29.993) (30.102) 
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Table 3.5: Estimates from the Logit Model, Bachelor’s Degree Graduates (cont.) 
Variable Log Odds Marginal Effect 
Part-time study -0.108*** -0.016*** 
 (7.973) (7.976) 
Accounting -2.475*** -0.368*** 
 (73.397) (75.685) 
Retail and Wholesale 1.312*** 0.195*** 
 (69.376) (70.971) 
Accommodation 2.243*** 0.334*** 
 (62.092) (63.235) 
Manufacturing -0.208*** -0.031*** 
 (9.328) (9.334) 
Mining  -1.060*** -0.158*** 
 (20.010) (20.065) 
Legal services -0.375*** -0.056*** 
 (13.649) (13.664) 
Government -0.043** -0.006** 
 (1.968) (1.968) 
Education -1.888*** -0.281*** 
 (61.743) (63.084) 
Higher education -0.596*** -0.089*** 
 (20.415) (20.499) 
Health and Community services -0.588*** -0.087*** 
 (27.708) (27.798) 
Medicine and Dentistry -0.120*** -0.018*** 
 (4.315) (4.315) 
Construction 0.429*** 0.064*** 
 (11.990) (12.000) 
Other services 0.277*** 0.041*** 
 (15.112) (15.139) 
Transport and Communications 0.187*** 0.028*** 
 (7.694) (7.697) 
Engineering and Consulting -0.908*** -0.135*** 
 (23.224) (23.283) 
2000 0.014 0.002 
 (0.614) (0.614) 
2001 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.843) (0.843) 
2002 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.859) (0.859) 
2003 0.031 0.005 
 (1.359) (1.359) 
2004 0.023 0.003 
 (1.035) (1.035) 
2005 0.088*** 0.013*** 
 (3.961) (3.961) 
2006 0.049** 0.007** 
 (2.084) (2.084) 
2007 -0.023 -0.003 
 (1.025) (1.025) 
2008 -0.020 -0.003 
 (0.919) (0.919) 
2009 0.118*** 0.018*** 
 (5.359) (5.359) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.317 0.317 
Observations 316,069 316,069 
Notes: Absolute values of robust ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** and *** indicate 
significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. (a) denotes ‘not applicable’.  
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Note, however, that the signs on tenure and its square remain unchanged. However, it 
should also be noted that the present dataset consists of fresh graduates, and those 
with tenure would have obtained their jobs on the basis of previous qualifications. 
Thus, obtaining a new and higher qualification would be extremely likely to place 
these graduates in the ‘overeducated’ category. The remainder of the estimated 
coefficients for other characteristics are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.3. 
Thus, the observations made above relating to those other characteristics stand, and 
will not be discussed again here.  
 
3.6 Summary of Findings for the Binary Logit Model 
The binary logit model has identified some important determinants of overeducation 
in the Australian graduate labour market. In particular, some fields of study and 
industries of employment have been found to have relatively large impacts in 
determining overeducation. Graduates working in profession-based industries, such 
as accounting, were much less likely to be overeducated (by 35 percentage points).  
 
Other important findings relate to the role of age and having a double degree 
qualification. Older graduates were more likely to be overeducated, as they were 
more likely to have completed a postgraduate qualification, which makes them 
overeducated by construction. Restricting the sample to only undergraduates reverses 
this finding. This is potentially important for policy, particularly with regards to the 
re-skilling of mature-aged individuals, as the estimated effects of age indicate that 
older graduates are well-absorbed into the labour market, and are better matched to 
their jobs compared to their younger peers.   
 
Lastly, graduates who have a double degree qualification, while being found to have 
no earnings premium to their relatively wider breadth of skills in later analyses or in 
the literature, do have a decreased probability, by 11 percentage points, of being 
overeducated. Therefore, there is some advantage, in terms of labour market 
outcomes, to obtaining a double degree qualification.  
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3.7 Results of the Multinomial Logit Model 
A multinomial logit model of the determinants of overeducation was also estimated. 
This model permits assessment of the role that graduates’ characteristics play in 
determining the extent of overeducation. The log odds ratio estimates from this 
model are presented in Table 3.6. Marginal effects were also calculated, and are 
listed in Table 3.7. As a discussion of both the log odds ratio and the marginal effects 
is repetitive and would not add much value, the following discussion will focus on 
the marginal effects. A note at this point will assist in the interpretation of results. 
First, the estimated marginal effects in Table 3.7 have column headings ranging from 
k = 0, to k = 6. Recall that k = 0 indicates the correctly matched, k = 1 denotes the 
categorical outcome of ‘overeducated by one level’, and so on for the remaining 
categories. The highest overeducated category is where k = 6, or where graduates are 
‘overeducated by six levels’.  
 
A quick examination of Table 3.7 indicates that most estimates are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. However, going across the rows of marginal 
effects reveals that the magnitude of the estimated impacts tend to get smaller at the 
higher overeducated outcomes. Thus, the graduate characteristics used in the analysis 
only have economically meaningful impacts up to around three levels of 
overeducation. In the case of the most overeducated category of k = 6, all of the 
marginal effects are negligible.
26
 Thus, likelihood ratio tests, as proposed by Cramer 
and Ridder (1991), were conducted to examine the possibility of pooling subsets of 
outcomes into one single category. The results from these tests are presented in Table 
3.8. These tests are all statistically significant at the one percent level, and thus reject 
the null hypotheses that outcomes can be combined. Therefore, the model with the 
most detailed specification of outcomes is retained.  
 
                                                 
26
 This could be reasonably expected, as mismatched graduates would most likely be employed in jobs 
that are not too far removed from their actual level of education.  
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Table 3.6: Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Overeducation 
Variable 
   (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
) 
Constant -5.100*** -4.777*** -0.961*** -7.456*** -12.435*** -20.212*** 
 (86.100) (78.365) (15.196) (67.432) (61.505) (28.868) 
Female 0.007 -0.057*** 0.161*** 0.145*** 0.079*** 0.180* 
 (0.713) (6.178) (17.060) (9.505) (3.622) (1.927) 
Age  0.194*** 0.188*** -0.013*** 0.246*** 0.457*** 0.604*** 
 (58.801) (56.137) (3.727) (39.507) (37.906) (16.611) 
Age squared/100 -0.214*** -0.198*** 0.039*** -0.279*** -0.526*** -0.636*** 
 (47.107) (43.399) (8.134) (31.765) (29.476) (12.633) 
Tenure 0.086*** 0.162*** 0.210*** 0.187*** 0.131*** 0.031 
 (32.732) (55.217) (62.244) (38.772) (16.780) (0.895) 
Tenure squared/100 -0.279*** -0.545*** -0.684*** -0.613*** -0.467*** -0.125 
 (24.036) (38.089) (37.487) (24.137) (10.360) (0.716) 
NESB -0.010 0.290*** 0.162*** 0.255*** 1.155*** 0.260** 
 (0.786) (25.319) (13.592) (13.323) (47.089) (2.277) 
Non-Australian -0.006 0.855*** 0.464*** 1.125*** 2.021*** 1.029*** 
 (0.206) (38.407) (19.949) (36.900) (62.867) (6.161) 
Double degree -0.530*** -0.807*** -0.513*** -0.676*** -0.902*** -1.709*** 
 (33.930) (45.731) (35.358) (24.960) (20.923) (4.969) 
Part-time study 0.737*** 0.745*** -0.002 0.422*** 0.177*** -0.374*** 
 (72.043) (69.408) (0.143) (23.715) (6.260) (3.357) 
Further study 0.371*** -0.066*** 0.158*** 0.302*** -0.338*** -0.957*** 
 (34.986) (5.726) (14.524) (17.726) (11.954) (6.265) 
Go8 0.679*** 0.471*** 0.074*** 0.455*** 0.532*** 0.935*** 
 (63.989) (43.288) (6.770) (26.149) (20.986) (8.840) 
ATN -0.093*** -0.170*** -0.435*** -0.425*** -0.406*** -0.083 
 (8.034) (14.642) (35.351) (19.759) (13.958) (0.592) 
IRU 0.408*** 0.031** 0.253*** 0.355*** -0.096** 0.311** 
 (31.964) (2.136) (18.530) (15.610) (2.327) (2.106) 
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Table 3.6: Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Overeducation (cont.) 
Variable 
   (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
) 
Natural and Physical Science 0.548*** 0.123*** 0.619*** 0.503*** -0.355*** 2.550*** 
 (25.501) (5.751) (32.639) (16.528) (6.907) (12.328) 
Information Technology -0.228*** -0.574*** -0.828*** -0.587*** -0.697*** -0.034 
 (10.290) (29.108) (39.733) (17.392) (19.368) (0.108) 
Engineering 0.210*** -0.726*** -0.594*** -0.492*** -0.798*** 1.817*** 
 (10.136) (33.034) (26.951) (12.913) (16.943) (8.382) 
Architecture -0.041 -0.389*** -0.857*** -0.685*** -1.661*** -1.023 
 (1.334) (13.455) (27.697) (12.295) (16.496) (1.391) 
Agriculture and Environment 0.206*** -0.140*** 0.306*** 0.164*** -0.412*** 2.132*** 
 (6.175) (4.360) (10.690) (3.481) (5.415) (9.108) 
Nursing -0.291*** -1.950*** -2.589*** -3.135*** -4.032*** -1.933*** 
 (14.397) (77.846) (62.210) (31.619) (21.471) (3.404) 
Medicine -0.162*** -0.619*** -0.701*** -0.927*** -1.675*** 0.195 
 (8.828) (34.437) (35.062) (25.201) (27.406) (0.758) 
Education 0.280*** -0.552*** -0.789*** -0.100*** -1.210*** -0.341 
 (15.832) (29.817) (32.996) (2.711) (18.377) (1.173) 
Society and Culture 0.292*** 0.012 0.437*** 0.595*** -0.329*** 1.558*** 
 (18.441) (0.789) (30.436) (27.127) (9.292) (7.986) 
Creative Arts and Others -0.057** -0.394*** 0.157*** 0.199*** -0.729*** 1.574*** 
 (2.566) (19.373) (8.788) (6.942) (15.172) (7.381) 
Self-employed -0.017 -0.106*** -0.529*** -0.501*** -0.355*** -0.086 
 (0.780) (5.001) (20.933) (13.261) (7.117) (0.479) 
Private Sector -0.057*** 0.266*** 0.229*** 0.309*** 0.248*** 0.243** 
 (5.441) (23.771) (18.611) (14.362) (7.730) (2.142) 
Short-term employment -0.095*** 0.050*** 0.662*** 0.731*** 0.864*** 0.749*** 
 (9.670) (4.863) (68.160) (45.204) (36.181) (7.622) 
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Table 3.6: Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Overeducation (cont.) 
Variable 
   (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
) 
Accounting -1.563*** -1.641*** -2.386*** -2.527*** -2.626*** -2.557** 
 (46.424) (61.608) (66.183) (33.141) (26.385) (2.505) 
Retail and Wholesale -0.150*** 0.421*** 1.461*** 1.273*** 1.500*** 1.444*** 
 (4.945) (18.193) (78.468) (45.876) (41.734) (6.687) 
Accommodation 0.012 2.122*** 2.168*** 2.034*** 1.983*** 1.977*** 
 (0.179) (55.468) (61.108) (45.700) (36.618) (6.049) 
Manufacturing 0.066*** -0.267*** -0.219*** -0.357*** -0.152*** -0.700** 
 (2.762) (11.828) (9.892) (9.319) (3.139) (2.174) 
Mining  0.315*** -0.562*** -0.973*** -0.518*** -1.011*** -1.702** 
 (8.763) (13.969) (19.848) (7.290) (7.600) (2.368) 
Legal services 0.190*** -0.759*** -0.099*** -0.191*** -0.507*** -0.426 
 (6.261) (22.571) (3.776) (4.355) (5.731) (1.131) 
Government 0.217*** 0.106*** -0.124*** 0.121*** 0.126** 0.411** 
 (10.681) (5.387) (5.975) (3.698) (2.573) (2.105) 
Education 0.118*** -0.529*** -1.786*** -2.308*** -1.968*** -1.215*** 
 (6.114) (26.757) (64.784) (44.190) (23.473) (4.355) 
Higher education 0.549*** 0.231*** 0.547*** -0.178*** 0.038 1.373*** 
 (23.668) (10.032) (24.465) (4.607) (0.724) (8.025) 
Health and Community services -0.072*** -0.183*** -1.026*** -0.985*** -1.216*** -1.161*** 
 (3.789) (9.800) (47.968) (27.547) (18.869) (4.513) 
Medicine and Dentistry 0.188*** 0.111*** -0.459*** -0.520*** -0.649*** -0.272 
 (7.683) (4.606) (16.855) (10.505) (8.026) (0.956) 
Construction -0.045 -0.179*** 0.331*** 0.030 -0.129 -0.308 
 (1.093) (4.643) (9.417) (0.480) (1.384) (0.588) 
Other services 0.123*** 0.081*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.178*** 0.424** 
 (5.976) (4.272) (6.259) (3.871) (4.076) (2.219) 
Transport and Communications -0.044 -0.078*** 0.220*** 0.201*** 0.352*** 0.461* 
 (1.521) (3.016) (9.260) (5.302) (7.497) (1.768) 
Engineering and Consulting 0.190*** -0.340*** -0.872*** -0.916*** -1.038*** -0.244 
 (6.419) (11.202) (23.446) (13.397) (10.812) (0.803) 
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Table 3.6: Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Overeducation (cont.) 
Variable 
   (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
)    (
   
   
) 
2000 -0.011 0.029 -0.011 -0.011 -0.097 0.278 
 (0.541) (1.342) (0.488) (0.299) (1.250) (1.008) 
2001 -0.010 0.074*** -0.037 -0.051 0.166** 0.083 
 (0.454) (3.266) (1.628) (1.289) (2.183) (0.277) 
2002 -0.079*** -0.047** -0.075*** -0.160*** 0.029 0.427 
 (3.732) (2.070) (3.338) (4.056) (0.379) (1.592) 
2003 -0.088*** 0.020 -0.027 -0.047 0.288*** 0.625** 
 (4.330) (0.950) (1.282) (1.285) (4.271) (2.471) 
2004 0.020 0.064*** 0.005 -0.005 0.453*** 0.358 
 (1.016) (3.076) (0.221) (0.147) (7.057) (1.366) 
2005 -0.023 0.129*** 0.040* 0.056 0.540*** 0.205 
 (1.179) (6.311) (1.950) (1.594) (8.355) (0.776) 
2006 0.049** 0.251*** 0.087*** 0.216*** 0.842*** 0.359 
 (2.435) (12.031) (4.051) (6.045) (13.387) (1.370) 
2007 -0.044** 0.111*** 0.041** 0.081** 0.989*** 0.615** 
 (2.225) (5.477) (2.047) (2.343) (16.388) (2.496) 
2008 0.064*** 0.323*** -0.037* 0.170*** 0.972*** 1.058*** 
 (3.275) (16.351) (1.819) (5.017) (16.096) (4.520) 
2009 0.099*** 0.423*** 0.079*** 0.346*** 1.132*** 1.197*** 
 (5.116) (21.431) (3.861) (10.417) (18.917) (5.143) 
Notes: Absolute values of robust ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of Variables from the Multinomial Logit Model 
Variable k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 
Female -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.016*** 0.023*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (5.120) (2.270) (12.360) (20.230) (9.010) (2.750) (1.690) 
Age  -0.034*** 0.020*** 0.021*** -0.017*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
 (54.790) (45.140) (44.790) (37.690) (28.190) (29.270) (9.640) 
Age squared/100 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (41.330) (38.130) (35.320) (36.230) (23.700) (24.060) (8.370) 
Tenure -0.036*** -0.001*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (64.100) (3.540) (36.750) (48.980) (22.150) (5.200) (1.710) 
Tenure squared/100 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (43.470) (3.130) (25.540) (28.440) (13.540) (3.720) (1.030) 
NESB -0.043*** -0.022*** 0.038*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.000 
 (20.650) (13.950) (21.950) (5.600) (7.880) (29.370) (1.240) 
Non-Australian -0.132*** -0.064*** 0.115*** 0.011*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.000*** 
 (35.420) (21.000) (30.260) (4.120) (21.150) (25.990) (2.820) 
Double degree 0.154*** -0.033*** -0.079*** -0.027*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (56.350) (16.660) (39.680) (16.000) (15.000) (15.780) (6.650) 
Part-time study -0.122*** 0.082*** 0.090*** -0.052*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (63.490) (54.670) (56.070) (37.580) (5.850) (5.650) (5.920) 
Further study -0.038*** 0.056*** -0.032*** 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 
 (19.160) (34.800) (21.640) (7.490) (12.560) (17.490) (7.460) 
Go8 -0.102*** 0.083*** 0.041*** -0.032*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
 (54.910) (50.810) (25.650) (25.620) (11.000) (9.830) (5.050) 
ATN 0.056*** 0.008*** -0.007*** -0.046*** -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 (26.480) (4.940) (4.160) (34.000) (15.690) (10.280) (0.370) 
IRU -0.055*** 0.054*** -0.023*** 0.018*** 0.008*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 (23.850) (26.860) (11.960) (10.100) (9.340) (6.640) (1.020) 
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Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of Variables from the Multinomial Logit Model (cont.) 
Variable k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 
Natural and Physical Science -0.099*** 0.057*** -0.030*** 0.065*** 0.009 -0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (28.210) (17.170) (11.820) (23.940) (7.600) (16.480) (4.620) 
Information Technology 0.126*** 0.010*** -0.052*** -0.072*** -0.010*** -0.003*** 0.000 
 (32.230) (3.180) (22.460) (41.030) (11.110) (14.130) (0.700) 
Engineering 0.074*** 0.086*** -0.089*** -0.058*** -0.010*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (18.460) (23.440) (40.850) (28.030) (10.280) (17.210) (4.220) 
Architecture 0.096*** 0.036*** -0.032*** -0.080*** -0.014*** -0.007*** 0.000 
 (16.750) (7.370) (8.650) (33.510) (11.110) (26.500) (1.630) 
Agriculture and Environment -0.030*** 0.026*** -0.040*** 0.042*** 0.003*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (5.150) (5.360) (10.960) (10.790) (1.990) (8.420) (3.840) 
Nursing 0.304*** 0.066*** -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.039*** -0.010*** 0.000*** 
 (78.250) (18.630) (108.200) (122.780) (75.750) (50.860) (4.100) 
Medicine 0.123*** 0.023*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.018*** -0.007*** 0.000 
 (35.760) (8.330) (28.590) (30.750) (23.910) (33.050) (1.530) 
Education 0.064*** 0.096*** -0.070*** -0.085*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.000 
 (17.660) (32.100) (33.560) (40.020) (1.590) (20.820) (0.680) 
Society and Culture -0.061*** 0.025*** -0.029*** 0.050*** 0.018*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (22.410) (11.470) (16.250) (26.340) (19.540) (16.150) (4.520) 
Creative Arts and Others 0.019*** -0.002 -0.061*** 0.037*** 0.010*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (5.180) (0.580) (26.780) (15.150) (8.710) (18.690) (4.030) 
Self-employed 0.049*** 0.020*** 0.002 -0.057*** -0.012*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 (11.260) (6.300) (0.750) (25.310) (13.380) (5.550) (0.170) 
Private Sector -0.037*** -0.029*** 0.035*** 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (18.660) (19.240) (21.830) (14.500) (10.980) (5.010) (1.340) 
Short-term employment -0.059*** -0.045*** -0.021*** 0.093*** 0.023*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 
 (34.520) (35.140) (14.450) (66.840) (34.600) (25.270) (5.010) 
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Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of Variables from the Multinomial Logit Model (cont.) 
Variable k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 
Accounting 0.412*** -0.108*** -0.124*** -0.140*** -0.032*** -0.008*** 0.000*** 
 (116.860) (41.280) (59.270) (106.340) (53.190) (35.950) (4.500) 
Retail and Wholesale -0.167*** -0.097*** -0.021*** 0.235*** 0.037*** 0.013*** 0.000*** 
 (51.660) (38.170) (7.560) (71.780) (23.990) (19.080) (2.890) 
Accommodation -0.304*** -0.145*** 0.217*** 0.193*** 0.032*** 0.007*** 0.000 
 (91.980) (50.990) (40.610) (43.250) (16.480) (10.550) (1.400) 
Manufacturing 0.035*** 0.030*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.001 0.000*** 
 (8.000) (8.460) (12.280) (8.690) (8.770) (1.510) (2.520) 
Mining  0.066*** 0.113*** -0.069*** -0.094*** -0.011*** -0.005*** 0.000*** 
 (8.870) (16.660) (15.960) (29.290) (6.500) (10.020) (4.510) 
Legal services 0.042*** 0.064*** -0.100*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000 
 (7.530) (12.500) (33.310) (0.120) (2.370) (5.680) (1.010) 
Government -0.020*** 0.033*** 0.011*** -0.027*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 
 (5.590) (11.010) (3.940) (12.100) (2.250) (1.510) (1.580) 
Education 0.142*** 0.097*** -0.037*** -0.154*** -0.040*** -0.008*** 0.000*** 
 (36.700) (29.280) (14.610) (97.810) (65.850) (29.740) (4.070) 
Higher education -0.093*** 0.061*** -0.007*** 0.053*** -0.013*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (23.970) (16.900) (2.220) (16.620) (15.460) (5.010) (3.810) 
Health and Community services 0.094*** 0.030*** 0.008*** -0.104*** -0.022*** -0.006*** 0.000*** 
 (26.130) (10.440) (2.920) (58.490) (28.240) (20.090) (4.620) 
Medicine and Dentistry 0.008 0.043*** 0.028*** -0.060*** -0.015*** -0.004*** 0.000 
 (1.680) (11.060) (7.430) (24.190) (13.450) (10.440) (0.990) 
Construction -0.009 -0.012*** -0.037*** 0.060*** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
 (1.310) (2.310) (7.980) (11.200) (0.130) (1.820) (0.740) 
Other services -0.025*** 0.011*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (7.240) (3.870) (1.210) (3.610) (1.780) (2.560) (1.610) 
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Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of Variables from the Multinomial Logit Model (cont.) 
Variable k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 
Transport and Communications -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.021*** 0.035*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.000 
 (2.360) (3.510) (6.210) (10.810) (4.720) (6.250) (1.360) 
Engineering and Consulting 0.067*** 0.078*** -0.034*** -0.086*** -0.019*** -0.005*** 0.000 
 (11.720) (14.840) (8.650) (31.430) (16.750) (14.060) (0.300) 
2000 0.000 -0.002 0.006** -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.110) (0.820) (1.850) (0.730) (0.360) (1.350) (0.890) 
2001 -0.003 -0.003 0.014*** -0.007*** -0.002** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.710) (1.100) (4.160) (2.650) (1.650) (2.000) (0.240) 
2002 0.017*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 
 (4.150) (2.460) (0.310) (2.010) (3.430) (0.920) (1.420) 
2003 0.006 -0.013*** 0.007*** -0.002 -0.001 0.003*** 0.000** 
 (1.580) (5.030) (2.370) (0.770) (0.970) (4.080) (1.920) 
2004 -0.009*** 0.000 0.009*** -0.003 -0.001 0.004*** 0.000 
 (2.370) (0.150) (2.860) (1.170) (0.870) (5.820) (1.110) 
2005 -0.015*** -0.011*** 0.019*** 0.000 0.001 0.005*** 0.000 
 (4.010) (4.300) (6.330) (0.170) (0.570) (6.560) (0.590) 
2006 -0.037*** -0.009*** 0.034*** -0.002 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.000 
 (9.960) (3.250) (10.400) (0.630) (3.530) (9.110) (0.900) 
2007 -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.002 0.012*** 0.000 
 (4.100) (5.830) (5.120) (0.220) (1.340) (11.340) (1.850) 
2008 -0.037*** -0.006*** 0.050*** -0.021*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.000 
 (10.450) (2.390) (15.990) (9.170) (2.320) (10.760) (2.800) 
2009 -0.058*** -0.010*** 0.061*** -0.012*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.000 
 (16.740) (4.090) (18.960) (5.270) (5.950) (11.710) (2.950) 
Notes: Absolute values of robust ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Results of Likelihood Ratio Tests for Pooling Outcomes 
Categories to be 
combined (k) χ2 P > χ2 
1 2 29039.420 0.000 
1 3 100000.000 0.000 
1 4 31345.936 0.000 
1 5 37560.093 0.000 
1 6 1862.529 0.000 
1 0 61198.752 0.000 
2 3 63017.048 0.000 
2 4 13907.596 0.000 
2 5 19044.200 0.000 
2 6 1635.299 0.000 
2 0 92497.313 0.000 
3 4 8417.134 0.000 
3 5 21511.874 0.000 
3 6 1759.378 0.000 
3 0 132000.000 0.000 
4 5 9307.534 0.000 
4 6 1395.523 0.000 
4 0 48958.396 0.000 
5 6 1471.619 0.000 
5 0 44555.342 0.000 
6 0 2803.036 0.000 
 
The estimated effects for females reinforce the finding in the earlier binary logit 
model. There do not appear to be large differences between males and females across 
the different extents of overeducation. The largest estimated marginal effect for 
females is the 2.3 percentage points increased probability of being overeducated by 
three extents. This effect arose largely from females being slightly less likely to be 
correctly matched, or overeducated by one or two extents. The estimates on age and 
its quadratic term indicate a propensity for older graduates to be overeducated, 
particularly by one or two extents. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of these ‘age 
effects’ are minimal, of around two percentage points for both categories. These 
effects are accompanied by a 3.4 percentage points decline in the probability of being 
correctly matched to their jobs, and a 1.7 percentage points decline in the probability 
of being overeducated by three extents. Thus, while older graduates are more likely 
to be overeducated, the extents of overeducation for them are typically ‘mild’.27  
 
                                                 
27
 Recall that the earlier binary logit analysis suggested that older graduates are more likely to be 
overeducated due to their increased likelihood to complete postgraduate qualifications.  
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Completion of a double degree is associated with a 15 percentage points increased 
probability of being correctly matched. This is due to the estimated reductions in the 
probability of being overeducated by up to five levels. The largest reduction in the 
probability of being overeducated, by eight percentage points, is observed at the 
second extent of overeducation. Graduates who were employed on a short-term or 
casual basis are associated with reduced probabilities of being correctly matched or 
overeducated at the lower extents, but are more likely to be overeducated by three or 
four levels. In particular, graduates employed on a short-term or casual basis are 
more likely, by nine percentage points, to be overeducated by three levels. 
 
Residency status appears to be associated with large and unfavourable impacts on the 
likelihood of overeducation. Being of non-Australian residency is associated with a 
13.2 percentage points lower chance of being correctly matched, and a 6.4 
percentage points lower chance of being overeducated by one extent. These effects 
are linked to a 11 percentage points higher probability of being overeducated by two 
extents, and smaller increased probabilities of being overeducated by three to five 
extents. These might, at least in part, be attributed to Australia’s immigration 
policies. One pathway for foreigners to gain permanent residency in Australia is 
through the acquisition of skills. While the visa requirements and rules are dynamic 
in nature, one feature that has largely remained unchanged lies in the additional 
‘points’ given to higher qualifications. Graduates with advanced qualifications, such 
as a masters degree or PhD, are awarded more bonus ‘points’ in applications for 
skilled migration (see, for instance, The Australian 2010b). Thus, on the one hand, 
foreign students might have added incentives to pursue advanced qualifications in 
order to bolster their chances at applying for Australian residency.
28
 On the other 
hand, it could be that the advanced qualifications of these graduates have allowed 
them to stay in Australia for work or residency purposes.  
 
There are mixed patterns for the three institutional groups identified in the analysis. 
Relative to the benchmark category of Other graduates, being a Go8 graduate is 
associated with increased probabilities of being overeducated by one or two extents. 
                                                 
28
 The figures in the dataset support this view. The proportion of non-Australian graduates who 
completed a masters or doctoral degree was much higher, at 43.5 percent, compared to just 16.6 
percent of Australian graduates who completed the same levels of qualification.  
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These are linked to a ten percentage points reduced likelihood of being correctly 
matched, and a smaller, by three percentage points, likelihood of being overeducated 
by three extents. Go8 graduates are moderately more likely to be overeducated by 
one or two extents, by around eight and four percentage points, respectively. IRU 
graduates are six percentage points less likely to be correctly matched, and two 
percentage points less likely to be two extents overeducated. The IRU graduates also 
have a five percentage points higher probability of being overeducated by one extent, 
and a minute two percentage points increased likelihood of being overeducated by 
three extents. The last group, of ATN graduates, differ from their peers in the other 
two university groups, as the estimated marginal effect in the k = 0 category indicates 
a 5.6 percentage points higher chance of being correctly matched. This is largely 
associated with a decreased likelihood of being overeducated by three levels. Note, 
however, that these results could be a reflection of the findings in the earlier 
discussion of the binary logit model. That is, the difference in proportions of 
postgraduate students across the various university groups could account for these 
findings.  
 
Among the various fields of study, seven are associated with increased probabilities 
of being correctly matched. These are the fields of Information Technology, 
Engineering, Architecture, Nursing, Medicine, Education and Creative Arts and 
Others, which have increased likelihoods of being correctly matched, ranging from 
two percentage points (Creative Arts and Others) to 30 percentage points (Nursing). 
However, the decreased probabilities of overeducation for graduates among these 
fields differ. Information Technology graduates are more likely to be correctly 
matched, by 13 percentage points, and less likely to be overeducated by two or three 
extents, by five and seven percentage points, respectively. Engineering graduates, 
while being associated with an increased likelihood of being correctly matched by 
seven percentage points, are also more likely to be overeducated by one level, with 
the marginal effects for the latter estimated at nine percentage points. At the same 
time, Engineering graduates are nine and six percentage points less likely to be 
overeducated by two or three levels, respectively. Thus, for Engineering graduates, 
increased probabilities of being overeducated are present only at the lowest extent.  
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Architecture graduates are ten percentage points more likely to be correctly matched. 
They are also four percentage points more likely to be overeducated by one level. 
While they are less likely to be overeducated in the remaining categories, they were 
much less likely to be overeducated by three levels, as the largest marginal effect for 
this field was estimated in the k = 3 category, at eight percentage points. Nursing 
graduates are much more likely to be correctly matched, by an increased probability 
of around 30 percentage points. They are also more likely to be overeducated by 
seven percentage points. These higher probabilities are associated with 16 percentage 
points lower representation in each of the overeducated by two and three extents 
categories, and a reduced probability of being overeducated by four extents. The 
same trend, on a smaller scale, is observed for graduates in the fields of Medicine 
and Education.  
 
The fields of Natural and Physical Sciences, together with Society and Culture, are 
associated with the largest reduced marginal effects of being correctly matched, by 
13 and six percentage points, respectively. Natural and Physical Sciences graduates 
are six percentage points more likely to be overeducated by one level, three 
percentage points less likely to be two extents overeducated, and seven percentage 
points more likely to be three extents overeducated. Estimates for Society and 
Culture graduates followed the same pattern, but with smaller magnitudes. Thus, the 
fields of study are associated with large estimated impacts in determining 
overeducation, and its extent. One pattern observed in the estimated marginal effects 
is that those fields of study which are associated with increased likelihoods of being 
correctly matched also tend to be associated with increased chances of being 
overeducated by one extent of overeducation. These tend to be linked to decreased 
probabilities of being overeducated by two or more levels. The exceptions are 
graduates in the fields of Natural and Physical Sciences, Agriculture and 
Environment, Society and Culture and Creative Arts and Others. These fields are all 
associated with moderate increased probabilities of overeducation in the k = 3 
category. 
 
The industries of employment appear to be associated with large estimated impacts 
on the probability of being overeducated. For instance, graduates who were 
employed in the accounting industry are more likely to be appropriately matched to 
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their jobs relative to their peers in the financial services industry, by 41 percentage 
points. This is accompanied by reductions, ranging from 11 to 14 percentage points, 
in the probabilities of being overeducated by one to three levels. Graduates who 
worked in the accommodation industry are 30 percentage points less likely to be 
correctly matched, and 15 percentage points less likely to be slightly overeducated at 
one level. These were linked to large increased probabilities of being overeducated, 
by two or three levels, at 22 and 20 percentage points, respectively. Graduates in 
retail are observed to share similar estimated effects of being overeducated to their 
peers in the accommodation industry, although the marginal effects calculated for 
them are of a smaller size. However, they are still very likely, by 24 percentage 
points, to be overeducated by three levels.  
 
Lastly, estimates on the year of graduation also appear to uncover a trend in the 
likelihood of being overeducated. Relative to the benchmark category of graduates 
from the 1999 cohort, graduates from 2000, 2001 and 2003 are not statistically 
different from the reference group in terms of the likelihood of being correctly 
matched. Graduates of 2002 were slightly more likely to be correctly matched, by 
two percentage points. The estimates on being correctly matched for those in later 
cohorts from the year 2004 onwards, however, were negative. While the estimate for 
the graduates of 2004 is negligible, at less than one percentage point, modest 
decreased probabilities of being correctly matched are observed for some of the 
remaining years. Specifically, graduates of 2006 and 2008 are less likely to be 
correctly matched, by around four percentage points. The largest decreased 
probability of being correctly matched is observed for the graduates of 2009, who 
were six percentage points less likely to be matched to their jobs. The corresponding 
increased probabilities of being overeducated for these years appear to be 
concentrated in the k = 2 category. The overall trend here appears to be one of an 
increasing likelihood of being overeducated, across years.  
 
3.8 Summary of Findings for the Multinomial Logit Model 
The multinomial logit model of overeducation has revealed some further insights into 
the influences on overeducation in the Australian graduate labour market. First, the 
factors identified in the analysis impact on overeducation status only at the lower 
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levels, and have negligible impacts at the most overeducated categories. Second, 
gender does not play a large role in determining the extent of overeducation. Third, 
age, while associated with an increased probability of being overeducated, has only 
very modest impacts on being overeducated. Fourth, residency status, field of study 
and industry of employment are all significant factors in determining the extent of 
overeducation.   
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter has examined the incidences of ORU for the Australian graduate labour 
market and its sub-populations. While the incidence of undereducation is low, at less 
than one percent, the incidence of overeducation is relatively high, at around 63 
percent. Male graduates were also found to have a higher incidence of overeducation, 
compared to females. The incidence of overeducation was found to vary across 
university groups. The ATN university group was found to have more correctly 
matched graduates, while the Go8 university group had the lowest. This was found, 
however, to have been influenced by the larger proportion of postgraduates in the 
Go8. Where only undergraduates were considered, the incidence of overeducation 
was found to be lower for the ATN and Go8 graduates, while similar proportions of 
the graduates from the two remaining university groups were found to be 
overeducated.   
 
The logit models of overeducation have also identified many important determinants 
of overeducation. The field of study, for example, played an enormous role in 
determining whether a graduate was overeducated. Graduates in Natural and Physical 
Sciences, Agriculture and the Environment, and Society and Culture were found to 
be much more likely to be overeducated compared to Management and Commerce 
graduates. Graduates who were employed in profession-based industries, such as 
accounting, were less likely to be overeducated. The completion of a double degree 
program was also found to be useful in increasing the chances of an education-job 
match. Older graduates were found to be less likely to be overeducated where only 
undergraduates were considered.   
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The extended multinomial logit model added further value to the examination of the 
determinants of ORU status. First, the characteristics used in the multinomial logit 
model were found to have impacts only at lower levels of overeducation. That is, 
impacts were minimal where higher levels of overeducation were considered. 
Second, gender appeared to play no substantive role in determining ORU status. 
Lastly, the fields of study and industries of employment were found to be important 
determinants of overeducation.    
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CHAPTER 4  
Earnings Impact of ORU - The Vahey Model 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Education is one of the main forms under which an individual invests in his or her 
own human capital. A large empirical literature has also been devoted to the study of 
the earnings premium or returns to investments in education. While there are 
competing theories on how educational attainment affects earnings, such as human 
capital theory (Becker 1962) or screening (Arrow 1973), the positive impact that 
education has on earnings is undisputed. However, a more recent literature on 
overeducation examines the earnings effects of education-job mismatch. Given the 
rapid higher education expansion in Australia, and the large incidences of 
overeducation observed in the preceding Chapter 3, an examination of how graduate 
earnings are affected by educational mismatch would be useful.  
 
Thus, this chapter will examine the wage effects of overeducation in the Australian 
graduate labour market. Further, the study adopts a specification of the ORU model 
proposed by Vahey (2000). This under-utilised approach is based on a detailed 
dummy variable specification, and appears to offer valuable insights into the labour 
market performance of educationally mismatched individuals. The empirical 
relevance of the Vahey (2000) model is assessed using F-tests on various sets of the 
education-occupation mismatch variables that are the distinguishing feature of the 
approach. The remainder of this chapter is organised in the following manner. 
Section 2 reviews the ORU literature, with particular attention focused on the 
dummy variable specification, and particularly the Vahey (2000) specification. 
Section 3 describes the methodology and data used. Section 4 discusses the results. A 
conclusion is presented in section 5.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
Educational mismatch is a feature of contemporary labour markets, and is prevalent 
at rather high rates. Overviews of the overeducation literature report that the average 
incidence of mismatch is around 40 percent (for instance, see Hartog 2000, pg. 133; 
McGuinness 2006, pg. 397). The methodological framework used in the examination 
of ORU earnings effects has also evolved from early studies such as Freeman (1976), 
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starting with Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) variation on the standard Mincerian 
earnings equation. Nevertheless, the numerous empirical studies on the effects of 
overeducation, with very few exceptions, offer the same conclusion.  
 
Educational mismatch has been found to be associated with pronounced impacts on 
earnings. There are three main findings in this literature. First, the returns to required 
levels of skills are higher than the returns to actual skill levels. This difference arises 
because the returns to required levels of skills capture both the payoff to the 
acquisition of the skills and mobility to an occupation where the skills can be used 
effectively. Second, while returns to surplus schooling are positive, they are less than 
the returns to required schooling, and are typically only one-half to two-thirds of the 
returns to required schooling (Hartog 2000; McGuinness 2006). Groot and Maasen 
van den Brink (2000), for example, conducted a cross country meta-analysis of 25 
studies, and reported that the return to a year of required schooling was around 7.9 
percent, while the return to surplus schooling was much smaller, at 2.6 percent. 
 
Third, undereducated workers earn more than their counterparts with the same 
amount of schooling and who are correctly matched to their jobs (Hartog 2000). This 
might be attributed to the presence of unobserved factors that influence earnings, 
such as ability or performance (see, for example, Chiswick and Miller 2008; Hartog 
2000).  
 
Further, while different methods of defining education-occupation mismatch exist 
(see Hartog 2000, pg. 132), the empirical findings with regards to earnings impacts 
are held to be robust to the approach used (Chiswick and Miller 2010; McGuinness 
2006; Rumberger 1987). As Hartog (2000, pg. 135) notes, the three main empirical 
findings highlighted above “hold independent of the type of measurement”.29  
 
The empirical frameworks used in the estimation of ORU earnings effects are 
described in McGuinness (2006). In comparison to the conventional Mincer human 
capital model which is based on the worker’s actual years of schooling, most of the 
                                                 
29
 Measurement issues due to different definitions of education-job mismatch have been discussed in 
Chapter 2. As highlighted earlier, only the incidence of education-job mismatch varies across 
definitions, while ORU earnings effects have been found to be consistent regardless of the approach 
used.  
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ORU models are based on a decomposition of the actual years of schooling into 
years of required, surplus or deficit schooling. Comparison of the returns on the 
actual years of schooling from the Mincer estimating equation and the returns on 
required, surplus and deficit schooling from the latter equation is then used to inform 
on the earnings effects of ORU.  
 
An alternative method uses dichotomous variables to represent overeducated and 
undereducated individuals. Verdugo and Verdugo’s (1989) specification included 
dummy variables for the overeducated and the undereducated, while including the 
actual level of education in the estimating model.
30
 In still other studies (for example, 
McGuinness and Bennett 2007), dummy variables for overeducated and 
undereducated status are combined with a continuous measure of the years of 
required education. 
 
An extension to the dummy variable model was proposed by Vahey (2000). In this 
specification, vectors of dummy variables for the required education level, as well as 
for overeducation and undereducation, were entered into the estimating equation. 
Specifically, in Vahey’s (2000) study, five levels of schooling were distinguished, 
with the occupational categories categorised as requiring the same five different 
levels of schooling. A total of 25 dichotomous variables reflecting these education-
job match statuses could then be formed, and except for one reference group, entered 
into the estimating equation.  
 
As such, this flexible specification permits an assessment of the earnings effects 
associated with deeper extents of educational mismatch. It also enables assessment of 
whether there are non-linearities in the return to years of required education. 
However, one challenge that exists in using this approach lies in its detailed and fine 
specification of educational mismatch. As Vahey (2000) points out, “required 
education is rarely more than one education level from attained education”. Thus, 
only small proportions of individuals can be found in the extremely mismatched 
categories (see, for instance, Vahey 2000, pg. 221). Vahey’s (2000) study therefore 
used a broader and more ‘collapsed’ specification, with 15 dummy variable 
                                                 
30
 This specification yielded negative and positive coefficients on the variables for overeducation and 
undereducation, respectively. 
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categories which indicated the level of education required for the job, and if 
individuals with each attained level of education were either overeducated or 
undereducated. In the current study, the larger sample size permits the use of 
multiple dummy variables to capture the extent of overeducation and undereducation 
at each attained level of education. 
 
4.3 Estimation Model 
The model used in the estimation of the ORU earnings effects of Australian 
graduates can be written as: 
 
(4-1)                 
      
      
        
 
where w represents the hourly wage, used in the analysis in natural logarithmic 
format,   represents a vector of characteristics correlated with earnings, and   ,   
and    are vectors of dummy variables indicating if the individual is overeducated 
(D
o
), undereducated (D
u
), or correctly matched to an occupation in terms of 
education (D
r
). The variables included in   indicate the graduates’ gender, English 
speaking background, residency status, mode of enrolment, further study status, 
university group, broad field of study, self-employment status, length of 
employment, industry of employment, sector of employment, year of graduation and 
labour market experience. Two proxies for experience are used, namely, the age of 
the graduate and the years of tenure in the present job, with both proxies entered into 
the estimating equation in quadratic form.  
 
Attention is placed in the estimations on assessing the empirical relevance of the 
Vahey specification. According, a number of F-tests are conducted. The variables in 
the    vector can be categorised in two main ways: 
i) by the extent of overeducation at each level of actual educational 
attainment. For example, the earnings of workers with a masters 
degree working in certificate level jobs (the most overeducated with 
this level of qualification), diploma level jobs (an intermediate level 
of overeducation) and bachelor’s pass degree level jobs (the least 
overeducated among the workers who possess a masters degree) can 
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be compared. F-tests, labelled ‘F-tests by Degree Type’, are 
conducted to ascertain if it is possible to replace the separate dummy 
variables for each degree type by a single dummy 
 
ii) by the extent of overeducation at each level of required education. For 
example, the earnings of workers with PhDs, masters degrees, 
graduate diplomas, graduate certificates and bachelor’s honours 
degrees who are employed in jobs that require only a bachelor’s pass 
degree can be compared. F-tests, labelled ‘F-tests by Job Types’, can 
be conducted to see if it would be possible to replace the multiple 
overeducation dummy variables associated with a particular required 
level of education by a single dummy variable. 
 
The summary statistics for the ORU variables are presented in Table 4.1. The middle 
portion of the variable name denotes the attained qualification, while the end portion 
denotes the required qualification associated with the graduates’ occupations. Among 
these, there were two correctly matched (oru_dip_dip and oru_bach_bach) and two 
undereducated (oru_dip_bach and oru_ascdeg_bach) categories. The remaining 20 
categories consist of overeducated graduates. As covered in Chapter 3, the majority 
of graduates were overeducated, with around 63 percent of them having an 
educational qualification which is higher than required for their jobs. 37 percent of 
graduates were correctly matched, and less than one percent were undereducated.
31
 
The relatively high incidence of overeducation observed here can likely be attributed 
to the fact that the focus is on university graduates. Nonetheless, the fact that less 
than 40 percent of graduates are employed in an occupation appropriate for their 
level of education, even 4 months after graduation, is a cause for concern. 
 
 
  
                                                 
31
 The low incidence of undereducation is consistent with that found in another Australian study by 
Kler (2005). 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of ORU Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Undereducated 
  
oru_dip_bach 0.003 0.052 
oru_ascdeg_bach 0.002 0.043 
Total 0.005 
 
   
Correctly Matched 
  
oru_dip_dip 0.002 0.048 
oru_bach_bach 0.367 0.482 
Total  0.369 
 
   
Overeducated   
oru_dip_cert  0.002 0.044 
oru_ascdeg_cert 0.001 0.037 
oru_ascdeg_dip 0.003 0.055 
oru_bach_cert 0.152 0.359 
oru_bach_dip 0.066 0.248 
oru_hons_cert 0.015 0.122 
oru_hons_dip 0.008 0.090 
oru_hons_bach 0.048 0.214 
oru_gcert_cert 0.006 0.076 
oru_gcert_dip 0.006 0.075 
oru_gcert_bach 0.046 0.210 
oru_gdip_cert 0.010 0.101 
oru_gdip_dip 0.007 0.084 
oru_gdip_bach 0.082 0.274 
oru_mast_cert 0.019 0.137 
oru_mast_dip 0.012 0.110 
oru_mast_bach 0.116 0.320 
oru_phd_cert 0.001 0.032 
oru_phd_dip 0.002 0.039 
oru_phd_bach 0.024 0.154 
Total 0.626 
 
Note: The ORU variable names have the attained level of qualification in the middle portion, and 
the required level of education in the end portion. cert = certificate, dip = diploma, ascdeg = 
associate degree, bach = bachelor’s pass degree,  hons = bachelor’s honours degree, gdip = 
graduate diploma, gcert = graduate certificate, mast = masters degree, phd = doctorate degree 
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4.4 Results 
The results from the estimation of the ORU model of earnings are presented in Table 
4.2. The model also included controls for the industry of employment and year of 
graduation, although these estimated coefficients will not be presented here, for 
brevity. The adjusted R-squared for this model is 0.188, indicating that the model 
accounts for 18.8 percent of the variation of graduates’ earnings around the mean. As 
can be seen from Table 4.2, most estimated coefficients are significant at the one 
percent level, and the signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with 
expectations. 
 
In order to determine the contribution of variable sets to the explanatory power of the 
model, F-tests were conducted, and the partial R-squared values for them were also 
computed. The results of the F-tests and the partial R-squared values are presented in 
Table 4.3. The F-statistics for all the variable groups are highly significant. Further, 
the partial R-squared values indicate that of all these variable sets, the year and 
personal characteristics effects are the greatest contributors to explaining the 
variation in graduate earnings.
32
 ORU effects come third in importance, while the 
broad fields of study and other study characteristics account for the least explanatory 
power. Apart from personal endowments, it seems that wages are determined 
according to the graduates’ labour market choices, and the contribution of schooling 
choices or characteristics do not play a substantial role in determining earnings. 
 
  
                                                 
32
 Separate regressions were run with the real wage as the dependent variable, which was calculated 
by deflating the nominal hourly wage by the Australian CPI for the corresponding years. The F-tests 
conducted for this series of regressions indicate that ORU effects are the second most important group 
of variables in determining graduates’ earnings, and the partial R-squared of 0.022 for the ORU 
variables is only slightly lower than the partial R-squared of 0.023 for personal characteristics. The 
corresponding partial R-squared values for study characteristics, industry, broad fields of study and 
years of graduation are 0.004, 0.011, 0.004 and 0.002, respectively.  
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Table 4.2: OLS Estimates of the Vahey Model of Graduates’ Earnings 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
Constant 2.305*** oru_dip_cert -0.216*** 
 (175.708)  (10.674) 
Female -0.048*** oru_dip_dip -0.018 
 (29.159)  (1.561) 
Age 0.035*** oru_dip_bach 0.031** 
 (45.334)  (2.564) 
Age squared/1000 -0.397*** oru_ascdeg_cert -0.185*** 
 (36.847)  (9.440) 
NESB -0.039*** oru_ascdeg_dip -0.068*** 
 (17.352)  (6.195) 
Non-Australian -0.202*** oru_ascdeg_bach -0.019 
 (33.694)  (1.155) 
Tenure 0.015*** oru_bach_cert -0.156*** 
 (30.517)  (55.637) 
Tenure squared/1000 -0.404*** oru_bach_dip -0.092*** 
 (17.551)  (27.292) 
Double degree 0.008*** oru_hons_cert -0.101*** 
 (3.016)  (14.606) 
Part-time study 0.086*** oru_hons_dip -0.037*** 
 (43.574)  (4.350) 
Further study 0.007*** oru_hons_bach 0.027*** 
 (3.330)  (7.719) 
Go8 0.026*** oru_gcert_cert -0.082*** 
 (13.210)  (7.423) 
ATN 0.031*** oru_gcert_dip 0.015 
 (13.777)  (1.563) 
IRU 0.004* oru_gcert_bach 0.118*** 
 (1.952)  (32.361) 
Natural and Physical Science -0.076*** oru_gdip_cert -0.117*** 
 (20.422)  (12.961) 
Information Technology -0.031*** oru_gdip_dip -0.008 
 (7.643)  (0.901) 
Engineering -0.008** oru_gdip_bach 0.089*** 
 (2.006)  (31.084) 
Architecture -0.098*** oru_mast_cert -0.122*** 
 (17.467)  (14.613) 
Agriculture and Environment -0.138*** oru_mast_dip 0.066*** 
 (27.394)  (8.391) 
Nursing -0.113*** oru_mast_bach 0.183*** 
 (28.156)  (63.714) 
Medicine -0.028*** oru_phd_cert 0.076*** 
 (8.149)  (3.249) 
Education -0.062*** oru_phd_dip 0.084*** 
 (16.597)  (4.066) 
Society and Culture -0.058*** oru_phd_bach 0.199*** 
 (21.762)  (39.303) 
Creative Arts and Others -0.117*** Industry  Included 
 (28.527)   
Self-employed 0.015*** Year of Graduation Included 
 (2.679)   
Private Sector -0.054***   
 (25.817) Observations 569,325 
Short-term employment -0.095*** Adjusted R-squared 0.188 
 (49.105) F-statistic 1720.73 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.3: F-Statistics and Partial R-squared Values for Variable Groups 
Set of Variables F-Statistic Partial R-squared 
Personal Characteristics 1653.79 0.024 
Study Characteristics 273.23 0.004 
Industry of Employment 374.51 0.011 
Broad Fields of Study 233.65 0.004 
Year of Graduation 112.64 0.024 
ORU 516.40 0.022 
Note: P-values were highly significant for all sets of variables.   
 
Graduates from a non-English speaking background earn 3.9 percent less than their 
English speaking counterparts. Further, those who are not of Australian residency 
status earn a substantial 20.2 percent less. Thus, foreign workers who come from 
non-English speaking backgrounds could earn up to a quarter less than their peers. 
Evidence of such substantial wage differences had been uncovered in earlier studies 
on Australian graduates. Chia and Miller (2008), for example, found that graduates 
who were born in non-English speaking countries earned 14 percent less than the 
native born. A similar estimate, of 16 percent, was reported in Li and Miller (2009), 
although they also found favourable earnings effects for those born in non-English 
speaking countries who arrived in Australia as a child.  
 
Age has a small, positive effect on graduate earnings for the overwhelming majority 
of the sample. When evaluated at 20 years of age, there is a very modest 1.9 percent 
increase in earnings with an extra year of age. The positive impact on earnings 
continues until the graduates are 45 years old, thereafter age is associated with small, 
negative impacts. This pattern is typical in studies of earnings determination in 
Australia (see, for example, Borland and Suen 1994). The other measure of 
experience in the model, tenure, shares the same pattern with age, but with even 
smaller impacts. After ten years of tenure, earnings increase by a negligible 0.7 
percent.  
 
The coefficients on broad fields of study indicate that there is a large variation in 
graduate earnings across fields of study. The field of study that yields the largest 
premium in graduate earnings is the omitted category of Management and 
Commerce. Agriculture and Environment graduates earn the least, at 13.8 percent 
less than Management and Commerce graduates. Science graduates earn 7.6 percent 
less than the reference group, and graduates from the Architecture, Nursing, and 
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Other fields of study earn around ten percent less. In this regard, there are some 
differences between the Australian graduate labour market and that of the United 
States. In particular, a comprehensive study by Carnevale, Strohl and Melton (2011) 
examined the earnings of all graduates who have bachelor’s degrees in the United 
States. Their study found a wide disparity in earnings by major. The top earners in 
the United States majored in Engineering, and had a median salary 314 percent 
higher than the lowest earners, who majored in Counselling Psychology. Computers 
and Mathematics graduates were the second highest earners, while Business 
graduates were the third highest earners in the study by Carnevale, Strohl and Melton 
(2011). Education and Arts majors were the least financially rewarded.  
 
4.4.1 The Earnings Impacts of ORU 
The results of the F-tests conducted to determine if the estimated ORU coefficients 
were statistically different from each other are presented in Table 4.4. The first set 
consists of seven separate tests, and examines whether the estimated coefficients on 
the overeducated were equal within each degree type. Each of these seven F-tests 
was statistically significant at the one percent level. This indicates that the earnings 
effects of overeducation for a specific qualification vary according to the level of 
overeducation. From the methodological perspective, with the large number of 
observations available for this study, it would be inappropriate to follow Vahey 
(2000) and represent the overeducated at each level of education by a single dummy 
variable.
33
  
 
The second set consists of three tests, and looks at whether the estimates were 
statistically the same across job types. For example, for certificate level jobs the F-
test looks at whether oru_dip_cert = oru_ascdeg_cert = … = oru_phd_cert. Again, 
each of these F-tests was statistically significant at the one percent level, further 
attesting to the heterogeneity of the wage effects associated with overeducation in the 
graduate labour market in Australia.  
 
  
                                                 
33
 Vahey’s (2000) approach, however, was a practical way of analysing the smaller sample in his 
study.  
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Table 4.4: F-Tests for Equality of ORU Coefficients 
 Set Description F-Stat Prob > F 
(i) F-tests by Degree Type Associate Degree*** 27.80 0.0000 
  Bachelor’s Pass Degree*** 273.94 0.0000 
  Bachelor’s Honours Degree*** 156.13 0.0000 
  Graduate Certificate*** 191.90 0.0000 
  Graduate Diploma*** 289.01 0.0000 
  Masters Degree*** 706.55 0.0000 
  PhD*** 27.53 0.0000 
     
(ii) F-tests by Job Type Certificate Level Job*** 31.81 0.0000 
  Diploma Level Job*** 86.50 0.0000 
  Bachelor’s Pass Degree Level Job*** 468.28 0.0000 
     
(iii)  F-test for Coefficients on the 
Undereducated** 
6.36 0.0117 
     
(iv)  F-Test for all ORU Coefficients*** 657.54 0.0000 
Notes: ** and *** denote significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. 
 
Third, an F-test of the equality of all of the 20 estimated coefficients for the 
overeducated was conducted. This null hypothesis was also rejected. Finally, an F-
test was undertaken to see if the two estimated coefficients on the undereducated are 
equal. This null hypothesis could not be rejected. These tests thus suggest that there 
is ‘value-added’ in a more detailed specification of the overeducation dummy 
variables in the present study, as compared to the simple approach utilised in typical 
studies. In other words, a detailed dummy variable specification of the ORU model 
of earnings, where the data permits, is attractive for the purposes of uncovering more 
of the ORU earnings effects by the extent of mismatch. This is illustrated below.  
 
As there are a number of ORU dummy variables, the discussion of results will be on 
groups of dummy variables, based on the attained level of qualification. Following 
this description of the findings according to the attained level of qualifications, 
comparisons are provided based around a graphical exposition. The benchmark 
category for the ORU dummy variables is graduates who have attained a bachelor’s 
pass degree qualification, who are correctly matched to jobs which require a 
bachelor’s pass degree.   
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4.4.2 Diploma Graduates 
The estimated coefficients for diploma graduates capture all three effects of being 
overeducated, being undereducated, and being appropriately matched to their jobs.
34
 
Interestingly, graduates from this only other ‘matched’ category, who work in a job 
that requires a diploma, have hourly earnings which do not differ statistically from 
those of the reference group, indicating that they earn similar wages to those 
appropriately trained who have a bachelor’s pass degree. The undereducated 
graduates here, who work in a job that requires a bachelor’s pass degree, have a 
modest earnings premium of 3.1 percent compared to the reference group. This 
stands slightly contrary to the literature, whereby undereducated graduates are 
expected to earn less, due to both the lower level of educational attainment and their 
job mismatch. This issue is addressed below. 
 
The overeducated diploma graduates have the largest earnings penalty amongst all 
the other overeducated groups, and earn 21.6 percent less than the correctly matched 
bachelor’s pass graduates. Thus, for diploma graduates, a large variance in earnings 
exists depending on the type of jobs they are in. The undereducated in this category 
earn up to 25 percentage points more than the overeducated. This range of findings 
could be a reflection on atypical job assignments that have leverage due to the 
relatively small sample size, as each of the job-education mismatch categories for the 
diploma graduates accounts for less than 0.3 percent of the total sample.  
 
Alternatively, the findings could also be a reflection of the graduates’ previous 
qualifications. As the dataset contains information on the level of the graduates’ 
previous qualification, this was examined. It was revealed that around one-fifth of 
the diploma graduates reported that they held an undergraduate or postgraduate 
qualification before their current diploma qualification. Another 12 percent have 
another qualification at the diploma level. Hence, equation (4-1) was re-estimated, 
excluding these graduates. The estimated coefficient on the overeducated diploma 
graduates retained the same level of impact and statistical significance. The 
estimated coefficient for correctly matched diploma graduates, however, indicated 
that this group earned 3.4 percent less than the benchmark group of correctly 
                                                 
34
 Typical fields of study for these diploma graduates include Paramedical Studies, Police Studies, 
Business Management and also Languages.  
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matched bachelor’s pass graduates, significant at the one percent level. 
Undereducated diploma graduates now have earnings that are not statistically 
different from the benchmark group, unlike the modest premium observed 
previously. These results are in line with expectations, and the literature.
35
 
 
4.4.3 Associate Degree Graduates 
The undereducated associate degree graduates have earnings that do not differ 
significantly from those of the benchmark group. However, the overeducated 
associate degree holders are penalised substantially for their overeducation, or are 
unable to utilise their surplus educational attainment efficiently in their jobs. These 
earnings penalties enlarge the more they are overeducated, that is, those who work in 
diploma level jobs earn 6.8 percent less, while those who work in a certificate level 
job have an earnings penalty almost three times more, at 18.5 percent. Graduates 
with this level of education, therefore, also experience large disparities in earnings 
depending on their jobs, albeit on a smaller scale compared to the diploma graduates.   
 
4.4.4 Bachelor’s Pass Degree Graduates 
Overeducated graduates in this group also experience substantial earnings penalties. 
Graduates who work in a job that requires a diploma earn 9.2 percent less than their 
correctly matched counterparts. However, their peers who worked in even lower 
level occupations that require only a certificate earn up to 15.6 percent less. 
Employment in a job that requires lesser qualifications is, therefore, of great 
detriment to bachelor’s pass degree graduates. With respect to the findings thus far, 
the importance of the level of educational attainment pales in comparison to the 
requirements of the actual job itself. Clearly, it is the latter that dictates wages.  
 
4.4.5 Bachelor’s Honours Degree Graduates 
Honours degree graduates who are overeducated in a diploma or certificate level job 
earn less than the reference group, with the earnings gap ranging from 3.7 percent 
less for those in a diploma level job, and up to 10.1 percent less for those in a 
certificate level job. Those who work in a job that still requires an undergraduate 
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 Examination of the other estimated ORU effects discussed below indicated that these were not 
impacted by the inclusion of graduates with prior qualifications.  
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degree have a very modest earnings premium of 2.7 percent. Given that an honours 
degree generally requires an additional year of study, the very small earnings 
premium suggests that an honours degree is an investment that does not offer very 
good returns.  
 
4.4.6 Graduates with Graduate Certificates or Graduate Diplomas 
The graduates in these two categories have similar impacts on their earnings from 
being overeducated. Graduate certificate holders in a certificate level job earn 8.2 
percent less than the benchmark group, while their similarly overeducated peers 
holding a graduate diploma earned 11.7 percent less. These graduates, however, earn 
more than the benchmark category if they are in a bachelor’s pass level job. 
Specifically, graduate certificate holders earn 11.8 percent more while graduate 
diploma graduates earn 8.9 percent more.  
 
The estimated coefficients on working in a diploma level job were both insignificant, 
for both types of educational attainment. In this regard, there appears to be a pattern. 
Being overeducated in a job that requires a vocational or training qualification 
(certificate) has rather adverse earnings consequences. Conversely, having surplus 
qualifications in jobs that require an undergraduate qualification is associated with 
more modest disadvantages in the labour market. As mentioned above, the pattern of 
the returns to overeducation is very similar for both levels of education.  
 
4.4.7 Masters Graduates 
The general trend observed so far for overeducation extends to the graduates who 
have a masters degree. That is, masters graduates who are overeducated in a 
certificate level job have much lower earnings, by 12.2 percentage points, than the 
appropriately trained bachelor’s pass graduates. Those in a diploma level job have a 
relatively small earnings premium of 6.6 percent. Finally, the graduates in a 
bachelor’s degree level job experience a rather substantial 18.3 percent earnings 
advantage.  This pattern follows on from the observed trend for graduate certificate 
and graduate diploma holders. Specifically, graduates with postgraduate degrees who 
work in a vocational qualification based job have extremely detrimental earnings 
effects, while the pay-off to working in a job requiring a bachelor’s pass degree 
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qualification is rather substantial. Masters graduates in jobs requiring diplomas have 
earnings in between those in jobs in the other two categories.  
 
4.4.8 PhD Graduates 
Doctoral graduates who are, by definition, the most overeducated category, have 
positive estimated coefficients for all categories. Doctoral graduates in a certificate 
level job earn 7.6 percent more than the reference group, while those in a diploma 
level job do slightly better, at 8.4 percent more. A substantial earnings premium of 
around 20 percent was estimated for those in a bachelor’s level job. Further 
comments on these earnings returns will be made in comparison with the 
corresponding returns from other attained levels of education in the next section.  
 
4.4.9 Comparison across Attained Levels 
It is generally observed that the more extensive the overeducation, the greater the 
earnings penalty. The estimated returns to selected attained levels of education are 
graphed in Figure 4.1, which consists of two panels. Panel (i) on the left presents the 
estimated ORU coefficients for those who have attained a bachelor’s pass degree or 
lower qualification. These groups consist of a mix of the overeducated, correctly 
matched, and undereducated. Panel (ii) charts the ORU coefficients for those with a 
bachelor’s pass degree or higher qualification, who, with the exception of the 
benchmark group of correctly-matched bachelor’s pass graduates, are all 
overeducated. Recall that the F-tests presented earlier, namely the ‘F-tests by Degree 
Type’, indicate that the overeducation earnings effects within a degree type are 
characterised by statistically significant variations.  
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Figure 4.1: OLS Estimates of the Returns to Education by Level Attained 
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Looking at panel (i) of Figure 4.1, it can be seen that the overeducated for all three 
education groups working in certificate level jobs earn substantially less than the 
reference group of correctly-trained bachelor’s pass graduates, experiencing lower 
earnings ranging from 15.6 to 21.6 percent less. The correctly matched diploma 
graduates actually earn more in comparison to the other two higher but overeducated 
groups of associate degree and bachelor’s pass degree graduates. In particular, 
bachelor’s pass degree graduates, who have the highest educational attainment 
amongst these graduates, earn the least in this job category. Note, however, that it 
was shown earlier that the diploma graduates have higher levels of previous 
qualifications. The exclusion of these ‘highly qualified’ diploma graduates led to a 
decline in the earnings premiums previously observed for the correctly matched and 
undereducated groups. Furthermore, those in bachelor’s degree level jobs have very 
similar levels of earnings, regardless of educational attainment. This similarity in 
earnings is even more pronounced when the diploma and associate degree graduates 
who have previous higher educational qualifications are excluded. The pattern in 
panel (i) of Figure 4.1 thus indicates strongly that a worker’s earnings are determined 
by the nature and requirements of the work that is done, and not primarily by the 
formal education that is brought to the job.  
 
The coefficients presented in panel (ii) of Figure 4.1 are for the overeducated, except 
for the appropriately trained bachelor’s pass degree graduates (i.e., the reference 
category). All of the curves, except for those for PhD graduates, have reasonably 
similar shapes. The predicted earnings effects for jobs requiring a bachelor’s pass 
degree indicate that earnings increase with the level of qualification within that job 
type. That is, over-qualified workers in occupations that require a bachelor’s pass 
degree earn more than the correctly matched bachelor’s pass degree graduates, with 
the extent of the earnings advantage rising with the level of qualifications. Gaining a 
higher qualification thus appears to attract a financial reward, even if it results in 
being overeducated.  
 
A similar description applies to jobs that require a diploma, where the earnings 
effects follow the same order as the level of qualification, although in each instance 
workers in jobs that require a diploma earn less than workers in jobs that require a 
bachelor’s pass degree.  
 85 
 
 
In the case of jobs that require a certificate, there are two exceptions to the general 
pattern documented for the other two job types. First, the relatively small number of 
PhD graduates employed in jobs that require a certificate (see Table 4.1) do quite 
well. A PhD offers some protection from the disadvantage associated with being 
overeducated, though the small numbers involved suggests caution be exercised in 
making this assessment. Second, the masters graduates employed in certificate level 
jobs earn about the same as those with lower level qualifications in the same type of 
jobs. This suggests -  as do the data in panel (i) - that any advantage associated with a 
higher level qualification gets eroded when there is an extensive level of 
overeducation.  
 
Figure 4.2: Comparisons of Estimated Earnings by Educational Attainment 
 
This point could be made evident with the help of a further illustration. Thus, Figure 
4.2 plots the estimated coefficients for all the different educational attainments, by 
job category. It is obvious that for jobs requiring a certificate, graduates from most 
levels of qualifications earn less than the benchmark group of adequately trained 
bachelor’s pass graduates, with the earnings penalties declining as the level of 
qualification increases. Graduates working in bachelor’s pass degree jobs all have 
positive earnings premiums, which increase with the level of qualification. The F-
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tests of Table 4.4, ‘F-tests by Job Type’, indicate that these variations across the 
overeducation effects within a job category are statistically significant.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the earnings effects of ORU in the Australian graduate 
labour market. Educational mismatch is very prevalent in this market, with over 60 
percent of graduates being incorrectly matched to their jobs, even four months after 
graduation.  
 
Several general patterns have emerged in the analysis of ORU in graduates’ earnings, 
using the Vahey (2000) specification. First, being undereducated produced either 
statistically insignificant, or very small positive earnings effects. Second, substantial 
earnings penalties arise for those overeducated in certificate or diploma level jobs. 
Third, those overeducated in a diploma level job fare slightly better, but most 
experience a modest detriment in the form of reduced earnings. Only masters or 
doctoral graduates employed in diploma level jobs obtain positive earnings impacts, 
relative to the benchmark group of correctly matched bachelor’s pass degree 
graduates. Last, being overeducated in a job requiring a bachelor’s degree brings 
modest to large earnings premiums, from 2.7 percent for bachelor’s honours 
graduates, to 19.9 percent for doctoral graduates. This result is similar to that in 
Vahey (2000), who observed that male graduates had positive returns to 
overeducation if the job required at least a bachelor’s degree. However, the marginal 
returns to earnings decrease quickly with extensive amounts of overeducation.  
 
From the methodological perspective, it has been shown that the Vahey (2000) 
specification is a better fit to the data than a more parsimonious model where the 
overeducated categories are grouped, either across all overeducated categories, or 
across the overeducation groups within a given level of educational attainment, or 
across those for a particular job type. Moreover, adopting the more detailed 
description of education-occupation mismatch proposed by Vahey (2000) generates 
results which are characterised by a high degree of regularity, as illustrated in Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2. This regularity strengthens the main empirical conclusions of the 
study, that the estimates from the model of earnings in the analysis indicate the 
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strong tendency for earnings to follow jobs, and for the distinction among types of 
qualifications to lessen, the more extensive the overeducation.  
 
There are, thus, several points which might be made with regards to the findings of 
this chapter and the preceding one. Recall that the preceding chapter uncovered a 
large incidence of overeducation, of around 60 percent, in the Australian graduate 
labour market. The findings in this chapter have revealed that those who are 
overeducated experience reduced returns to their education, or even negative 
earnings effects, in the case of the majority of those who are in a certificate or 
diploma level job. This suggests that the rate of higher education expansion is 
exceeding the demand for graduates in the labour market.  
 
Further, the incidence of overeducation across the years of study indicates that this is 
not a recent phenomenon, and that high rates of overeducation have been prevalent 
throughout the past decade. In addition, there can be severe earnings penalties 
associated with being overeducated. The focus, therefore, should not be on a blanket 
expansion of higher education. Instead, a targeted approach would be more 
favourable to both individuals and the economy. There is a well-publicised shortage 
of skilled workers in Australia. The Sydney Morning Herald (2012b), for example, 
reported on a recent change in Australia’s migration policy to expedite work visas for 
tradesmen, such as electricians and plumbers, from the US. The rationale for this 
policy change according to Australian Skills Minister, Chris Evans, was to 
“…address skills shortages in Australia by filling shortfalls in particular areas with 
qualified candidates from the US…”.  
 
Apart from the media, the skills shortage in Australia has also been studied and 
analysed by governmental agencies. For instance, the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations regularly studies, surveys and monitors the 
labour market to identify areas of shortages on a state-by-state or national level 
(Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2012c). A look at 
the national skills shortages list for 2011 indicates that the main areas of shortages 
appear to be for education professionals, trades workers, and certain health 
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professionals or specialised engineers.
36
 It would, therefore, be more value-added to 
use this information to inform education policy and attract funding into areas of 
need, perhaps in other sectors of tertiary education. The analyses in the preceding 
chapter have also identified differences in the probability of overeducation across 
various fields of study. These findings may be used to inform policy makers on the 
areas of demand in the graduate labour market, where greater priority and resources 
might be diverted to.    
                                                 
36
 These are generalisations. The actual list is much more detailed, and follows a six digit occupational 
classification code in the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations.  
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CHAPTER 5  
The Impact of Overeducation on the Gender Wage Gap 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In a meta-analysis of 263 international empirical studies spanning from the 1960s to 
the late 1990s, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) reported a halving of the 
gender wage gap, from 65 percent to 30 percent. This decline was attributed by these 
authors to the equalisation of human capital endowments. The typical Blinder-
Oaxaca wage residual, or the gender wage gap usually attributed to labour market 
discrimination, was reported to have been unchanged over time.  
 
The gender wage gap in Australia has also fallen considerably since the 1960s (see, 
for instance, Borland 1999; Gregory 1999). In contrast to the situation overseas, 
however, the change in Australia appears in large part to be due to a decrease in the 
size of the Blinder-Oaxaca wage residual, following the Equal Pay decisions of 1969 
and 1972, and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 (Miller 1994). Nevertheless, a 
standardised gender pay gap of up to 15 percent remains (Borland 1999). 
 
Recent studies of this gender pay gap have documented a number of striking 
patterns. First, it has been established that the gender pay gap is quite modest among 
15-19 year olds, and increases with age (ABS 2004). The minor gender wage gap 
among 15-19 year olds could be due to minimum wage effects. The male minimum 
wage was extended to females in 1974. Under this explanation, it would be expected 
that there would be a reasonably sharp jump in the gender pay gap between youth 
and older workers, as one moves from a wage-setting regime where minimum rates 
of pay are more prevalent to a situation where wages are more likely to be above the 
minimum. An alternative explanation, that draws on a more gradual widening of the 
female wage disadvantage with age, is that the measure of labour market experience 
included in the conventional education and experience earnings equation becomes 
increasingly error prone among older workers. 
 
A second pattern evident in the studies is that the gender wage gap is larger among 
the better educated than it is among the less-well educated (OECD 2011). The 
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greater wage disadvantage experienced by tertiary educated females compared to 
their counterparts without post-secondary qualifications is presumably a reflection of 
the glass ceiling effect reported by Kee (2006). This may also be linked to 
institutional factors. The graduate labour market is a relatively high-wage market, 
with average starting salaries well above the average for non-graduates of a similar 
age. Preston (2001, pg. 199) argues that “Females benefit from institutional 
regulation (e.g. minimum wage laws) when it comes to wage determination”. It 
would therefore be expected that as institutional regulation would have little impact 
on the graduate labour market the graduate gender wage gap could be significant.  
 
From this perspective, a study of gender wage discrimination in the graduate labour 
market has much appeal. It will permit assessment of the relative strengths of the 
countervailing ‘young age’ and ‘high level of education’ influences on the gender 
wage gap. This is one aim of the current chapter. Moreover, the analyses will be 
undertaken using perspectives from the overeducation/required 
education/undereducation literature. This seems particularly apt, given the changes in 
the higher education participation rates of males and females in recent decades. Up to 
the early 1970s, the participation rate of males at most levels of education exceeded 
that of females (Le and Miller 2002). Since then, however, the relative standing has 
been reversed. For example, The Australian (2011d; 2011e) reports that over the 
2000 to 2009 decade, the higher education attainment rate was 39 percent for 
females, and only 26 percent for males.  This greater representation of females 
among graduates raises the question of whether it is reflected in females being more 
likely to be overeducated. In other words, given that females are more likely to 
engage in higher education, it might be that larger proportions of them are in jobs 
which are not suited to their level of educational attainment. Related to this, it is of 
interest to see how individuals fare in the graduate labour market if they are not 
matched properly to their jobs, whether any penalty to such education-occupation 
mismatch differs for males and females, and whether the overeducation phenomenon 
contributes to the gender pay gap in the graduate labour market. These seemingly 
important issues are addressed below.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on overeducation, with an emphasis on studies in this literature that 
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examine gender differences. The gender differences in educational mismatch are 
discussed in the context of the ‘job search’ hypothesis (Frank 1978). These are 
followed by a discussion on the methodology and measurement issues of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition methodology. Section 3 presents the methodology to be used 
in the statistical analyses for this chapter. Section 4 presents and discusses the results 
of the estimations. Finally, a conclusion is offered in section 5.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Over-, Required and Under-Education (ORU) 
There is a well-developed literature on the incidence and earnings effects of Over-, 
Required, and Under-education (ORU). This literature has its origins in Freeman 
(1976), though the empirical framework that is now commonly used is due to 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981). The key concept considered is that while most 
individuals will be ‘matched’ to their jobs on the basis of their education, some will 
not be. Individuals with education in excess of that required by the job are considered 
‘overeducated’. Conversely, individuals who have less education than that required 
for the job are taken to be ‘undereducated’. The labour market outcomes of matched 
and mismatched individuals could differ.  
 
Various conceptual frameworks and measurement issues in this literature are 
discussed in Hartog (2000) and Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011). A discussion of the 
empirical frameworks which have been used by studies examining ORU can be 
found in McGuinness (2006). Each of these studies offers a summary of the 
empirical findings in the overseas literature, while a survey of the Australian 
literature is presented in Miller (2007). A number of findings have emerged from the 
empirical studies. While some of these findings have been covered in the literature 
reviews in earlier chapters, they are briefly described here. The first finding relates to 
the definition of educational mismatch.
37
 A number of studies have shown that 
whereas the estimated wage effects are robust regardless of the approach adopted, the 
measured incidence of overeducation depends on the definition of mismatch 
employed (Hartog 2000). The objective approaches, which will be used in the 
analysis below, are explained in more detail in section 3.  
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 See Chapter 2.  
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The second finding relates to the incidence of educational mismatch in the labour 
market. Hartog’s (2000) review found that, on average, a substantial 40 percent of 
workers are not correctly matched to their jobs.
38
 Third, while the earnings returns to 
being overeducated are positive, they are less than the earnings returns on required 
education. Returns to surplus years of education typically range from one-half to 
two-thirds of the returns to years of required education. Fourth, workers who are 
undereducated earn more than their peers with the same level of education but who 
are working in a correctly matched (and hence lower level) job. This might be 
attributed to the presence of unobservable factors, such as innate ability or the 
propensity to work hard, such that these undereducated individuals are able to enter 
jobs which they would otherwise be unqualified for. Fifth, it has been reported that 
there are differences between males and females in both the incidence of education-
occupation mismatch, and the wage effects of such mismatch. 
 
5.2.2 The Job Search Hypothesis 
Studies of gender differences in the incidence and effects on wages of education-
occupation mismatch have been guided by several theoretical arguments. One of 
these is the job search hypothesis. This proposes that females are secondary income 
earners in the household (Frank 1978) and so are more constrained in their job 
search. This more limited job search is expected to result in females being more 
likely to be mismatched, and also to incur a larger wage penalty than males from 
being overeducated. Buchel and Battu (2003) report results that are consistent with 
this description of the labour market, in that married women were found to be more 
likely to be overeducated, relative to men or unmarried women. This was particularly 
so in small, localised labour markets.  
 
However, most studies reject the job search hypothesis. Vahey (2000), for example, 
restricted his sample to unmarried females (who are unlikely to be a secondary 
income earner) who were based in the metropolitan area, and compared the ORU 
earnings effects in this sample to those for the female sample without these 
restrictions. Vahey (2000) found that most of his ORU dichotomous variables were 
                                                 
38
 Recall that the analysis in Chapter 3 revealed a much higher rate of education-occupation mismatch, 
at around 61 percent. 
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statistically insignificant, and the two that were significantly different from zero 
exhibited impacts which were not reconcilable with the job search theory. Similarly, 
McGoldrick and Robst (1996) also find no indication that overeducated females are 
penalised more than males due to geographical constraints in their job search.  
 
A second theoretical perspective is offered by Robst (2007), based on consideration 
of both the supply- and demand-side factors that could lead to educational mismatch. 
Supply-side factors include career-oriented ones, such as accepting a promotion, or 
amenity- and constraint-related reasons, such as accepting a job nearer to home. The 
demand-side factors typically refer to the inability to find a job that matches the 
qualification possessed. Robst (2007) found that males were more likely to be 
overeducated due to career-related reasons, while females were more likely to be 
mismatched due to family-related reasons, although he acknowledges the possibility 
of reporting bias due to social norms.   
 
5.2.3 ORU Differences by Gender in the Graduate Labour Market 
A number of studies have examined gender differences in educational mismatch in 
the graduate labour market. There is disagreement in the research findings of these 
studies, and even within particular studies. Thus, Kler (2005) examined the 
Australian graduate labour market. He reported that, using the realised matches 
approach, 38 percent of female graduates were overeducated, compared with 46 
percent of male graduates. When the job analysis approach was used, however, there 
was no gender difference in the incidence of overeducation.
39
 McGuinness and 
Bennett (2007) studied graduate overeducation in Northern Ireland and found that 
females were more likely to be overeducated than men in their first job, although the 
gap was narrowed six years later.  
 
Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2000) used three different measures of overeducation in 
their study of the UK graduate labour market. The two subjective measures used 
revealed that males were more likely to be overeducated, while the realised matches 
approach yielded the opposite finding. The absence of a clear pattern regarding the 
                                                 
39
 A comparison of these results for graduates with findings from studies of all workers suggests these 
are outcomes specific to particular groups. Thus, another Australian study by Voon and Miller (2005), 
which covered all workers, reported that the incidence of mismatch was 29.5 percent for males and 
32.1 percent for females. 
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relative importance of overeducation for males and females seems to reflect both the 
measurement issue noted earlier, and differences across the labour markets of the 
various countries. 
 
The penalties to overeducation among graduates have also been found to differ by 
gender. Again there is considerable irregularity in the research findings across 
studies. McGuinness and Bennett (2007), for example, reported OLS estimated 
coefficients of -11.3 and -22.8 percent for overeducated males and females, 
respectively. This pattern is also evident in the study by Battu, Belfield and Sloane 
(2000), though the difference by gender works in the opposite direction in an earlier 
study by Dolton and Vignoles (2000). Kler’s (2005) study of the Australian graduate 
labour market reported greater returns to surplus education for females compared to 
males. These studies do not focus on the gender pay gap, or on the contribution that 
ORU status can make to this in the graduate labour market. These issues are 
addressed below.   
 
5.2.4 The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
The decomposition method used in the examination of earnings differentials between 
sub-groups of the population was developed in Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). It 
has come to be known as the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. In its most widely used 
form, the decomposition involves the estimation of a standard Mincerian earnings 
equation separately for the sub-groups of interest. This equation can be expressed as: 
 
(5-1)      
    
    
   
    
 
, i = 1,…,n; j= m for male and f for female 
 
where       denotes the earnings of individual i, expressed in logarithmic format, 
and    denotes the vector of characteristics hypothesised to impact on earnings. The 
superscript j identifies the membership of individual i in the male or female groups. 
The decomposition can thus be written as:  
 
(5-2)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    ̂ 
 ( ̅   ̅ )  ( ̂ 
   ̂ 
 ) ̅  ( ̂ 
   ̂ 
 ) 
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The use of the estimated coefficients, as well as the mean values of variables for both 
groups, thus allows for a decomposition of the difference between the mean wages of 
the sub-groups into two portions. The first term on the right hand side of equation (5-
2) attributes earnings differences to differences in endowments or characteristics, and 
is considered the ‘explained’ portion of the earnings gap. In this version of the 
decomposition the differences in endowments are evaluated using the male 
coefficients. This implies that the male wage structure is the wage structure that 
would prevail in the absence of discrimination, that is, it is the non-discriminatory 
norm. The second term on the right hand side of equation (5-2) attributes earnings 
differences to differences in coefficients, or returns to human capital characteristics. 
This portion thus implies unequal treatment of productivity characteristics in the 
labour market. The coefficient effects, together with the difference between the two 
constant terms in the estimation as expressed by the third term, form the unexplained 
portion of the earnings differential. These effects are generally attributed to 
discrimination in the labour market.  
 
There are also alternative decomposition methods which involve a three-fold 
decomposition of the earnings difference (see, for example, Jones and Kelley 1984 
for a discussion). These decomposition methods involve the addition of an 
interaction term which captures the joint effect of differences in endowments and 
coefficients. The interpretation of this interaction term differs, depending on the view 
of the labour market adopted. The different treatments of this interaction term are 
described in more detail in the following section. The two-fold decomposition 
appears to be preferred by researchers in the economics discipline, while the three-
fold decomposition seems to be preferred by researchers in the sociology discipline.  
 
5.2.5 Measurement Issues with the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
There are two main measurement issues that have been raised in the decomposition 
literature. The first issue lies in the choice of the non-discriminatory earnings 
structure. That is, the results of the decomposition of equation (5-2) above would be 
dependent on whether the male or female wage structure is used as the non-
discriminatory wage structure. This issue has been raised by a number of researchers, 
including Jones and Kelley (1984), Cotton (1988), Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and 
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Ransom (1994). The available research demonstrates that the results of wage 
decompositions are sensitive to the choice of the non-discriminatory benchmark. In 
Ferber and Green (1982), for instance, adopting the female wage structure as the 
non-discriminatory norm yields an estimate of two percent of the earnings 
differential as the discriminatory component. When the male wage structure was 
adopted, however, discrimination accounted for 70 percent of the wage differential.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the choice of the non-discriminatory benchmark 
depends on the wage structure that is thought to prevail in the absence of 
discrimination. Where rates of pay in the post-discrimination era are likely to be 
determined by the wages of the higher earning group, then these should be used to 
evaluate the endowment effect in the decomposition.
40
 In contrast, where rates of pay 
in the post-discrimination era are likely to be determined by the wages of the lower 
earning group, then it is the lower earning group’s pay that should be used to 
evaluate the endowment effect in the decomposition.
41
 The use of the alternative pay 
structures in the decomposition also provides a basis for reconciling the two-way and 
three-way decompositions. Hence, as Jones and Kelley (1984) show, the use of the 
pay structure of the higher earning group as the non-discriminatory norm in the two-
way model is equivalent to adding the interaction term for the three-way model to the 
endowment component. Similarly, the use of the pay structure for the low earning 
group in the simple decomposition is equivalent to adding the interaction term for the 
three-way model to the discrimination component.  
 
The idea that the post-discrimination wage structure would be given by one of the 
two prevailing wage structures has been argued to be inconsistent with the notion of 
market determined pay structures. The pay structure that emerges in the post-
discrimination era would presumably be somewhere in between the original two sets 
of pay. Neumark (1988), for example, assumes that both nepotism and discrimination 
                                                 
40
 A typical approach in the literature uses both the male and female wage structures as the non-
discriminatory wage structure in alternative decompositions, and the average results from the analyses 
are reported.  
41
 Jones and Kelley (1984) distinguish these decompositions by addressing how one would remove the 
endowment effect: by reducing any greater endowment of the higher earning group (removing a 
privilege under their privilege model) or by enhancing any inferior set of endowments of the lower 
earning group (removing a deficit under their deprivation model). Economists generally view the 
endowments of the two groups as equalising over the longer term in response to the removal of any 
differences in pay (see Cotton 1988).  
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occur at the same time, and the choice of the non-discriminatory structure should 
consider both scenarios in tandem. He thus suggests the use of a pooled wage 
structure as the non-discriminatory wage structure, where, in this instance, the pooled 
wage regression does not include a gender intercept shift. Cotton (1988) proposed the 
use of a weighted average of the two original wage structures with the weights being 
given by the employment shares of the groups being examined. The methodology in 
the Neumark-Cotton approach thus allows for the identification of the portions in the 
earnings differential that are attributable to nepotism and discrimination.  
 
In a further refinement of this approach, Fortin (2008) shows that the coefficients in 
the pooled regression could overstate the effects of variables which vary markedly 
across both groups.
42
 To overcome this, Fortin (2008) suggests the inclusion of a 
gender intercept shift in the pooled wage regression (see Fortin 2008, pg. 898).
43
 
Fortin’s (2008) method allows for the attribution of the gender wage gap to nepotism 
and discrimination, and is similar to Neumark (1988) and Cotton (1988) in that 
sense. The Fortin (2008) method appears to represent the preferred approach in the 
recent literature. An attractive feature of Fortin’s (2008) approach is that it is fully 
compatible with the classic pooled regression approach which includes a dummy 
variable for the disadvantaged group. That is, the estimated ‘discriminatory’ portion 
of the earnings gap from Fortin’s (2008) decomposition is equal to the estimated 
coefficient on the disadvantaged group in a pooled linear regression.  Fortin’s (2008) 
examples show that Neumark’s (1988) method yields extreme results, and, 
empirically, her ‘regression-compatible’ decomposition gives results more similar to 
Cotton’s (1988) approach.  
 
Another issue that has been raised with the decomposition literature lies with the use 
of dummy variables in the estimating model. It should be noted at this point that this 
issue relates only to the results of the individual components of the decomposition, 
and the aggregate result of the decomposition remains the same.
44
 The main issue 
                                                 
42
 Fortin (2008) referred to the estimated effects for unionisation and schooling in Neumark (1988), 
which were larger for the pooled sample compared to the corresponding estimates for the male and 
female samples.  
43
 Alternatively, Fortin (2008) suggests weighting the male and female dummy variables by their 
percentage in the sample to overcome this issue. 
44
 That is, the overall wage gap components remain the same, and only the amounts attributed to the 
specific coefficient effect vary due to this measurement issue.  
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that has been addressed is that the results of the decomposition are sensitive to the 
choice of the base or reference category where dummy variables are entered in the 
estimating equation (Jones 1983).
45
 As Jones and Kelley (1984) note, the choice of 
the omitted or benchmark category is often arbitrary, as all available options are 
usually equally logical. They illustrate this using data on earnings and schooling for 
males and females in Australia. Specifically, they distinguished five categories of 
schooling levels, and then omitted the highest or lowest level of schooling in 
alternative estimations of the gender wage gap. The estimates and conclusions 
differed markedly, depending on the choice of the benchmark scenario. In particular, 
the estimated results where university education was the omitted category indicated 
that females have favourable coefficients effects compared to men. This finding was 
reversed when primary school education was used as the benchmark in their analysis. 
Jones and Kelley (1984) argue that the differences are substantial, and that these 
differences point to vastly different conclusions and therefore remedial policy. 
 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) illustrate the same point in their empirical example 
looking at the gender wage gap of college professors. The partial contribution of 
degree type to discrimination was -19.3 log points, and the contribution of constant 
term differences was 21.9 log points, when ‘No Advanced Degree’ was used as the 
omitted case. Corresponding figures for the alternative specification using ‘PhD’ as 
the omitted case were -1.1 log points and 3.7 log points. While the overall impact 
was unchanged at 2.6 log points, the magnitude and importance of the role degree 
type plays in contributing or alleviating discrimination were vastly different.  
 
                                                 
45
 Further, Jones and Kelley (1984) show that the same general issue arises in the case of continuous 
variables, where the relative size of the components of discrimination in the decomposed wage gap 
depends on the locations of the zero points of the independent variables in the model. The issue here is 
that the choice of some, if not most or all, of the zero points of the explanatory variables used in the 
estimating model is arbitrary. This, in turn, causes the results of the decomposition to be arbitrary and 
be influenced by the choice of the zero points rather than actual discrimination. Jones and Kelley 
(1984) illustrated their point using Australian data on income, gender and schooling. They showed 
that substantial differences emerge in the portion of the income gap attributable to differences in the 
intercept terms and the estimated coefficients for males and females, when human capital endowments 
were specified as either years of schooling or age left school. In estimates of the model employing the 
latter ‘age left school’ specification, they found that the amount of the income gap attributable to the 
intercept terms dropped by 40 percent whereas the corresponding amount of the income gap 
attributable to the coefficients effect is 50 percent higher. This issue remains unresolved and generally 
serves as a reminder to exercise caution in making comparisons across studies. 
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More recent studies have proposed solutions to overcome the identification problems 
stated above. Yun (2005), for instance, suggests an ‘averaging approach’. This 
approach uses the average of the estimated characteristics and coefficients effects 
obtained using all the various possible reference groups for a particular categorical 
variable. Further, Yun (2005) illustrated how her approach can be implemented 
without the need for multiple estimation runs, through a normalisation of the 
regression equation.
46
 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Measurement of Education Mismatch 
In the present chapter, two different approaches are used to define educational 
mismatch. First, the job analysis approach, which was used in the preceding chapter 
4, will be used. As mentioned above, this approach uses required levels of education 
as defined in a job dictionary, specifically, the Australian Standard Classification of 
Occupations.  
 
In an alternative analysis, information from the 2006 Australian Census of 
Population and Housing will be used to determine the required levels of education 
separately for males and females. Specifically, this realised matches, or statistical, 
approach determines the modal levels of education for the various occupations, 
separately for males and females. Individuals with education levels above the modal 
levels are deemed to be overeducated. The reverse holds for the undereducated. The 
required levels of education defined here are more detailed than that from the ASCO, 
and consist of the following categories: i) year 10; ii) year 12; iii) certificate; iv) 
diploma, and; v) bachelor’s pass degree. Thus, a total of 40 ORU categories can be 
constructed in this part of the analysis (that is, eight actual levels times five required 
levels). While the number of correctly matched and undereducated categories here 
remains the same as under the ASCO-based approach, the increased number of 36 
overeducated categories permits a more detailed look at the earnings effects of being 
overeducated by larger extents. Further comments on this approach, and its benefits, 
are offered in a subsequent section. 
                                                 
46
 Other approaches have been proposed by Gardeazabal and Ugigdos (2004) and Neilson (2000). 
However, Yun (2005) notes that identical results are produced by all three approaches and the choice 
of approach adopted should thus be dictated by efficacy or ease.  
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5.3.2 Estimation Models 
The ORU model of earnings can be expressed in the following form: 
 
(5-3)                
      
      
          
   
where w represents the hourly wage for individual i, used in the analysis in natural 
logarithmic format,   represents a vector of characteristics correlated with earnings, 
and   ,    and    are vectors of dummy variables indicating if the ith individual is 
overeducated (D
o
), undereducated (D
u
), or correctly matched to his or her occupation 
of employment in terms of education (D
r
), as identified in the preceding sub-section. 
The variables included in   indicate the graduates’ gender, English speaking 
background, residency status, mode of enrolment, further study status, university 
group, broad field of study, self-employment status, contract length, industry of 
employment, sector of employment, year of graduation and labour market 
experience. Two proxies for experience are used, namely, the age of the graduate and 
the years of tenure, with both proxies entered into the estimating equation in 
quadratic form.  
 
In order to obtain a greater understanding of the ORU earnings effects, and their 
impacts on gender wage differences, a wage decomposition method, as outlined in 
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), is used. A general overview of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition methodology, and measurement issues, had been discussed in 
the literature review section of this chapter, and the wage decomposition equation 
that will be used in this part of the analysis was presented as equation (5-2). To 
accommodate the fact that a number of alternative non-discriminatory wage 
structures can be used in this computation, the decomposition here is based on the 
average of those which use, respectively, the male ( ̂ ) and female (  ̂ ) wage 
structures in this regard.
47
 The analysis will also incorporate Yun’s (2005) ‘averaging 
approach’ to overcome the measurement issues raised earlier, and draw comparisons 
between the results of the conventional decomposition method and those from Yun’s 
(2005) approach. 
                                                 
47
 See footnote 40.  
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Results from the ORU Model of Earnings 
The results from the estimation of the ORU model of earnings determination are 
presented in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 presents the results for the full sample in panel (i), 
for comparison purposes. Estimates for the separate samples of males and females 
are presented in panels (ii) and (iii), respectively.  
 
As the pooled sample results have been discussed in the preceding chapter, attention 
is drawn to just the estimated coefficient on gender. The estimated gender wage gap 
is five percent, and this is much smaller than that traditionally found in the literature, 
of up to 15 percent (see Borland 1999). As discussed in the introduction, the graduate 
labour market will be affected by a ‘young age’ effect that will decrease the female 
wage disadvantage, and a ‘high level of education’ effect that will increase the 
female wage disadvantage. The modest five percent wage effect in the pooled sample 
analysis suggests that the former of these is the more important influence. This is 
explored in a subsequent section.  
 
Further, note that earlier the discussion of results in chapter 4 drew attention to two 
striking features of the estimated earnings effects associated with overeducation. 
First, graduate earnings are more closely related to the nature of the job than to the 
qualification possessed. For example, graduates who work in a certificate level job 
earn less than the reference group, regardless of the educational level attained. 
Second, earnings premiums that tend to increase with the level of qualification are 
observed for graduates in bachelor’s pass degree level jobs. In other words, despite 
the close linkage of earnings to jobs, there remains a payoff to the acquisition of a 
higher level of qualification. An exception in this regard is associate degree 
graduates. These patterns are also observed for the estimations obtained for the 
separate samples of males and females. 
 
  
 102 
 
Table 5.1: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model of Earnings 
Variable Full Males Females 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Constant 2.305*** 2.233*** 2.274*** 
 (175.708) (95.120) (151.039) 
Female -0.048*** (a) (a) 
 (29.159)   
Age
#
 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
 (45.334) (26.984) (38.731) 
Age squared/1000 -0.397*** -0.400*** -0.404*** 
 (36.847) (20.527) (32.903) 
NESB
#
 -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.036*** 
 (17.352) (13.066) (11.803) 
Non-Australian
#
 -0.202*** -0.187*** -0.216*** 
 (33.694) (22.988) (24.338) 
Tenure 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (30.517) (20.954) (22.485) 
Tenure squared/1000 -0.404*** -0.471*** -0.376*** 
 (17.551) (13.555) (12.443) 
Double degree
#
 0.008*** -0.001 0.014*** 
 (3.016) (0.218) (3.939) 
Part-time study
#
 0.086*** 0.094*** 0.081*** 
 (43.574) (30.379) (31.497) 
Further Study
#
 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.004 
 (3.330) (3.603) (1.430) 
Go8 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 
 (13.210) (9.994) (9.378) 
ATN 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 
 (13.777) (7.856) (11.696) 
IRU
#
 0.004* -0.007* 0.011*** 
 (1.952) (1.911) (4.016) 
Natural and Physical Sciences
#
 -0.076*** -0.084*** -0.065*** 
 (20.422) (15.260) (12.916) 
Information Technology
#
 -0.031*** -0.041*** -0.007 
 (7.643) (8.234) (0.935) 
Engineering
#
 -0.008** -0.011** 0.012 
 (2.006) (2.456) (1.413) 
Architecture -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.092*** 
 (17.467) (13.191) (10.684) 
Agriculture and Environment
#
 -0.138*** -0.163*** -0.109*** 
 (27.394) (22.880) (15.294) 
Nursing
#
 -0.113*** -0.152*** -0.098*** 
 (28.156) (15.102) (21.165) 
Medicine
#
 -0.028*** -0.041*** -0.019*** 
 (8.149) (6.753) (4.510) 
Education
#
 -0.062*** -0.075*** -0.052*** 
 (16.597) (11.803) (11.240) 
Society and Culture
#
 -0.058*** -0.065*** -0.048*** 
 (21.762) (14.904) (14.257) 
Creative Arts and Others
#
 -0.117*** -0.134*** -0.102*** 
 (28.527) (18.337) (20.204) 
Self-employed 0.015*** 0.007 0.017** 
 (2.679) (0.873) (2.043) 
Private sector
#
 -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.052*** 
 (25.817) (15.709) (20.118) 
Short-term employment -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.093*** 
 (49.105) (29.550) (39.125) 
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Table 5.1: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model of Earnings (cont.) 
Variable Full Males Females 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
oru_dip_cert -0.216*** -0.186*** -0.234*** 
 (10.674) (6.022) (8.785) 
oru_dip_dip -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 
 (1.561) (1.158) (1.177) 
oru_dip_bach 0.031** 0.019 0.036** 
 (2.564) (1.033) (2.343) 
oru_ascdeg_cert
#
 -0.185*** -0.147*** -0.220*** 
 (9.440) (5.557) (7.704) 
oru_ascdeg_dip -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.066*** 
 (6.195) (4.961) (3.804) 
oru_ascdeg_bach -0.019 -0.016 -0.035 
 (1.155) (0.688) (1.471) 
oru_bach_cert -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.150*** 
 (55.637) (35.295) (42.038) 
oru_bach_dip -0.092*** -0.088*** -0.093*** 
 (27.292) (17.170) (20.650) 
oru_hons_cert -0.101*** -0.096*** -0.103*** 
 (14.606) (9.065) (11.428) 
oru_hons_dip
#
 -0.037*** -0.012 -0.053*** 
 (4.350) (0.971) (4.721) 
oru_hons_bach 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (7.719) (6.037) (5.719) 
oru_gcert_cert -0.082*** -0.072*** -0.094*** 
 (7.423) (4.913) (5.994) 
oru_gcert_dip 0.015 0.009 0.012 
 (1.563) (0.674) (0.807) 
oru_gcert_bach
#
 0.118*** 0.100*** 0.127*** 
 (32.361) (16.294) (28.118) 
oru_gdip_cert -0.117*** -0.130*** -0.110*** 
 (12.961) (9.141) (9.513) 
oru_gdip_dip -0.008 -0.009 -0.015 
 (0.901) (0.672) (1.281) 
oru_gdip_bach 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 
 (31.084) (18.749) (24.412) 
oru_mast_cert
#
 -0.122*** -0.143*** -0.109*** 
 (14.613) (12.174) (9.097) 
oru_mast_dip
#
 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 
 (8.391) (7.129) (3.518) 
oru_mast_bach 0.183*** 0.186*** 0.174*** 
 (63.714) (41.567) (45.974) 
oru_phd_cert
#
 0.076*** 0.010 0.121*** 
 (3.249) (0.289) (3.803) 
oru_phd_dip 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.089*** 
 (4.066) (2.698) (2.995) 
oru_phd_bach 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 
 (39.303) (26.622) (27.509) 
Industry  Included Included Included 
Year of Graduation Included Included Included 
Observations 569,325 221,746 347,579 
Adjusted R
2
 0.188 0.218 0.164 
F-statistic 1720.73 804.87 928.1 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. (a) indicates that the variable was not 
entered into the estimating equation. # indicates statistical difference for males and females.  
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The adjusted R-squared values for the male and female analyses are 0.218 and 0.164, 
respectively. The ORU model of earnings, therefore, can be said to have relatively 
higher power in explaining the earnings of male graduates. This could be due to two 
reasons. First, the estimated coefficients for the industry of employment variables 
indicate that employment in certain industries, such as education and mining, have 
estimated impacts of greater magnitude for males compared to females. Other 
industry variables, such as for higher education, construction and engineering, have 
statistical significance for males, but not for females. Second, due to data 
unavailability the model does not control for marital status or the number of children 
the graduates have. These characteristics, arguably, would impact on women more, 
as the household burden generally falls on women more than men.  
 
An F-test was conducted to see if there were gender differences in the estimated 
coefficients. This yielded an F-statistic of 21.254, indicating that some or all of the 
estimated coefficients for males and females differ. A comparison of the coefficients 
of specific variables for males and females revealed a number where there are 
statistically significant differences. These are denoted by the 
# 
beside the variable 
names in the table. For instance, male Information Technology graduates earn 4.1 
percent less than male Management and Commerce graduates (the benchmark group 
in the estimating equation), while the corresponding coefficient for females is 
insignificant. Male Agriculture and Environment graduates earn 16.3 percent less 
than the benchmark group, while female graduates in this category are slightly better 
off, with a smaller earnings disadvantage of 10.9 percent. Similarly, female Nursing 
graduates earn 9.8 percent less than the reference category while their male 
counterparts earn 15.2 percent less. These differences are reasonably minor, and 
affect relatively few in the sample, and so the discussion will focus on the gender 
differences in the ORU earnings effects. 
 
5.4.2 Gender Differences in the ORU Earnings Impacts 
There are a number of differences between males and females with respect to the 
estimated coefficients on the ORU variables. All of these differences relate to 
differences in the size of the point estimates, with the sign of the estimated impacts 
on earnings being consistent for both sexes. The ‘t’-tests of differences between 
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males and females on the specific ORU coefficients indicated that only six of the 
estimated ORU coefficients differed statistically by gender, namely: i) associate 
degree graduates working in certificate level jobs; ii) bachelor’s honours degree 
graduates working in diploma level jobs; iii) graduate certificate graduates working 
in bachelor’s pass level jobs; iv) masters degree graduates working in certificate 
level jobs; v) masters degree graduates working in diploma level jobs, and; vi) 
doctoral graduates working in certificate level jobs. Two general points can be made 
regarding these six differences. First, the ORU categories involved are heavily 
concentrated in the diploma and certificate level jobs and, hence, ORU differences 
by gender can be said to be more likely found for those in lower-level jobs. Second, 
for these six categories, females were worse off than males in only three categories.  
 
The most substantial penalty to being overeducated is for the associate degree 
graduates who are working in certificate level jobs (oru_ascdeg_cert): Whereas male 
associate degree graduates in certificate level jobs earn 14.7 percent less than the 
benchmark group their female counterparts earn 22 percent less than the reference 
category.  
 
Male graduates with a bachelor’s honours degree working in diploma level jobs have 
earnings that do not differ statistically from the benchmark group of correctly 
matched bachelor’s pass degree graduates. Female graduates with the same 
educational attainment and working in jobs that require a diploma, however, earn 5.3 
percent less than the female benchmark category. In the category of graduates with 
graduate certificates working in bachelor’s pass level jobs, females marginally 
outperform their male counterparts in earnings. Female graduates in this category 
earn 12.7 percent more than the reference group, while male graduates here earn ten 
percent more.  
 
Masters degree graduates working in diploma level jobs (oru_mast_dip) have 
positive returns to their higher qualifications. However, males in this category have 
an earnings return of 7.4 percent whereas females have a more modest return, of 4.1 
percent. Masters graduates working in certificate level jobs (oru_mast_cert) fare 
much worse than this, with males having earnings 14.3 percent less than the 
benchmark group, and females 11 percent less than the benchmark group.  
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A considerable gender difference in the magnitude of the ORU earnings impacts is 
observed for doctoral graduates in certificate level jobs - the most overeducated 
category. For male graduates, the impact of being overeducated in this instance is 
statistically insignificant compared to the benchmark group of male bachelor’s pass 
graduates working in matched jobs. Female graduates in this situation, however, get 
an earnings premium compared to the benchmark group of 12.1 percent for their 
surplus human capital. Note, however, that female PhD graduates employed in 
certificate level jobs have earnings around eight percentage points lower than female 
PhD graduates employed in jobs requiring a bachelor’s pass degree.  
 
Of the six estimated coefficients with statistically significant differences between 
males and females, three (oru_gcert_bach, oru_mast_cert and oru_phd_cert) 
indicated that females were better off compared to males in terms of the earnings 
effects associated with overeducation, which is contrary to the predictions of the job 
search hypothesis outlined above. Clearly, the above comparison of gender 
differences in the ORU earnings effects gives little support to this interpretation of 
the labour market. This, however, could be a reflection of the dominance of workers 
from metropolitan areas in the present analysis, who are not as geographically 
constrained in their job search.
48
 
 
5.4.3 The Role of Occupation of Employment 
There is a high degree of occupational segregation in Australia. While previous 
studies have shown that this is not detrimental to women’s relative rate of pay (see 
Jones 1983), the linkages with the ORU effects have not been explored. Equation (5-
3) was therefore re-estimated for the male and female samples with added controls 
for occupation. While the education-occupation match variables are created using 
data on the occupation of employment, fully 103 occupations were used to compile 
the reference levels of education, and dummy variables for the occupation of 
employment can also be included in the model provided this is done at a higher level 
of aggregation. Hence, only 11 dummies for occupational groups were entered into 
                                                 
48
 The data set contains information on the residential and employment postcodes of the graduates. 
However, these were not entered into the estimating equation, as there were missing values for a 
substantial number of the respondents.  
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the estimating equation: within each of these 11 occupational groups there is 
variation in the ORU variables.  
 
The results of these analyses of the ORU earnings effects are presented in Table 5.2. 
Panels (i) and (iii) in Table 5.2 replicate the results contained in Table 5.1, for ease of 
comparison with the estimates with occupational controls, set out in panels (ii) and 
(iv). One striking feature from Table 5.2 is the direction of impact in the ORU 
earnings effects as a result of adding controls for occupation. For males, the negative 
earnings effects associated with the ORU variables are reduced once occupations are 
taken account of. For example, male graduates with a masters degree who work in 
certificate level jobs have their earnings disadvantage reduced, albeit modestly, from 
14.3 percent, to 11.4 percent. On the contrary, females have their earnings 
disadvantage exacerbated once occupation is controlled for. This increase in earnings 
disadvantage can be rather substantial, as in the case of female graduates with 
graduate diplomas working in certificate level jobs. These female graduate diploma 
holders originally have an earnings penalty of 11 percent, and this earnings penalty 
increases by seven percentage points, to 18 percent, once occupation is controlled 
for. Females, therefore, seemingly enter occupations which are especially detrimental 
to earnings, and which do not utilise their surplus human capital well.  
 
  
 108 
 
Table 5.2: Selected Results of the ORU Model of Earnings  
Variables Males Males  Females Females  
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
oru_dip_cert
#
 -0.186*** -0.165*** -0.234*** -0.292*** 
 (6.022) (4.455) (8.785) (6.914) 
oru_dip_dip -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 -0.077** 
 (1.158) (0.608) (1.177) (2.054) 
oru_dip_bach 0.019 0.013 0.036** 0.036** 
 (1.033) (0.693) (2.343) (2.322) 
oru_ascdeg_cert
#
 -0.147*** -0.125*** -0.220*** -0.300*** 
 (5.557) (3.667) (7.704) (6.899) 
oru_ascdeg_dip -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.066*** -0.123*** 
 (4.961) (3.087) (3.804) (3.272) 
oru_ascdeg_bach -0.016 -0.033 -0.035 -0.034 
 (0.688) (1.391) (1.471) (1.473) 
oru_bach_cert
#
 -0.160*** -0.138*** -0.150*** -0.217*** 
 (35.295) (5.936) (42.038) (6.427) 
oru_bach_dip -0.088*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.153*** 
 (17.170) (4.151) (20.650) (4.557) 
oru_hons_cert
#
 -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.103*** -0.177*** 
 (9.065) (3.536) (11.428) (5.122) 
oru_hons_dip
#
 -0.012 -0.024 -0.053*** -0.116*** 
 (0.971) (0.956) (4.721) (3.284) 
oru_hons_bach 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 
 (6.037) (6.667) (5.719) (6.483) 
oru_gcert_cert
#
 -0.072*** -0.061** -0.094*** -0.173*** 
 (4.913) (2.274) (5.994) (4.690) 
oru_gcert_dip 0.009 0.018 0.012 -0.035 
 (0.674) (0.724) (0.807) (0.960) 
oru_gcert_bach
#
 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 
 (16.294) (14.029) (28.118) (27.827) 
oru_gdip_cert -0.130*** -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.180*** 
 (9.141) (4.051) (9.513) (5.106) 
oru_gdip_dip -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 -0.068* 
 (0.672) (0.161) (1.281) (1.926) 
oru_gdip_bach 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 
 (18.749) (18.393) (24.412) (25.173) 
oru_mast_cert -0.143*** -0.114*** -0.109*** -0.177*** 
 (12.174) (4.415) (9.097) (5.009) 
oru_mast_dip
#
 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.041*** -0.011 
 (7.129) (3.148) (3.518) (0.310) 
oru_mast_bach 0.186*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.169*** 
 (41.567) (38.805) (45.974) (45.174) 
oru_phd_cert 0.010 0.009 0.121*** 0.023 
 (0.289) (0.218) (3.803) (0.489) 
oru_phd_dip 0.078*** 0.074* 0.089*** 0.033 
 (2.698) (1.878) (2.995) (0.745) 
oru_phd_bach 0.192*** 0.203*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 
 (26.622) (27.505) (27.509) (27.643) 
Industry  Included Included Included Included 
Year of Graduation Included Included Included Included 
Occupation Not included Included Not included Included 
Observations 221,746 221,746 347,579 347,579 
Adjusted R
2
 0.218 0.225 0.164 0.167 
F-statistic 804.87 753.07 928.1 847.42 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. 
#
 indicates 
significance for the t-test of difference for the earnings models presented in panels (ii) and (iv).  
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The difference between males and females in the direction of change in the ORU 
earnings coefficients when broad occupational controls are added may be linked to 
gender differences in job mobility. Specifically, once the broad occupational groups 
are controlled for, the estimated ORU earnings impacts reflect the obtaining of the 
qualification, as well as the movement within the broad occupational category to 
where the worker is overeducated, correctly matched, or undereducated, as the case 
may be. Thus, the negative (positive) shifts in ORU earnings impacts for females 
(males) suggest the following. Females, upon obtaining their higher qualification, 
canvass a considerable amount of occupational mobility to minimise the effects of 
overeducation. This explains why females seem to have more negative overeducation 
earnings effects once occupational group is controlled for, and there is effectively a 
constraint placed on this mobility (to within the broad occupational group). Males, 
however, appear to be initially more constrained in moving within the broad 
occupational category. It could be that males move across broad occupational groups 
to appropriate low-paid entry level jobs, and the inclusion of the occupation dummies 
controls for the low pay in these jobs, and hence is associated with a lowering of the 
penalties associated with overeducation.   
 
Once again, ‘t’-tests of differences on the basis of gender were conducted on the 
estimated coefficients associated with the ORU and occupations variables. There are 
statistically significant gender differences for eight ORU categories and two 
occupational categories.
49
 For the ORU categories, these are indicated by 
#
 beside the 
name of the variables in Table 5.2. Adding occupational controls thus reveals a 
marginally higher extent of gender differences in the ORU earnings effects. This, 
once again, indicates that the applicability of the job search hypothesis to the 
Australian graduate labour market is likely to be limited. In all, there are only seven 
estimated coefficients out of the 23 ORU dummy variables which exhibit the effects 
predicted by the job search theory, although this is more than the three ORU dummy 
variables which concur with job search theory predictions in the prior analysis 
without occupational controls. As mentioned above, adding occupational controls 
results in more favourable shifts in earnings effects for females compared to males, 
                                                 
49
 The two occupational estimated coefficients that are statistically different by gender are those for 
health, and education professionals. While male health and education professionals earn seven and 
five percent more, respectively, than the benchmark category of intermediate clerical, sales and 
service workers, female graduates in the same jobs earn four and five percent less. 
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suggesting that females are more mobile across occupations. This would also run 
contrary to the predictions of the job search theory, or alternatively, assist in the 
explanation of why the job search theory does not apply in the Australian graduate 
labour market. Even if females (who are hypothesised to be the secondary income 
earners in their households) are more geographically constrained in their job search, 
the fact that they are more mobile across jobs could offset the negative earnings 
effects of having to ‘make do’ with jobs in the immediate vicinity.  
 
5.4.4 ORU Analyses Using Gender-Specific Required Levels of Education 
Thus far, the ORU variables have been constructed using the same reference levels 
of education for males and females.  In this section the analyses are undertaken using 
gender-specific reference levels of education for each occupation. The greater 
variation across the ORU categories under this approach provides a better basis for 
using a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the study of the gender earnings gap. 
 
The conventional job classification approach, such as in ASCO, holds that the same 
educational standard applies for all workers in an occupation.  Empirically, however, 
it often appears that standards differ between males and females. In the ‘reverse 
regression’ literature, for example, when schooling levels are regressed on income, a 
typical finding is that to receive similar pay females generally require higher 
amounts of education (see Goldberger 1984; Kapsalis 1982). Kamalich and Polachek 
(1982), for example, find that females have around 1.2 years more of schooling, 
compared to males with similar earnings.  
 
To address this issue, the modal qualification for each gender was obtained for each 
occupation using data from the 2006 Australian Census. There are 17 occupations, 
out of the total of 103 listed in the data, in which the modal levels of education 
differed by gender. Among these 17 occupations, in only 3 instances was the modal 
level of education higher for males than for females. However, despite the generally 
higher modal levels of education for females, their incidence of educational match 
remained unchanged from the corresponding figure found earlier in Chapter 3, at 38 
percent. Males, however, are less ‘matched’ to their occupations, with a 30 percent 
incidence of educational match, four percentage points less than in the preceding 
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section. This difference between males and females is likely to be a consequence of 
occupational segregation by gender and the lower reference levels of education in the 
analysis of male graduates.  
 
The results of the estimation of the earnings equation using the gender-specific 
modal levels of education are presented in Table 5.3. In this set of analyses the ORU 
variables have names beginning with cen. As with the ORU variables in the 
preceding sections, the cen variable names have the attained qualification in the 
middle portion (cert to phd), and the modal levels of education at the end portion 
(y10 to bach).  
 
The adjusted R-squared for the analysis of the full sample is 0.186, which is very 
similar to the earlier analysis reported in Table 5.1. The adjusted R-squared values 
for the male and female estimations in panels (ii) and (iii) are 0.215 and 0.162, 
respectively. Thus, there is no advantage, and perhaps even a slight disadvantage, 
from using the additional detail available in these alternative measures of required 
education. At face value, this suggests that the labour market is not overly discerning 
in this regard. However, the results of the ‘t’-tests of differences in the estimated 
earnings coefficients by gender revealed a much larger number of statistically 
significant earnings effects differences in the Table 5.3 analyses, as compared to 
those in Table 5.1. These are again denoted by the 
#
 beside the variables’ names. Out 
of the 87 variables in the model, estimated coefficients for 41 of them, or almost half, 
were found to differ statistically by gender.  A review of the estimated coefficients in 
panels (ii) and (iii) reveals that the magnitudes of earnings effects are generally 
larger for males, and in some cases are statistically significant for males but not for 
females. This is similar to the pattern evident in Table 5.1. Looking at fields of study, 
for example, it is observed that the estimates for the Information Technology and 
Engineering graduates are statistically significant at the one percent level for males, 
but are insignificant for females. Moreover, the estimates on Agriculture and 
Environment, Nursing, and Creative Arts and Others are larger (in absolute terms) 
for males.  
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Table 5.3: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, Gender-specific Required Education 
Variable Full 
(i) 
Male 
(ii) 
Female 
(iii) 
Constant 2.228*** 2.120*** 2.199*** 
 (171.798) (91.246) (148.410) 
Female -0.049*** (a) (a) 
 (29.650)   
Age
#
 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 
 (53.392) (32.029) (45.767) 
Age squared/1000 -0.455*** -0.466*** -0.461*** 
 (42.603) (24.032) (37.899) 
Tenure
#
 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 (39.528) (25.898) (28.936) 
Tenure squared/1000
#
 -0.538*** -0.609*** -0.502*** 
 (23.251) (17.259) (16.594) 
NESB
#
 -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.040*** 
 (19.578) (14.648) (13.149) 
Non-Australian  -0.214*** -0.213*** -0.227*** 
 (35.822) (26.568) (25.612) 
Further study
#
 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.003 
 (2.832) (3.034) (0.895) 
Go8
#
 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 
 (11.219) (9.954) (8.350) 
ATN 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (13.278) (9.041) (11.519) 
IRU
#
 -0.000 -0.011*** 0.008*** 
 (0.148) (2.943) (2.754) 
Natural and Physical Sciences  -0.090*** -0.085*** -0.082*** 
 (24.251) (15.413) (16.351) 
Information Technology
#
 -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.012 
 (8.136) (6.436) (1.585) 
Engineering -0.021*** -0.013*** 0.002 
 (5.394) (2.670) (0.223) 
Architecture -0.116*** -0.095*** -0.110*** 
 (20.724) (12.870) (12.745) 
Agriculture and Environment
#
 -0.137*** -0.158*** -0.113*** 
 (27.158) (22.057) (15.675) 
Nursing
#
 -0.124*** -0.155*** -0.113*** 
 (30.761) (15.201) (24.178) 
Medicine -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.032*** 
 (11.018) (6.886) (7.479) 
Education
#
 -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.060*** 
 (18.962) (11.950) (13.056) 
Society and Culture
#
 -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.049*** 
 (22.313) (14.735) (14.487) 
Creative Arts and Others
#
 -0.126*** -0.137*** -0.109*** 
 (30.672) (18.820) (21.485) 
Self-employed 0.019*** 0.014* 0.018** 
 (3.285) (1.720) (2.215) 
Private sector -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.050*** 
 (25.374) (15.084) (19.336) 
Short-term employment
#
 -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.098*** 
 (52.295) (32.906) (41.398) 
cen_dip_y10
#
 -0.374*** -0.228*** -0.523*** 
 (6.841) (3.438) (3.761) 
cen_dip_y12 -0.148*** -0.122** -0.172*** 
 (7.326) (2.453) (7.221) 
cen_dip_cert
#
 -0.016 0.013 -0.109*** 
 (1.394) (0.993) (3.334) 
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Table 5.3: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, Gender-specific Required Education 
(cont.) 
cen_dip_dip
#
 -0.055 -0.350*** 0.102*** 
 (1.255) (3.237) (7.991) 
cen_dip_bach 0.039*** 0.021 0.040*** 
 (3.230) (0.932) (2.613) 
cen_ascdeg_y10 -0.312*** -0.275*** -0.232** 
 (5.548) (3.523) (2.276) 
cen_ascdeg_y12
#
 -0.178*** -0.063* -0.197*** 
 (7.608) (1.953) (6.408) 
cen_ascdeg_cert
#
 -0.035*** -0.018 -0.165*** 
 (3.014) (1.514) (3.989) 
cen_ascdeg_dip -0.258*** -0.549 0.016 
 (2.979) (1.169) (1.358) 
cen_ascdeg_bach -0.008 -0.029 -0.018 
 (0.578) (0.900) (0.821) 
cen_bach_y10 -0.292*** -0.263*** -0.285*** 
 (30.049) (22.118) (14.824) 
cen_bach_y12
#
 -0.132*** -0.102*** -0.141*** 
 (48.965) (21.102) (39.460) 
cen_bach_cert
#
 -0.109*** -0.040*** -0.085*** 
 (22.742) (9.197) (17.352) 
cen_bach_dip
#
 -0.028*** -0.207*** 0.018 
 (3.453) (10.521) (1.393) 
cen_hons_y10
#
 -0.284*** -0.217*** -0.379*** 
 (8.568) (5.463) (5.795) 
cen_hons_y12
#
 -0.081*** -0.054*** -0.098*** 
 (12.468) (5.139) (11.080) 
cen_hons_cert
#
 -0.061*** -0.016 -0.046*** 
 (4.753) (1.485) (3.729) 
cen_hons_dip
#
 -0.026 -0.011 0.117** 
 (1.020) (0.246) (2.416) 
cen_hons_bach 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 
 (6.419) (5.564) (4.605) 
cen_gcert_y10 -0.228*** -0.224*** -0.212* 
 (4.958) (4.480) (1.919) 
cen_gcert_y12
#
 -0.017* 0.019 -0.055*** 
 (1.866) (1.387) (3.837) 
cen_gcert_cert
#
 -0.000 0.131*** 0.031* 
 (0.001) (16.014) (1.820) 
cen_gcert_dip
#
 0.040 -0.218*** 0.066 
 (1.441) (3.240) (0.907) 
cen_gcert_bach
#
 0.145*** 0.115*** 0.155*** 
 (40.735) (15.438) (34.943) 
cen_gdip_y10 -0.318*** -0.362*** -0.264*** 
 (8.523) (7.801) (3.780) 
cen_gdip_y12
#
 -0.064*** -0.046*** -0.086*** 
 (8.260) (3.327) (7.733) 
cen_gdip_cert
#
 -0.018 0.148*** -0.013 
 (1.255) (16.097) (1.003) 
cen_gdip_dip
#
 0.001 -0.108*** 0.118*** 
 (0.038) (3.539) (4.831) 
cen_gdip_bach
#
 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.099*** 
 (36.836) (15.462) (29.132) 
cen_mast_y10 -0.351*** -0.354*** -0.317*** 
 (11.979) (10.111) (6.113) 
cen_mast_y12
#
 -0.048*** -0.010 -0.082*** 
 (6.525) (0.867) (6.963) 
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Table 5.3: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, Gender-specific Required Education 
(cont.) 
cen_mast_cert
#
 0.055*** 0.238*** 0.065*** 
 (4.732) (38.381) (5.670) 
cen_mast_dip
#
 0.088*** -0.140*** 0.060* 
 (4.820) (3.711) (1.955) 
cen_mast_bach
#
 0.201*** 0.163*** 0.191*** 
 (71.672) (32.360) (51.265) 
cen_phd_y10 -0.256* -0.283*** -0.370 
 (1.823) (2.956) (0.933) 
cen_phd_y12 0.107*** 0.077** 0.132*** 
 (6.304) (2.365) (5.198) 
cen_phd_cert
#
 0.096** 0.228*** 0.145*** 
 (2.430) (13.918) (6.343) 
cen_phd_dip 0.188*** -0.020 0.534 
 (4.476) (0.169) (1.066) 
cen_phd_bach
#
 0.192*** 0.172*** 0.190*** 
 (38.078) (22.609) (26.514) 
Observations 569,325 221,746 347,579 
Adjusted R
2
 0.186 0.215 0.162 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. 
#
 indicates 
significance for the t-test of difference. (a) indicates that the variable was not entered in the 
estimating equation.  
 
The analyses disaggregated by gender, and using gender-specific modal levels of 
qualifications, are associated with greater variability in the ORU earnings impacts 
between males and females. Thus, using the ‘t’-tests of difference, 26 of the 39 ORU 
variables here differ statistically between males and females. This is a larger 
proportion than that found for the earlier analyses which did not use gender-specific 
required levels of education, and this is presumably linked to the greater detail used 
in the construction of the ORU variables in lower-skilled jobs. Second, the 
magnitude of the earnings differences by gender are substantially larger, compared to 
those found in the earlier section. For example, males with a diploma, employed in a 
job with a modal educational level of a Year 10 qualification, earned a substantial 23 
percent less than the benchmark group of their male counterparts with a bachelor’s 
pass degree working in a job where the modal qualification is a bachelor’s pass 
degree.
50
 In comparison, females are much worse off if they are in the same situation, 
with the earnings effect being negative 52 percent. Earnings effects differences 
between males and females exceeding ten percentage points are evident in 18 
categories, though these are reasonably evenly divided between cases where males 
are at an earnings advantage and cases where females are at an earnings advantage. 
                                                 
50
 This ORU category consists of farm mangers, and production or transport labourers.  
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Further, of the 39 ORU earnings coefficients in this section, only 17 exhibited gender 
differences in earning impacts that are consistent with the job search hypothesis. 
While this is a larger proportion compared to that found in the previous section (3 out 
of 23), it still accounts for less than half of the estimated earnings coefficients. 
Generally, it can be said that the job search hypothesis does not appear to be 
validated by the findings here for the Australian graduate labour market.  
 
5.4.5 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
As noted in relation to equation (5-2), a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be used 
to provide a better understanding of the reasons why females have a lower mean rate 
of pay than males. The results of this decomposition, which uses the average of the 
female and male wage structures as the non-discriminatory norm, are presented in 
Table 5.4. In the current data there is a raw gender wage differential of 9.6 
percentage points in favour of males. Of this 9.6 percentage points, the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition revealed that 4.4 percentage points were attributable to the 
difference in the endowments of the male and female graduates. The remaining 5.1 
percentage points, or slightly over half of the wage difference, can be attributed to 
the difference in coefficients.
51, 52
 The ORU variables accounted for a combined, and 
very small, 0.3 percentage points of the ‘endowment’ effect.53 The majority (32 out 
of 39) of the estimated endowment effects for the ORU variables were, however, 
statistically significant at the ten percent level or higher. 
 
The negligible combined endowment effect for the ORU variables may seem 
inconsistent with the findings reported earlier, of males being less likely to be 
‘matched’ to their occupation (30 percent incidence of education-occupation match 
compared with 38 percent for females) and of there being substantial variation in 
wages across the ORU categories entered into the estimating equation.  An 
                                                 
51
 This ‘coefficient’ effect is also known as the ‘unexplained’ wage differential, or discrimination, in 
the gender wage gap literature.  
52
 A two-fold decomposition is performed here, for simplicity in the discussion of results, as well as 
compatibility with most studies in the economics literature. Performing a three-fold decomposition 
reveals that the ‘third’ interaction component is small, at 2.5 percentage points. The endowment and 
coefficient effects were 3.2 and 3.9 percentage points, respectively.   
53
 For the unexplained ‘coefficient’ component, ORU effects account for a modest 1.5 percentage 
points, out of the 5.2 percentage points. 
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examination of the individual endowment effects for the 39 ORU variables shows 
that these effects are very minute, with the largest estimate being only 0.7 percentage 
points, for the category of graduates with a masters degree working in certificate 
level jobs.
54
 Moreover, 21 of the ORU estimated coefficients, or around one-half of 
the ORU variables, were of negative sign, while the remaining 18 were of positive 
sign. A negative sign means that the removal of that component would lead to a 
wider gender wage gap, whereas a positive sign indicates that removal of that 
component would lessen the gender wage gap, ceteris paribus. Thus, these effects 
cancel out, with the net result being that the ORU endowment effects do not favour 
either gender. This finding provides a basis for further evaluation of the job search 
hypothesis. Specifically, as there does not appear to be a clear wage advantage 
(detriment) caused by the ORU endowments for males (females), the job search 
hypothesis is not validated, at least for the Australian graduate labour market. It 
would be of interest, however, to know if these findings hold after the measurement 
issues that were highlighted in the literature review section are accounted for. These 
issues are addressed in the following section.  
 
Table 5.4: Estimates from the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Predicted Male Wage 3.0658***  
 (0.0013)  
Predicted Female Wage 2.9701***  
 (0.0010)  
Raw Wage Gap 0.0957***  
 (0.0017)  
Explained  0.0443*** 
  (0.0012) 
Unexplained  0.0514*** 
  (0.0018) 
Constant  -0.0788*** 
  (0.0221) 
Observations 569,325  
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively.  
 
5.4.6 The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition and the ‘Averaging Approach’ 
As an extension to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis from the preceding 
section, and bearing in mind the measurement issues raised in the literature review 
section earlier, equation (5-2) is re-estimated utilising the ‘averaging approach’ 
suggested by Yun (2005). Selected results from this decomposition are presented in 
                                                 
54
 The individual endowment effects are not reported here, but are available on request.  
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Table 5.5. Panels (i) and (ii) presents the results from the previous decomposition 
discussed in the preceding section, while panels (iii) and (iv) present the results 
which have incorporated Yun’s (2005) ‘averaging approach’. Note that as the results 
of the overall decomposition do not change, they will not be presented here. Instead, 
the focus will be on the ORU effects and the change in the constant terms. The first 
key observation that can be made is that the value of the intercept term is markedly 
different. The estimate for the intercept term in the previous decomposition was 
around 7.9 percent, while the corresponding estimate for the current decomposition 
with deviation contrast coding is 13 percent. This suggests that group membership 
per se is more important in contributing to the gender wage gap than that indicated 
from the previous decomposition, where the constant term referred to the outcomes 
for a single reference group, namely, the bachelor’s degree graduates working in jobs 
that require the level of qualification that they possess.  
 
Looking at the estimated coefficient effects associated with the ORU variables, 
however, indicates very modest changes. 31 out of the 40 ORU variables have 
coefficient effects in the decomposition that are statistically significant at the ten 
percent or higher levels, similar to the 32 out of 39 significant ORU coefficient 
effects reported under the ‘single benchmark’ approach from the previous section. 
The sign on the estimated coefficient effects largely remains unchanged – the only 
exception is for graduates with an honours degree working in certificate level jobs. 
The endowment effect for these graduates changed from being of a negative sign, to 
being positive. The absolute value of the endowment effect, however, remains small, 
at 0.2 percent. 
 
Further, an examination of the endowment effects in the decomposition for the 
different levels of required education reveals four general (though not universal) 
patterns. First, there are few significant gender endowment effects in jobs that 
require a diploma, and the gender endowment effects in jobs that require a bachelor’s 
degree are mixed. As these are job requirements that are closest to the qualifications 
of the graduate population, this empirical result indicates that similar sorting 
outcomes for male and female university graduates occur for such jobs.  
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Table 5.5: Selected Results from the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition and Deviation 
Contrast Coding 
 Single Benchmark Deviation Contrast Coding 
Variable Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)  
cen_bach_bach   -0.0042*** 0.0098** 
   (0.0005) (0.0045) 
cen_dip_y10 -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_dip_y12 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0000*** 0.0001* 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
cen_dip_cert -0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
cen_dip_dip 0.0001** -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_dip_bach 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
cen_ascdeg_y10 -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_ascdeg_y12 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_ascdeg_cert -0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0002* 0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
cen_ascdeg_dip 0.0003*** -0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
cen_ascdeg_bach -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
cen_bach_y10 -0.0040*** 0.0003 -0.0032*** 0.0006** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
cen_bach_y12 0.0084*** 0.0049*** 0.0044*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0017) 
cen_bach_cert -0.0040*** 0.0038*** -0.0003 0.0062*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0012) 
cen_bach_dip -0.0006*** -0.0013*** -0.0002*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
cen_hons_y10 -0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
cen_hons_y12 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0001* 0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
cen_hons_cert -0.0002*** 0.0003* 0.0002** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
cen_hons_dip 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001** -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_hons_bach 0.0002*** 0.0003 0.0008*** 0.0016** 
 (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0007) 
cen_gcert_y10 -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_gcert_y12 -0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0000* 0.0006*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
cen_gcert_cert 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0023*** 0.0016*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
cen_gcert_dip -0.0000* -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_gcert_bach -0.0027*** -0.0015*** -0.0039*** -0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
cen_gdip_y10 -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_gdip_y12 0.0002*** 0.0004** 0.0000 0.0006*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
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Table 5.5: Selected Results from the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition and Deviation 
Contrast Coding (cont.) 
Variable Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)  
cen_gdip_cert 0.0009*** 0.0021*** 0.0016*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
cen_gdip_dip 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000* -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_gdip_bach -0.0030*** -0.0012** -0.0049*** 0.0008 
 (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0010) 
cen_mast_y10 -0.0012*** -0.0001 -0.0010*** -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
cen_mast_y12 -0.0002*** 0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0017*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0003) 
cen_mast_cert 0.0079*** 0.0061*** 0.0109*** 0.0071*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
cen_mast_dip -0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
cen_mast_bach -0.0017*** -0.0027*** -0.0022*** 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0013) 
cen_phd_y10 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_phd_y12 0.0000** -0.0001 0.0000** -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_phd_cert 0.0008*** 0.0002** 0.0010*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
cen_phd_dip 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cen_phd_bach 0.0013*** -0.0004* 0.0017*** 0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Total 0.0030 0.0149 0.0067 0.0328 
Constant -0.0788***  -0.1296***  
 (0.0221)  (0.0249)  
Observations 569,325  569,325  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the ten, five 
and one percent levels, respectively. Panels (iii) and (iv) present results of the two-fold decomposition 
with deviation contrast coding.  
 
Second, jobs that require certificate level qualifications have endowment effects that 
favour more highly qualified males. That is, fewer more highly qualified males than 
females work in these jobs that attract a wage penalty. When this result is combined 
with the first feature mentioned above, the implication is that male and female 
graduates are differentially sorted into jobs that require lower-level qualifications.  
 
Third, jobs that require Year 12 education typically have endowment effects that 
favour males. As graduates in these jobs are overeducated, and their overeducation 
status is associated with lower wages, this endowment effect in favour of males must 
arise because females are more likely than males to be in these intermediate level 
jobs.  
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Fourth, jobs that require Year 10 education typically have endowment effects that 
favour females. Applying the reasoning advanced above, this suggests that males are 
more likely than females to be in these low-skilled jobs. 
 
In the case of the coefficients effect, there are three findings of note. First, the 
coefficient effects for jobs that require either a diploma or bachelor’s pass degree 
tend to be associated with a negative effect. In other words, this component of the 
wage decomposition acts to lessen the male wage advantage that would otherwise 
occur.  
 
Second, the coefficient effects for jobs that require either a certificate or Year 12 
schooling tend to be positive. In other words, the overeducation wage effects 
associated with university graduates working in these jobs tend to favour males, and 
lead to a widening of their wage advantage.  
 
Third, the low-skilled jobs requiring only Year 10 are typically associated with 
similar wage effects for males and females, so that the coefficient effects in the wage 
decomposition for these jobs are usually not statistically significant. Thus, the 
decomposition indicates that while the overall wage effects are slight, there are 
interesting patterns in the data that suggest that there are systematic factors impacting 
the wage determination process when it is examined from the ORU perspective.  
 
A comparison of the overall contribution of ORU earnings effects to the gender wage 
gap reveals changes of a moderate scale. Recall from the previous section that ORU 
earnings effects accounted for a total 0.3 percentage point impact on the endowment 
effect. Further, the unexplained portion of the gender wage gap, or the coefficient 
effect, attributed to ORU effects was 1.5 percentage points. Under the ‘averaging 
approach’, these values are 0.7 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. The 
endowment and coefficient effects of the gender wage gap attributable to ORU can 
thus be said to have doubled. In the case of the endowment effects, ORU earnings 
effects can be said to play a minor role - they still account for only 17 percent of the 
overall endowment effect for the model. The coefficient effect of the gender wage 
gap attributable to ORU, however, is substantial. ORU earnings effects account for 
roughly two-thirds of the (modest) estimated coefficient effect of five percentage 
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points. Nevertheless, the finding from the previous section, that the ‘job-search’ 
hypothesis is not validated in the Australian graduate labour market, is reinforced by 
the decomposition utilising Yun’s (2005) ‘averaging’ approach, given the small 
endowment effects associated with ORU.   
 
5.4.7 The Gender Wage Gap and Age 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition indicated a standardised gender wage gap of 5.2 
percentage points. This gender wage gap is of similar size to that estimated by the 
female dummy variable in the ORU models of earnings in the preceding sections. 
Further, recall that in an earlier section it was noted that the relatively small gender 
wage gap observed in the present study might be due to the focus on labour market 
entrants. Thus, the pooled regression will be used in a more detailed examination of 
the gender wage gap effect by age. Two approaches are considered in this 
examination. First, the sample was disaggregated by age groups, and equation (5-3) 
was estimated separately for each age group.
55
 The results indicated that for 
graduates aged 35 years and below, the gender wage gap was around 4.5 percent. 
Thereafter, the gender wage gap widened considerably. Females aged 36 to 40 years 
earned six percent less. Those aged 46 to 50 years experienced earnings eight percent 
lower than their male counterparts. Female workers aged more than 56 years old 
earned 13 percent less. These estimates were all significant at the one percent level. 
As age increases, both males and females enter higher-wage positions, but the female 
wage disadvantage widens. This provides some support for the ‘glass ceiling’ found 
in other studies. 
 
Second, equation (5-3) was estimated on the full sample, with an interaction term 
between gender and age (genage = female*age). The inclusion of this term in the 
model yielded an estimate of -0.013 for female, and an estimate of -0.004 on genage, 
both significant at the one percent level. These estimates can be interpreted as 
follows. The gender wage gap is three percent when evaluated at 25 years of age. For 
graduates aged 40 years old, the gender wage gap is much wider, at nine percent. 
This increase in the gender wage gap follows through for increasing years of age, and 
the gap is a substantial 19 percent for graduates at the (retirement) age of 65 years.  
                                                 
55
  The results for the full model on these analyses by age groups, and the subsequent pooled 
regression are not presented in this study, but are available on request.  
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These findings lend support to the thesis that the relatively small gender wage effect 
among younger workers, and the larger gender wage effect among older workers, is 
due to the measure of work experience. Mincer and Polachek (1974) for the US, and 
Rummery (1992) for Australia, show that changing from a measure of potential work 
experience to a measure of actual work experience can reduce the standardised wage 
gap by 40 to 70 percent.
56
 The competing hypothesis, that the small gender wage gap 
for young graduates is due mainly to minimum wage effects, does not seem credible 
when the gradual changes in the gender wage gap with age are considered. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined gender differences and educational mismatch in the 
Australian graduate labour market, using various analyses and perspectives. A 
number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the gender wage gap 
for the higher educated labour market entrants is smaller than that reported in other 
Australian studies. Analyses of the change in this with age suggest that it is most 
likely linked to the measure of work experience included in the estimating equation. 
 
Second, the most substantial penalties to being overeducated are found at the lowest 
job levels. Most ORU earnings effects do not differ statistically between males and 
females. Greater earnings penalties and gender differences are found when gender-
specific and more detailed required levels of education are used from the Census data 
than when the gender-neutral ASCO-based standards are employed. Nevertheless, 
the absence of evidence in either set of analyses that females incur greater earnings 
penalties than males from their overeducated status suggests that females’ 
overeducation does not arise due to their more limited job search.  
 
A third finding reinforces that of the second point. Adding broad controls for 
occupation to the model impacts negatively (positively) on the ORU earnings effects 
for female (male) graduates. This indicates that females are more mobile across 
                                                 
56
 In Rummery (1992) the measure of actual experience was constructed as the number of years 
worked full time plus a third of the years worked part time. All data were collected retrospectively. 
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occupations compared to males. Again, this does not support the theorised outcomes 
under the job search hypothesis. 
 
Fourth, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition revealed that ORU effects accounted for 
only a negligible portion of the gender wage gap. However, the decomposition 
revealed interesting trends regarding sorting outcomes and ORU earnings effects for 
males and females. With regard to jobs that require lower education levels, males 
were more likely than females to be sorted into jobs requiring Year 10 schooling or 
certificates. At the same time, the coefficient effects in the decomposition indicated 
that the estimated ORU effects for higher-level jobs that require a diploma or 
bachelor’s degree tend to narrow the gender wage gap. In contrast, the estimated 
ORU effects for jobs that require a certificate or Year 12 tend to widen the gender 
wage gap.  
 
In summary, there is a gender wage gap in the Australian graduate labour market, 
though this gap is smaller than that found for the aggregate-level Australian labour 
market. These findings thus favour education as a tool of eliminating discrimination 
in the labour market. As females are less overeducated than males, despite the larger 
representation of the former in higher education, there should not be concern that 
expanding higher education will disadvantage females. This prognosis is reinforced 
by the finding that the majority of the estimated ORU penalties do not differ 
statistically between males and females, and the finding that different levels of 
overeducation of males and females make a minute contribution to the ‘endowment 
effect’ in the gender pay gap decomposition. At the same time, however, a word of 
caution is needed. The gender wage gap is larger for graduates in the older age 
groups and who are in more advanced stages of their career. This ‘glass ceiling’ 
effect appears substantial. However, whether it is a pure ‘glass ceiling’ effect, or 
simply a statistical artefact attributable to the use of a poor measure of work 
experience in the earnings equation, is a moot point. The collection of detailed work 
histories will be needed if the understanding of this labour market outcome is a 
priority. 
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CHAPTER 6  
ORU Earnings Impacts: How do They Change with Increases in Tenure? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the change in ORU impacts as work tenure increases. In 
particular, the sample is disaggregated into four groups based on the graduates’ 
tenure. The first three groups are those with tenure of zero, one year and two years, 
respectively. The fourth group are those with tenure of three years and above. Each 
of these groups has a large number of observations, with the sample sizes ranging 
from 57,580 (for those with tenure = 2) to 209,593 (for those with tenure = 0).  
 
It should be borne in mind that the data here consist of fresh graduates. Hence, those 
with and without tenure in their jobs can be thought of as the following. There are 
three categories of graduates. First, there are the graduates who did not work while 
studying, and commenced their current job following their graduation. Second, the 
group with zero tenure will also include the graduates who had been working while 
studying, and, upon graduation, moved to another position or job, and who have thus 
reported no tenure. The third and last group comprises those with positive tenure in 
their jobs who commenced working before or while studying for their higher 
qualifications.  
 
There is, however, one caveat relating to this classification of graduates by tenure. 
The question relating to tenure in the survey asks about the tenure that graduates 
have “in this job”. This question is rather subjective in the sense that whether it 
relates to ‘job tenure’ or firm tenure’ is open to interpretation. That is, graduates who 
were working in a job, and got moved into another job after graduation could answer 
the question in one of two ways. They could have reported tenure of zero, reflecting 
their ‘new’ job or role, or reported a positive amount of tenure, reflecting their 
experience in the firm.
57
  
 
                                                 
57
 Consider, for example, a graduate who had been working for two years as an accounting clerk in a 
firm, and who was moved to the role of an accountant after graduation. This graduate could report 
tenure of zero to reflect the new job scope, or a tenure of two years.  
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It is anticipated, however, that the mix of graduates in the zero tenure group is 
unlikely to pose large problems with regards to the comparison of earnings against 
graduates with positive tenure. This is due to three reasons. First, graduates with a 
history of employment who have found a new job, and hence are now in the zero 
tenure group, are expected to account for only a relatively small proportion of those 
in this tenure group.  
 
Second, the impact of firm-specific experience gained in the lower-level job on 
earnings in the current, higher-level position, is expected to be small, especially as 
the job level and extent of education-occupation mismatch is held constant. Third, 
where some of these graduates have obtained their current position due to a job 
search external to their previous firm, their prior general labour market experience 
will be partially captured in the age and age squared variables. With regards to the 
comparison on the incidence of overeducation, the same reasons apply, albeit to a 
lesser extent for the latter reason.  
 
This aspect of the dataset affects the issues that can be addressed with it. The 
conventional approach is typified by the study by de Oliveira et al. (2000), who 
examined the effects of overeducation on earnings as tenure or firm-specific 
experience is accumulated after graduation. However, in the present study the 
research question that needs to be posed is, ‘Are there differences in the ORU effects 
for graduates who have accumulated job tenure while studying and graduates who 
did not work while studying?’. With regards to the former group of graduates who 
have some tenure in their jobs, whether the ORU effects differ by the length of job 
tenure they have is also of interest, and will also be examined in this section. To 
provide a framework for interpreting the changes in the ORU effects with tenure 
from this perspective, a review of the applicable labour market theories and their 
respective predictions of the ORU earnings effects is in order. There are five of these 
theories: i) the searching and matching model; ii) human capital theory; iii) the 
technological change hypothesis; iv) assignment theory, and; v) the screening 
hypothesis. For two of these, namely, technological change and screening, there are 
predictions for the tenure effects in the current study that differ from those in 
analyses of datasets with a more conventional tenure variable.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 2 
presents a review of the five labour market theories and the a priori expectations of 
the change in ORU impacts with increasing tenure under each of the theoretical 
frameworks. Section 3 describes the methodology used, while section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis.
58
 Section 5 concludes.  
 
6.2 Labour Market Frameworks 
6.2.1 Searching and Matching Model 
Hartog (2000) gives an explanation of the incidence of ORU as tenure increases 
under the job searching and matching theory. This theory states that individuals 
move across jobs when they are able to secure one which has a higher job level, and 
thus their current job is the job with the highest job level available at present.
59
 
Under this scenario, job tenure cannot be said to have clear correlations with job 
levels, as there are opposing forces at work. That is, a worker who is currently in a 
job with a particularly high level would be likely to remain in this job for a lengthy 
period of time, since the likelihood of getting a job with a higher level is lower. At 
the same time, a worker who has just received a particularly high level job offer, and 
therefore switched jobs, would have a very low level of job tenure, due to the job 
switch. It is thus unclear if job levels (and hence, educational (mis)match) would 
increase or decrease with rises in job tenure.
60
 This sorting process over time appears 
to preclude making predictions on changes in the incidence and earnings effects of 
ORU with tenure, either in conventional datasets or in the current dataset.  
 
6.2.2 Human Capital Theory 
Under the human capital theory interpretation, workers may choose to invest in more 
(formal) education in order to compensate for other human capital deficiencies, such 
                                                 
58
 This chapter includes an examination and discussion of the differences in the incidence of ORU as 
tenure progresses. While these seem more suited to have been included as part of Chapter 3, it has 
been left to this stage as the tenure variable in the data is unique and requires some understanding 
before the results can be interpreted in the correct context.  
59
 Hartog (2000) argues that job mobility is likely to be upward, where the move is done voluntarily. 
This view is in line with studies such as Sicherman (1990).  
60
 This statement addresses the overeducated. For the undereducated, increases in job levels would 
increase the extent of undereducation. Thus, increases in job tenure have ambiguous effects for the 
overeducated, and would increase the extent of educational mismatch for the undereducated. 
However, given the dominance of the overeducated in the present study, this statement is a fair one to 
make.  
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as the lack of experience, or ability (see, for example, Sicherman 1991 and Alba-
Ramirez 1993). In other words, educational qualifications are used as substitutes for 
other forms of human capital, such that workers in the same job, who have differing 
levels of educational qualifications, could have similar levels of human capital.  
 
An alternative, and complementary, explanation of the same situation would be that 
overeducated workers choose jobs with lower educational requirements to obtain the 
requisite experience in order to bolster their chances of getting a more correctly 
matched job (de Oliveira et al. 2000), and/or to acquire skills which would be useful 
in their subsequent career or occupation (Sicherman 1990). These views were found 
to be valid by Sicherman (1990), whose study found that overeducated workers tend 
to have less experience or training. Further, overeducated workers were found to 
have higher rates of firm and occupational mobility, ceteris paribus. Conversely, 
undereducated workers had much higher amounts of on-the-job training, and also 
had more experience. Overeducation would be a transitory situation under this 
interpretation, as workers would transition to jobs commensurate with their 
qualifications in the future, as they accumulate experience or other human capital 
over time. Undereducation, however, would be a long lasting situation, as workers 
who are compensating for their lack of formal qualifications with other forms of 
human capital would continue to be undereducated, unless they obtain higher 
qualifications.  
 
These interpretations of human capital theory have two different implications for the 
incidence of ORU with increasing tenure. If the individuals were overeducated as a 
result of formal qualifications being obtained as a substitute to other human capital 
deficiencies, the incidence of overeducation will not change with increases in tenure. 
However, where overeducated individuals had entered their jobs for the purpose of 
accumulating job experience in order to prime themselves for a better job 
subsequently, the incidence of overeducation should change with increases in job 
tenure, as positive job tenure indicates an unsuccessful job search. At the same time, 
individuals who succeed in getting a better matched job subsequently as a result of 
accumulating job experience in their previously overeducated jobs will report zero 
tenure. Thus, where the job search interpretation under human capital theory is 
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applicable, the incidence of overeducation is expected to fall over time as some 
graduates succeed in getting a higher level job.   
 
Human capital theory also offers predictions on the change in ORU earnings effects 
as tenure is accumulated. Under the interpretation of human capital substitution, the 
wages of the overeducated are expected to increase as job skills are accumulated. 
However, where the overeducated have made a deliberate choice to be overeducated 
in their jobs in order to gain experience while searching for a job elsewhere, it would 
be expected that the accumulation of job tenure will not have any impact on wages.  
 
These predictions remain unchanged with the current dataset. As with the 
conventional view on the accumulation of job skills, graduates with tenure in the 
current dataset, who have primarily seen time with the firm as an opportunity for job 
training, would also be expected to experience positive impacts on wages due to the 
larger amount of job experience that they have. However, where the graduates have 
mostly engaged in job search while with the firm, there is expected to be less or little 
job training, and thus tenure would have little or no impact on wages. Thus, the 
predictions on the wages of the overeducated are the same, irrespective of the 
difference in the current dataset compared to those in conventional studies, under the 
human capital theory interpretation of the labour market.  
 
6.2.3 Technological Change Hypothesis 
de Oliveira et al. (2000) argued that technological change might also be an 
explanation for ORU in the labour market. They argued that advancements in 
technology could lead to jobs requiring higher levels of skills than those obtained by 
the currently employed workers. As the upgrading of skills takes time and incurs 
costs, this causes a mismatch, and the currently employed workers are considered 
undereducated. However, hiring standards by the employers might be raised, and, 
therefore, new job entrants with higher educational qualifications relative to their 
older counterparts in the same job would be considered or perceived as overeducated. 
Under this scenario, undereducated workers would have less long-term value to the 
firm, and as such the firm will not invest in their training. Their relative wage should 
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therefore decline with job tenure, and thus will be reflected in an increasing wage 
penalty associated with undereducation.  
 
Overeducated workers are more valued by their employers due to the more 
‘appropriate’ level of education they have, and hence are expected to be favoured in 
on-the-job investment decisions. Accordingly, their earnings should increase with job 
tenure, which would be associated with a reduction in any initial wage penalty 
associated with their overeducated status. This view is shared by Kler (2005), who 
finds a large incidence of overeducation in the Australian graduate labour market, but 
also reports that young male graduates experience no wage penalty associated with 
overeducation.
61
 Kler (2005) suggests that the finding of younger male graduates 
having no wage penalties for being overeducated could be attributed to “fast paced 
technological change that has significantly altered occupational requirements” (Kler 
2005, pg. 67).  
 
With the current dataset, however, any of the on-the-job investments into the 
overeducated graduates with positive job tenure considered under the technological 
change hypothesis would not have (yet) occurred, as the higher qualifications are 
recently obtained, and there is thus no basis for any change in wage expectations for 
the overeducated with job tenure. Specifically, the incidence and wage effects across 
tenure groups are expected to be the same. There is one caveat, however, relating to 
the above prediction. Overeducated graduates may have been identified as part of the 
firm’s future prior to obtaining their most recent higher qualification, and thus may 
already have had on-the-job training invested into them in tandem with their own 
educational investment. If this scenario holds true, the overeducated graduates with 
tenure would be expected to earn more.  
 
Technological change theory also predicts a stable incidence of overeducation across 
tenure groups. As overeducation is a symptom of job classifications changing slower 
compared to the rising technological requirements in the labour market, or that the 
higher skill levels required are more applicable to labour market entrants, there is no 
                                                 
61
 The findings for female graduates were mixed. Overeducated female graduates experienced minor 
wage penalties if they were in full-time work. Female graduates working part-time had a relatively 
higher wage penalty associated with being overeducated when the realised matches method was used, 
but not for the objective method.  
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expectation that the incidence of overeducation will vary across tenure groups. This 
is particularly valid for the current study due to the larger number of labour market 
entrants in the sample and the use of the ‘job analysis’ method in defining 
overeducation. The incidence of undereducation is expected to stay the same as 
tenure increases, although the extent of undereducation increases, as the increase in 
technological requirements, and hence higher qualifications, serves to amplify the 
education-job gap for the undereducated.  
 
6.2.4 Assignment Theory 
McGuinness (2006) has referred to assignment theory as the middle ground between 
the ‘extreme’ theories of human capital theory and the job competition (searching 
and matching) model. Specifically, human capital theory hypothesises that earnings 
are dependent on the characteristics of the individual (education and experience, for 
instance) while the job competition model treats earnings as being primarily 
dependent on the characteristics of the job. In the assignment theory framework, 
heterogeneous workers are assigned to different jobs, on the basis of their individual 
characteristics, such as educational qualifications, and the characteristics of the job, 
such as the required level of education. One distinguishing feature of this labour 
market model is that the level of earnings, as McGuinness (2006) puts it, “is the 
equilibrium outcome to the solution of the assignment problem”, and “plays an 
allocative role in the economy rather than simply being rewards for the possession of 
particular characteristics”. Under this interpretation of the labour market, an 
individual can be assigned to a job if the individual’s characteristics match, or exceed 
the job requirements. In this context, it would be expected that overeducation occurs 
when: i) there is a larger supply of highly skilled labour; ii) there is a smaller demand 
for highly skilled labour; or, iii) a combination of the two factors aforementioned. 
Thus, in a competitive job market, individuals will engage in further education in 
order to be matched with a better job. Since the graduates with positive tenure have 
already entered their current jobs before they obtained their current qualification, it 
can be assumed that the current qualification is obtained for the purpose of being 
matched to a higher level job. Thus, the ORU earnings effects are expected to be 
similar, regardless of the length of job tenure. As the incidence of overeducation 
under assignment theory is dependent on the prevailing labour market conditions at 
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the time of job entry, comment on the expected changes in overeducation as tenure 
increases is also precluded under this labour market theory. 
 
6.2.5 Screening Hypothesis 
The screening model (Arrow 1973) contends that the purpose of education is to serve 
as a filter, or as its name implies, a screen by employers to sort individuals by ability, 
in the absence of more knowledge about their true capabilities. Thus, all things 
constant, a higher qualification could be taken as a ‘signal’ of higher ability. Further, 
to the extent that higher qualifications are unreliable indicators of the average true 
productivity or ability, lower wages will be offered to the graduates on job entry 
(Aigner and Cain 1977). It would thus be expected that where a worker gained entry 
to a job on the basis of qualifications, the employer would, over time, gain additional 
knowledge about the ability of the worker, and wages would increase once the new 
information regarding the worker’s true ability is obtained.  
 
However, recall that one distinct feature of the current dataset is that graduates who 
have been promoted within the firm, or who have switched jobs after attaining their 
recent higher qualification, are likely to be categorised as part of the zero tenure 
group. Thus, graduates who have tenure and are mismatched in their current jobs are 
either ‘stuck’ in this state of education-job mismatch, or are experiencing the effects 
of a slow-adjusting labour market since they are not being channelled into jobs more 
appropriate for their educational levels. In the case of the former, it is likely that 
these ‘stuck’ graduates have been identified through the screening process to be of 
lesser ability.  
 
For the conventional measurement of tenure effects (such as those in de Oliveira et 
al. 2000), two sources of noisy information pertaining to the graduates exist. For a 
graduate with zero job tenure, the noisy information relates to: i) the innate abilities 
or unobserved characteristics of the individuals; and ii) the quality of the degree and 
thus its match with the requirements of the firm. For a worker with positive tenure, 
and especially those in the higher tenure categories in the current study, the latter, but 
not the former, factor will operate. Hence, comparisons of graduates with zero tenure 
against those with positive tenure should reveal the relative importance of innate 
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abilities or unobserved characteristics in the noise. In studies utilising conventional 
datasets, both sources of noise will diminish with increases in tenure. Under the 
current analysis, however, changes in wages are expected only where the uncertainty 
regarding the graduates’ innate abilities is relatively important.  
 
The change in the incidence of overeducation for the various tenure groups in the 
current dataset under the screening hypothesis is less clear. As aforementioned, 
employees will be screened twice, once upon job entry, and once again over the 
course of their job tenure. Graduates with zero tenure will thus have been subject to 
the first screening, but not, in the majority of cases, for the second (on-going) 
screening process. Graduates with tenure would have been screened over the course 
of their tenure as well, and those who remain overeducated despite a higher 
qualification are presumably those who have had their shortcomings revealed over 
the course of their tenure. Under this scenario, the incidence of overeducation would 
be expected to rise if relatively large numbers of graduates are less able, and are not 
suitable to be placed in a higher level job, even with the added qualification.  
 
The review of labour market theories, as well as their predictions on the ORU 
earnings effects and incidence across tenure groups, has been covered in this section. 
Overviews of the predicted effects of ORU as tenure increases will be covered in the 
next two sections, which examine changes in the incidence and earnings effects of 
ORU across tenure groups, respectively.  
 
6.3 Methodology 
The estimation model used in the analysis of graduate earnings for this chapter is 
based on the ORU model of graduate earnings. This model is similar to the one used 
in the preceding chapters and can be expressed as: 
 
(6-1)                
      
      
          
   
where w represents the hourly wage, used in the analysis in natural logarithmic 
format and   represents a vector of characteristics correlated with earnings.   ,    
and    are vectors of dummy variables indicating if the individual is overeducated 
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(D
o
), undereducated (D
u
), or correctly matched to his or her occupation of 
employment in terms of education (D
r
), as identified in the preceding chapters. The 
variables included in   indicate the graduates’ gender, English speaking background, 
residency status, mode of enrolment, further study status, university group, broad 
field of study, self-employment status, length of employment, industry of 
employment, sector of employment, year of graduation and labour market 
experience. Note here that while the preceding chapters used quadratic specifications 
of age and tenure as proxies for experience, only the quadratic form of age is entered 
into the estimating equation here, for obvious reasons.  
  
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Incidence of ORU across Tenure Groups 
As mentioned above, the theories of searching and matching, and assignment do not 
make any predictions on the change in the incidence of ORU as tenure increases. 
There are, however, different predictions under human capital theory, technological 
change theory, and the screening hypothesis. In summary, the theories of human 
capital and technological change predict a similar incidence of overeducation across 
tenure groups, while the screening hypothesis predicts a rising trend. 
 
The incidence of overeducation for the various tenure groups is presented in Figure 
6.1. In addition, the data contain information about whether the graduate is actively 
seeking another job, and the sample is subdivided on this basis.
62
 Specifically, those 
looking for work could be viewed as being dissatisfied with aspects of their current 
job, including mismatch status, and so would be expected to be associated with a 
higher incidence of overeducation.
63
  
 
  
                                                 
62
 Specifically, those employed can be divided into four subcategories: i) Employed full-time and 
looking for another job, ii) Employed full-time and not looking for another job, iii) Employed part-
time and looking for a full-time job, and iv) Employed part-time and not looking for another full-time 
job.  
63
 Again, the incidence of undereducation is less than one percent for each tenure group and sub-
category. Therefore, these data are not presented, and the sum of the overeducated and correctly 
matched approximates 100 percent.  
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Figure 6.1: Incidence of Overeducation, by Tenure Groups and Job Search 
 
 
There are a couple of striking features about Figure 6.1. First, looking at the first 
column for each tenure group, the incidence of overeducation for the full sample 
increases as job tenure is accumulated. As the GDS survey was administered four 
months following the completion of graduates’ respective qualifications, the fact that 
a large and increasing incidence of overeducation is observed across these tenure 
groups indicates that the labour market is rather sluggish in adjusting and 
repositioning these graduates into more suitable jobs or occupations. At the same 
time, this increase in overeducation with increasing tenure rules out the theory of 
technological change, and the ‘human capital substitution’ interpretation of human 
capital theory. The screening hypothesis seems to be the most valid among these 
labour market theories, and the increasing incidence indicates that there is a 
relatively large number of the ‘less able’ among the more intensely screened 
graduates with greater tenure, perhaps due to the rapid higher education expansion 
observed in recent years. This symptom of increasing overeducation is unlikely to 
abate, as the Australian federal government has ‘uncapped’ the number of publicly 
funded undergraduate student places from 2012 onwards. The Group of Eight 
universities has also expressed concerns over the loss of quality in student intakes, 
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and also outcomes due to the inability of the higher education sector to absorb the 
large increases in numbers (The Australian 2010c).  
 
Second, while the increasing trend of overeducation with tenure is evident for all 
sub-categories, the incidences of overeducation across the tenure groups are 
dramatically lower for those not seeking to change jobs, compared to those who have 
indicated that they intend to look for another full-time job, or change from part-time 
to full-time jobs. Thus, overeducation could be said to have some impact on job 
dissatisfaction.  
 
The data were also disaggregated on the basis of the length of employment, that is, 
whether the graduates were employed on a permanent or short-term basis. 
Comparison of the differences in overeducation status between these two groups will 
reveal further information on the applicability of human capital theory to the 
contemporary graduate labour market. Under human capital theory, it is hypothesised 
that some workers are deliberately overeducated in their current jobs in order to gain 
experience, which will prepare them for a better job subsequently. Thus, it is 
predicted that overeducation will be more prevalent among individuals who are 
employed on a short-term basis.  
 
The incidences of overeducation based on employment length are presented in Figure 
6.2. The information presented in Figure 6.2 indicates that a larger proportion of the 
overeducated can be found in the group employed on contracts which were less than 
a year in length, as opposed to those employed on a longer-term basis. This finding 
applies across all tenure groups.  
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Figure 6.2: Incidence of Overeducation, by Tenure Groups and Employment Length 
  
 
The analysis of the incidence of overeducation by tenure groups indicates that 
overeducation is prevalent even for those with higher amounts of job experience. 
However, this is unsurprising, as this job experience has been accumulated prior to 
the obtaining of the most recent higher qualification. It was observed that the 
incidence of overeducation increases with tenure, even for those who do not intend to 
switch jobs, although a larger proportion of the increase in the overeducated lies 
among those who have expressed a desire to change jobs in the future. Following the 
analysis of the incidence of overeducation across tenure groups, an analysis of the 
differences in ORU earnings effects across tenure groups, as well as how those 
earnings effects relate to the predictions of the labour market theories discussed 
above, will be conducted. This is covered in the following section.   
 
6.4.2 Overview of the Discussion on Labour Market Theories 
The discussion of the various labour market theories in an earlier section has led to 
predictions on how the ORU earnings effects are expected to differ across tenure 
groups. For clarity, these expectations are set out in Table 6.1. The predicted ORU 
earnings effects under the conventional approaches taken by existing studies, for the 
same labour market theories discussed above, are presented in panel (iii) of Table 
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6.1, while the corresponding predictions that take into account the unique feature of 
the current dataset are presented in panel (iv). In summary, the searching and 
matching theory does not offer an explanation on the variation of the ORU earnings 
effects across tenure groups. The two theories of technological change and 
assignment generally predict no change in the ORU earnings effects across tenure 
groups, although the former does allow for small increases in earnings if firms are 
forward looking in making their human capital investments in employees. Human 
capital theory and the screening hypothesis support the notion of similar earnings 
effects across all tenure groups, although the wage penalty associated with being 
overeducated may also be expected to decline under human capital theory. The 
following section presents the empirical analyses disaggregated by tenure groups.  
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Expected ORU Earnings Effects  
Labour Market Theory Mismatch Type Conventional Current Dataset 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Searching and 
Matching 
Overeducated No prediction on earnings No prediction on earnings 
 Undereducated No prediction on earnings No prediction on earnings 
Human Capital Theory Overeducated Wage penalty declines 
with tenure, or stays the 
same 
Wage penalty declines 
with tenure, or stays the 
same 
 Undereducated Wage penalty declines 
with tenure, or stays the 
same 
Wage penalty declines 
with tenure, or stays the 
same 
Technological Change Overeducated Wage penalty declines 
with tenure 
No impact on earnings as 
tenure increases, or slight 
increases 
 Undereducated Wage penalty declines 
with tenure 
No impact on earnings as 
tenure increases 
Assignment Overeducated ORU incidence and 
earnings depend on 
relative amounts of labour 
demand and supply - no 
prediction  
ORU incidence and 
earnings depend on 
relative amounts of labour 
demand and supply - no 
prediction 
 Undereducated ORU incidence and 
earnings depend on 
relative amounts of labour 
demand and supply - no 
prediction 
ORU incidence and 
earnings depend on 
relative amounts of labour 
demand and supply - no 
prediction 
Screening Overeducated Wages increase with 
tenure 
Wages are similar across 
tenure groups, unless 
information on individual 
ability is relatively 
important  
 Undereducated Wages increase with 
tenure 
Wages are similar across 
tenure groups, unless 
information on individual 
ability is relatively 
important 
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6.4.3 Analyses on the Earnings Effects, by Tenure Groups 
The results of the estimations for the various tenure groups are presented in Table 
6.2. The coefficient of variation for the dependent variable for each of the tenure 
groups was also calculated. The values of the coefficient, starting from the group 
with no tenure to the group with the most tenure, were 0.189, 0.214, 0.230 and 0.201, 
respectively. These values are indicative of a widening earnings distribution as 
tenure increases. Further, it is interesting to note that the adjusted R-squared for the 
four tenure groups increases from 0.107 in panel (i) to 0.226 in panel (iv). This 
indicates that the explanatory power of the model increases the longer the graduates 
have been in their current job. The larger R-squared values for graduates with more 
job experience could be interpreted as the graduate labour market being much more 
rigid at entry, with the attributes of each graduate, including the characteristics of 
their schooling, being rewarded or penalised only after some time spent in the labour 
force. Once again, the ‘t’-statistics indicate that most of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
The F-statistics and partial R-squared values were calculated for the sets of variables 
entered in the regressions, for the different tenure groups.
64
 These are presented in 
Table 6.3. Reading the partial R-squared values across the rows allows for the 
observation of how the explanatory power of these sets of variables change across 
the tenure groups.  
 
  
                                                 
64
 The dependent variable entered in the regressions for these calculations is the real wage.  
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Table 6.2: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model of Earnings, by Tenure Groups 
Variables Tenure=0 Tenure=1 Tenure=2 Tenure>3 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Constant 2.475*** 2.189*** 2.070*** 2.243*** 
 (128.839) (85.899) (49.596) (73.351) 
Female -0.026*** -0.047*** -0.070*** -0.068*** 
 (10.192) (14.340) (12.086) (21.571) 
Age 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 
 (18.638) (26.936) (22.037) (27.853) 
Age squared/1000 -0.340*** -0.651*** -0.754*** -0.627*** 
 (14.596) (21.168) (18.207) (23.520) 
NESB -0.014*** -0.053*** -0.068*** -0.040*** 
 (3.894) (12.059) (9.133) (8.943) 
Non-Australian -0.132*** -0.209*** -0.265*** -0.212*** 
 (13.821) (20.696) (15.366) (13.243) 
Double degree 0.020*** 0.007 -0.002 -0.014 
 (5.888) (1.159) (0.134) (1.606) 
Part-time study 0.093*** 0.084*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 
 (24.915) (23.637) (10.486) (18.542) 
Further study -0.008** 0.002 0.016** 0.021*** 
 (1.993) (0.518) (2.537) (5.601) 
Go8 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 
 (5.068) (6.800) (6.470) (10.380) 
ATN 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.051*** 0.024*** 
 (8.991) (6.525) (6.674) (5.777) 
IRU 0.002 0.010** 0.018** 0.001 
 (0.732) (2.149) (2.189) (0.283) 
Natural and Physical Science -0.091*** -0.067*** -0.073*** -0.056*** 
 (13.900) (9.883) (6.055) (7.725) 
Information Technology -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.029** -0.029*** 
 (3.587) (2.711) (2.138) (4.103) 
Engineering 0.024*** -0.011 -0.026** -0.008 
 (3.652) (1.477) (1.976) (1.097) 
Architecture -0.099*** -0.112*** -0.094*** -0.070*** 
 (9.506) (10.691) (6.312) (6.735) 
Agriculture and Environment -0.113*** -0.138*** -0.120*** -0.164*** 
 (12.833) (14.785) (7.664) (17.009) 
Nursing -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.104*** -0.099*** 
 (16.994) (12.868) (7.055) (13.678) 
Medicine -0.016*** -0.050*** -0.040*** -0.018*** 
 (2.645) (7.397) (3.066) (2.794) 
Education -0.047*** -0.060*** -0.083*** -0.075*** 
 (6.923) (7.431) (6.383) (12.714) 
Society and Culture -0.049*** -0.060*** -0.053*** -0.060*** 
 (10.337) (11.726) (6.366) (12.888) 
Creative Arts and Others -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.116*** -0.114*** 
 (16.050) (14.254) (8.964) (13.976) 
Self-employed 0.027** 0.033*** -0.019 -0.011 
 (2.373) (2.870) (1.022) (1.234) 
Private Sector -0.035*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.057*** 
 (10.965) (13.313) (8.116) (14.151) 
Short-term employment -0.075*** -0.104*** -0.131*** -0.115*** 
 (28.213) (28.220) (18.128) (22.008) 
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Table 6.2: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model of Earnings, by Tenure Groups (cont.) 
Variables Tenure = 0 Tenure = 1 Tenure = 2 Tenure > 3 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
oru_dip_cert -0.266*** -0.226*** -0.260*** -0.171*** 
 (6.451) (5.784) (3.128) (7.078) 
oru_dip_dip -0.053 -0.051 -0.054 -0.026** 
 (1.264) (1.323) (1.527) (2.098) 
oru_dip_bach 0.047** 0.063** 0.075** -0.018 
 (2.241) (2.338) (2.199) (0.918) 
oru_ascdeg_cert -0.297*** -0.151*** -0.166** -0.191*** 
 (3.321) (3.427) (2.447) (10.755) 
oru_ascdeg_dip -0.059 -0.042 -0.095*** -0.085*** 
 (0.763) (1.091) (5.057) (6.316) 
oru_ascdeg_bach 0.035 -0.008 -0.074 -0.044** 
 (0.760) (0.320) (1.049) (1.976) 
oru_bach_cert -0.150*** -0.131*** -0.145*** -0.172*** 
 (32.176) (25.848) (14.902) (28.294) 
oru_bach_dip -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.112*** -0.104*** 
 (13.725) (11.102) (9.059) (15.334) 
oru_hons_cert -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.089*** -0.129*** 
 (8.946) (5.578) (4.171) (8.931) 
oru_hons_dip -0.022* -0.021 -0.068* -0.059*** 
 (1.793) (1.420) (1.870) (2.861) 
oru_hons_bach 0.024*** 0.045*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 
 (5.102) (6.620) (4.104) (3.968) 
oru_gcert_cert -0.073** -0.084*** -0.102*** -0.097*** 
 (2.308) (3.737) (3.234) (6.325) 
oru_gcert_dip 0.052 0.017 -0.048 0.000 
 (1.585) (0.639) (1.179) (0.034) 
oru_gcert_bach 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.104*** 0.095*** 
 (13.192) (17.131) (9.845) (18.137) 
oru_gdip_cert -0.153*** -0.104*** -0.086*** -0.118*** 
 (6.811) (5.643) (3.876) (8.927) 
oru_gdip_dip -0.002 0.004 -0.034 -0.021* 
 (0.103) (0.207) (1.065) (1.825) 
oru_gdip_bach 0.050*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 
 (11.013) (15.984) (10.508) (18.600) 
oru_mast_cert -0.090*** -0.102*** -0.146*** -0.123*** 
 (5.398) (7.264) (6.885) (7.316) 
oru_mast_dip 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 
 (6.647) (2.737) (2.585) (4.735) 
oru_mast_bach 0.185*** 0.206*** 0.181*** 0.162*** 
 (29.219) (35.504) (19.786) (35.404) 
oru_phd_cert 0.127*** 0.105*** -0.072 0.021 
 (3.365) (3.114) (0.838) (0.417) 
oru_phd_dip 0.091** 0.091*** 0.002 0.092** 
 (2.455) (2.986) (0.034) (2.099) 
oru_phd_bach 0.251*** 0.203*** 0.153*** 0.180*** 
 (19.995) (23.759) (10.343) (20.066) 
Observations 209,593 148,449 57,580 153,703 
Adjusted R-squared 0.106 0.171 0.205 0.225 
F-Statistic 355.34 421.23 209.63 562.77 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 6.3: F-Statistics and Partial R-Squared Values for Variable Sets, by Tenure 
Groups 
Set of Variables Tenure = 0 Tenure = 1 Tenure = 2 Tenure > 3 
F-Stat. Partial 
R
2
 
F-Stat. Partial 
R
2
 
F-Stat. Partial 
R
2
 
F-Stat. Partial 
R
2
 
Personal 
Characteristics 
247.61 0.007 591.10 0.024 286.23 0.032 631.00 0.024 
Study 
Characteristics 
94.68 0.004 77.10 0.004 22.31 0.003 61.03 0.003 
Industry of 
Employment 
114.71 0.010 126.10 0.013 43.83 0.011 115.22 0.013 
Broad Field of 
Study 
104.55 0.005 55.08 0.004 17.41 0.003 66.48 0.004 
Year of Graduation 41.57 0.002 29.34 0.002 8.00 0.001 42.21 0.002 
ORU 128.64 0.017 138.29 0.023 51.20 0.021 180.24 0.025 
Note: P-values were highly significant for all sets of variables, across all tenure groups 
 
The partial R-squared values in Table 6.3 indicate three findings of interest. First, the 
sets of variables for study characteristics, broad field of study and year of graduation 
only played minor roles in determining graduate earnings. Second, the ORU earnings 
effects were substantial explanatory factors of graduate earnings, and in most cases 
were the second most important contributor (after personal characteristics), for all the 
different tenure groups. Third, personal characteristics, the variable set with the 
highest partial R-squared, was a substantial contributor to the explanation of graduate 
earnings for graduates with one year or more of tenure, but accounted for only 0.7 
percent of the variation in earnings for those without any tenure. Again, this suggests 
that the graduate labour market is rigid at entry, and any premium or penalty 
associated with personal attributes surfaces only after some time in the labour 
market. The relative importance of employment related characteristics, such as the 
ORU and industry effects, over broad field of study and other schooling 
characteristics, also suggests that it is what one does in the labour market, and not 
what one studied (or how, or even where, one studied) that determines earnings.  
 
Moving on to a discussion of the estimated coefficients in Table 6.2, it is apparent 
that a few empirical observations can be drawn. The estimated coefficient for gender 
in panel (i) indicates that female job entrants earn 2.6 percent less than their male 
counterparts. As mentioned above in the discussion for the full sample, it seems that 
there is a minimal amount of gender discrimination in the graduate labour market. 
However, going across panel (ii) to panel (iv) of Table 6.2 clearly demonstrates that 
females incur a greater wage penalty the longer they remain in their jobs. One year of 
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tenure increases the wage disadvantage to almost five percent, while having tenure of 
two years increases the wage disadvantage yet further to seven percent. For tenure of 
three years and above, the wage disadvantage remains at around seven percent, 
suggesting that the gender discrimination levels off as tenure increases above three 
years.
65
 This is consistent with the evidence presented in Borland (1999), who 
reported a standardised hourly wage gap across the entire workforce of around ten 
percent, a figure comparable with the estimates for the higher tenure groups in the 
present study.  
 
To explore this further, the sample with three years or more of tenure was further 
disaggregated, and equation (6-1) was estimated for graduates with increasing years 
of tenure.
66
 These analyses revealed that as the years of tenure increased, female 
graduates experienced an increasing earnings disadvantage. For example, as 
mentioned above, female graduates earned seven percent less than their male 
counterparts at two years of tenure. A similar wage gap was observed for female 
graduates up to six years of tenure, but the wage gap increased slightly to eight 
percent for the female graduates with eight years of tenure, and to ten percent for 
those with ten years of tenure in the firm. Thereafter, there is a decline in the extent 
of this earnings disadvantage, as the estimates for graduates with 11 or more years of 
tenure indicate that females earn 6.5 percent less than males. This latter group 
accounted for only four percent of the sample.  
 
As the higher tenure groups are also higher wage groups, these estimates reveal that a 
‘glass ceiling’ exists, even in the higher education labour market, and females 
experience greater earnings penalties the longer they have been in a specific job. The 
empirical finding here is also consistent with the analysis of the partial R-squared 
values earlier, where personal characteristics were found not to contribute much in 
explaining variations in graduate earnings for graduates starting in new jobs, but had 
relatively higher explanatory power for those with one year or more of job tenure. 
 
                                                 
65
 This is supported by earlier findings in Chapter 5. The earlier analysis of the gender wage gap for 
workers from various age groups indicated that the gender wage gap was wider among older workers. 
Specifically, females aged 35 years and below earn 4.5 percent less than their male counterparts, while 
females aged 56 years and older earn 13 percent less than their male peers.  
66
 The specific results of these analyses are not reported here, but are available on request.  
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The estimated coefficients for the experience proxy, age, indicate that the returns on 
this human capital measure increase with tenure. However, the estimates of age 
squared also increase with tenure while remaining negative in sign, indicating that 
the decline in returns to experience is more intense among the higher tenure groups. 
For example, when evaluated at twenty five years of age, those with no tenure in 
their current job can expect returns of less than one percent on their experience. The 
corresponding estimate for those with two years of tenure is slightly higher, at 1.3 
percent. Those with three years or more of tenure in their current job experience 
returns of 1.4 percent on their labour market experience, similar to those with two 
years of tenure. These findings are suggestive of complementarity between the forms 
of human capital captured by the age and tenure variables.  
 
Non-English speaking graduates have a very modest earnings disadvantage, of 1.4 
percent, when they are fresh in their jobs with no firm-specific experience. However, 
this earnings disadvantage increases, by almost 3.5 percentage points, once they 
reach their first year of tenure in their respective jobs. Those with two years of tenure 
earn 6.8 percent less than their English speaking counterparts. Seemingly, the 
disadvantage of language background is very modest at the beginning of graduates’ 
careers in their firms, and increases the longer they stay in their jobs. This is similar 
to what is observed in the case of gender, and again complements the earlier finding 
that personal endowments play a stronger role in determining earnings after some 
time in the labour market.  
 
Graduates without Australian residency status share the same trend in earnings 
disadvantage, though on a larger scale. Fresh graduates in a new job start off in the 
labour market with a 13.2 percent earnings disadvantage, which more than doubles to 
nearly 27 percent when they have been in their job for two years. The estimate for 
being of non-Australian residency status decreases to 21.2 percent among the highest 
tenure group distinguished, and this reduced effect may be associated with an 
adjustment effect that takes place in the longer term. However, with earnings around 
one-fifth lower than their counterparts with residency status even after three years, 
the earnings penalties are still substantial.  
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Graduates from a combined degree program have a very modest earnings premium 
on entry into their firm, compared to graduates without a double degree. However, 
this premium is not evident among the higher tenure groups. This implies that the 
additional human capital gained from a double degree program does not appear to 
add value to graduate earnings. Birch, Li and Miller (2009) observed the same results 
in their study, noting that the modest premium does not justify the additional costs 
involved in procuring the additional knowledge in another discipline. A study of 
double degree programs by Moulton et al. (2011) found that a large number of 
double degree programs are “essentially two unrelated and poorly integrated courses 
placed side by side”. In effect, due to the omission of ‘sub-majors’ from double 
degree programs, graduates from these programs have not learnt essential knowledge 
which is highly valued by employers. One example of this can be found in double 
degree programs which include engineering. Moulton et al. (2011) found that, in one 
instance, 16 subjects were dropped from the bachelor’s of engineering and bachelor’s 
of business dual degree program, including three core subjects. The very modest 
premium on double degree programs could be simply a reflection of the fact that 
these programs do not offer ‘double the value’ (The Australian 2011b), and, in many 
cases, omit key components of a discipline which would have been offered in a 
single ‘stand alone’ degree.67  
 
There are some differences in the estimated coefficients on university groups across 
the job tenure groups. For the Go8 and ATN graduates, modest premiums of 1.5 and 
3.3 percent, respectively, over the earnings of graduates from Other universities, are 
experienced by workers in a new job. Among those who had been in their job for two 
years at the time of graduation, slightly lower earnings advantages of 4.4 and 5.1 
percent, respectively, were recorded. Go8 graduates with three years of job-specific 
experience were characterised by the same level of premiums, while their peers from 
the ATN had a smaller premium of 2.4 percent.
68
 This volatility in the earnings 
                                                 
67
 On a separate note, the findings in this study have prompted the Australian Teaching and Learning 
Council to call for a change in the way these double or combined degree programs are marketed, since 
they do not offer ‘double’ the degree, nor ‘combine’ degrees in an inter-disciplinary way. However, 
the findings in the earlier Chapter 3 do indicate that a double degree offers graduates a reasonably 
higher chance of being correctly matched to their jobs. 
68
 The proportion of graduates from the Go8 and Other university groups changed for the sample with 
two years of tenure. The proportion of Go8 graduates decreased from around 30 percent (tenure = 1) 
to 27 percent (tenure = 2). More noticeably, the proportion of Other university graduates increased 
from 38 percent to 42 percent, of the total sample.  
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effects associated with the institutional groups appears to show that the type of 
university attended does not have a robust effect on earnings outcomes in the 
Australian labour market.  
 
6.4.4 ORU Effects on Earnings across Tenure Groups 
In this section, the ORU earnings effects for different tenure groups are discussed. 
Following on from the discussion thus far in the earlier analyses of ORU earnings 
effects, graduates from each level of educational attainment are discussed in turn. 
The estimated coefficients on the ORU effects from Table 6.2 are graphed in Figure 
6.3 to Figure 6.10.  
 
A few comments at this point will assist in the interpretation of the figures. First, it 
should be noted that the horizontal axis no longer denotes the education required for 
each job. Rather, the horizontal axis indicates the particular tenure group. In this 
way, following the shape of the curves from left to right allows an observation of the 
general trend in the ORU effects for greater job tenures.  
 
Second, the estimates for each level of education required for a job are graphed as a 
separate curve. Once again, statistically insignificant estimates are represented by 
‘grey’ markers, as was done for the graphs in Chapter 4. The benchmark group here 
is, again, the appropriately matched bachelor’s pass degree graduates in occupations 
that require the same qualification, in each particular tenure group.  
 
Third, the ORU earnings effects generally appear to be characterised by a trend of 
stability across the various tenure groups. Thus, F-tests were conducted on each of 
the estimated ORU coefficients, for the four estimations by tenure groups, to see if 
they were statistically the same across the four sets of estimations. The results of 
these F-tests are listed in Table 6.4. The results of these F-tests indicated that out of 
the 23 ORU categories, 11 had estimated coefficients that differed across equations, 
while the remaining 12 had coefficients that were statistically the same for the four 
tenure groups. These will be discussed in turn, together with the discussion of the 
ORU earnings effects for each qualification group.   
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Table 6.4: F-test of Statistical Equality of Coefficients across Tenure Groups  
Variable χ2 Prob > χ2 Variable χ2 Prob > χ2 
Diploma    Grad. certificate   
oru_dip_cert 4.88 0.1809 oru_gcert_cert 0.70 0.8743 
oru_dip_dip 1.12 0.7714 oru_gcert_dip 4.12 0.2493 
oru_dip_bach** 10.10 0.0177 oru_gcert_bach*** 41.11 0.0000 
      
Associate deg.    Grad. Diploma   
oru_ascdeg_cert 2.34 0.5040 oru_gdip_cert 4.98 0.1734 
oru_ascdeg_dip 1.70 0.6366 oru_gdip_dip 1.99 0.5737 
oru_ascdeg_bach 3.36 0.3399 oru_gdip_bach*** 70.14 0.0000 
      
Bachelor’s pass   Masters   
oru_bach_cert*** 26.91 0.0000 oru_mast_cert 5.10 0.1649 
oru_bach_dip*** 21.29 0.0001 oru_mast_dip** 8.83 0.0317 
oru_bach_bach (a) (a) oru_mast_bach*** 36.10 0.0000 
      
Bachelor’s honours   PhD   
oru_hons_cert* 6.69 0.0823 oru_phd_cert* 6.56 0.0873 
oru_hons_dip 3.82 0.2812 oru_phd_dip 1.53 0.6757 
oru_hons_bach*** 12.54 0.0057 oru_phd_bach*** 31.48 0.0000 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. (a) indicates 
non-applicability.  
 
6.4.5 Diploma Graduates 
The estimated ORU coefficients for diploma graduates are presented in Figure 6.3. 
There is the expected hierarchy in the estimated coefficients, in that diploma 
graduates in jobs which require a bachelor’s pass degree earn more than their 
counterparts in jobs that require a diploma, who, in turn, earn more than those in jobs 
that require only certificate level qualifications. Recall that the diploma graduates 
category is one of the smallest educational groups in the sample, and this size factor 
is accentuated with the disaggregation into four tenure groups. This possibly 
accounts for the statistical insignificance of a number of the estimated coefficients.  
 
An initial examination of the estimated coefficients for the overeducated graduates at 
this qualification level, and who work in certificate level jobs, seems to indicate 
some variability across tenure groups. For diploma graduates who have no job 
tenure, a substantial earnings disadvantage, of around 27 percent, is experienced 
relative to the bachelor’s pass degree graduates with bachelor’s pass degrees. 
However, among those with three years or more of job tenure, the earnings 
disadvantage is only 17 percent less than the benchmark group. Thus, while the 
earnings penalty associated with being overeducated for diploma graduates working 
in certificate level jobs appears to diminish, as one considers the higher tenure 
groups, the null hypothesis that the earnings effects are the same cannot be rejected 
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(see Table 6.4). Similarly, the null hypothesis that the earnings effects for diploma 
graduates working in correctly matched jobs that require a diploma are the same 
across the four tenure groups cannot be rejected.  
 
Figure 6.3: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Diploma Graduates 
 
 
In comparison, the undereducated diploma holders working in bachelor’s level jobs, 
and who have no job tenure, earn around five percent more than the appropriately 
matched reference group of bachelor’s pass graduates.69 This earnings premium was 
marginally higher, at 7.5 percent, among the group with two years of job tenure. 
Moreover, the F-test of equality indicates that the estimated coefficients for the 
undereducated graduates here are statistically different. However, excluding the 
statistically insignificant and lower estimate for the graduates with three or more 
years of tenure from the null hypothesis yields an F-test result which indicates that 
the estimated ORU coefficients for graduates in the first three tenure groups are 
statistically the same.  
 
Thus, it can be said that the three curves for diploma graduates are indicative of ORU 
earnings effects which are stable across tenure groups, or in other words, that the 
earnings effects displayed in Figure 6.3 are basically indistinguishable from straight 
lines. The equality in the wage effects to being undereducated and overeducated 
                                                 
69
 As noted in Chapter 4, the undereducated are likely to possess some favourable but unobserved 
characteristics that have enabled them to obtain a higher level job. These unobserved favourable 
would contribute to an earnings advantage as well.   
-0.35
-0.25
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15
0.25
0 1 2 3 or more
Percent 
Years of Tenure 
Cert. Jobs
Dip. Jobs
Bach. Jobs
 148 
 
observed for diploma graduates lends credence to the human capital, technological 
change and screening views, and do not favour any of the above labour market 
theories in particular. 
 
6.4.6 Associate Degree Graduates  
Figure 6.4 charts the estimated ORU coefficients for associate degree graduates. This 
figure is characterised, again, by the hierarchy in earnings according to the level of 
qualifications required in the job.  
 
Figure 6.4: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Associate Degree Graduates 
 
 
The associate degree graduates are another relatively small group in the sample, 
being even smaller than the diploma graduates. Again, it is to be noted that a number 
of the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. Moreover, the changes in 
the estimated coefficients between the different tenure groups are irregular. For 
instance, the most overeducated group of associate degree graduates working in 
certificate level jobs, and who have zero tenure, experience earnings substantially 
lower than the benchmark category, by almost 30 percent. For the group who have 
one year of tenure in their jobs, however, the earnings disadvantage is halved to 
around 15 percent.  
 
However, the F-test of the null hypothesis that the relative earnings positions of this 
group of mismatched associate degree holders is the same across tenure groups fails 
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to reject this null hypothesis. Similarly, the F-tests for the other two job categories 
indicate that the ORU coefficients are statistically the same, across tenure groups. 
Thus, for associate degree graduates, the general trend for all three groups appears to 
be that of stable, and persistent earnings penalties. While the ORU earnings effects 
are stable across groups, all graduates with this level of educational attainment 
experience earnings penalties, regardless of whether they are overeducated or 
undereducated.  
 
6.4.7 Bachelor’s Pass Degree Graduates 
The estimated coefficients for the overeducated bachelor’s pass degree graduates 
working in certificate and diploma level jobs are presented in Figure 6.5. The 
bachelor’s pass degree graduates working in jobs that require a bachelor’s degree are 
correctly matched to the job requirements, and are the benchmark group in the 
regression analysis, as indicated by the horizontal line of 0.00. All the other wage 
effects are interpreted as relative to the earnings position of this benchmark group.  
 
Figure 6.5: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Bachelor’s Pass Graduates 
 
 
Bachelor’s pass degree graduates in jobs that require either a diploma or certificate 
level qualification are overeducated, and the curves for both groups indicate that 
there are earnings penalties associated with this overeducated status. Bachelor’s pass 
degree graduates working in certificate level jobs earn around 15 percent less than 
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their counterparts working in a job matched to their bachelor’s degree, for those with 
zero tenure, while those in the higher job category requiring a diploma earned 7.5 
percent less than the benchmark group. Note that the earnings disadvantage of the 
overeducated tends to be greater when the higher tenure groups are examined. 
Moreover, these estimates were found to differ statistically according to the results of 
the F-tests of equality, which are significant at the one percent level. 
 
The graduates working in diploma level jobs fare slightly better, earning from seven 
to 11 percent less than the benchmark group. While the variance in the ORU earnings 
effects across tenure groups here does not appear to be considerable, the trend 
appears to be one of increasing wage penalties associated with being overeducated.  
 
This pattern of an increase in the earnings penalties associated with overeducation as 
higher job tenure groups are examined is different from that for the diploma and 
associate degree graduates. The relative earnings outcomes of overeducated 
bachelor’s pass degree graduates seem to provide some support for the screening 
hypothesis. That is, the increase in earnings penalties for the groups with positive 
tenure suggests that more able workers are being promoted into more correctly 
matched jobs. In other words, the lower earnings observed for the overeducated 
groups with higher tenure could be attributed to the lower mean (and unobserved) 
levels of ability for those who have been screened, or ‘filtered’. At the same time, the 
small dissipation of the uncertainty wage discount (Cain and Aigner 1977) observed 
for those with positive tenure (and who have not been promoted), indicates that the 
screening process is not important. 
 
6.4.8 Bachelor’s Honours Degree Graduates 
The ORU earnings effects for bachelor’s honours graduates are shown in Figure 6.6. 
The observed changes in the estimated ORU coefficients for graduates with a 
bachelor’s honours degree are moderate as higher tenure groups are examined, 
following on from the pattern in the earlier discussion. The F-tests of equality 
indicate that the estimated ORU earnings effects are the same across tenure groups, 
for bachelor’s honours degree graduates working in diploma level occupations, but 
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differ statistically for those in the highest and lowest job categories which require a 
bachelor’s pass degree, and a certificate, respectively.  
 
Figure 6.6: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Bachelor’s Honours Graduates 
 
 
The curves for the bachelor’s honours degree graduates overeducated in the lower 
level certificate level jobs indicate that the estimated earnings effects are similar for 
the graduates with zero, one and two years of tenure. These graduates earn around 
nine percent less than the benchmark category. However, the honours graduates 
working in certificate level jobs, and who have three years or more of job tenure, 
have a modestly higher earnings penalty (by four percentage points), at 13 percent. 
Further, the exclusion of this last group yields a F-test result which indicates that 
estimates for the first three tenure groups are statistically similar. Thus, earnings 
differ only for the graduates with the highest levels of tenure.  
  
In contrast, an increasing, and statistically different, trend is observed for the 
graduates in the highest category of bachelor’s pass degree jobs. Nevertheless, the 
variance in the estimated ORU coefficients is very modest. While the earnings 
advantage experienced by honours graduates in bachelor’s pass level jobs who have 
three years or more of job tenure is double that observed for their counterparts with 
zero tenure, the difference, of just 2.6 percentage points, is negligible.  
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The trend for graduates at this level of educational attainment can be interpreted thus. 
Stable ORU earnings penalties are found for the bachelor’s honours graduates at the 
lower job levels, regardless of the level of tenure. For bachelor’s honours graduates 
in the higher bachelor’s pass degree level jobs, a very small earnings premium, of 
three percentage points, is observed. This is, again, consistent with the interpretation 
that a screening process which does not result in job mobility is a relatively 
unimportant function of the labour market. 
 
6.4.9 Graduates with Graduate Certificates 
The estimated ORU coefficients for graduates with graduate certificates are 
presented in Figure 6.7. The estimates for graduate certificate holders working in 
diploma level jobs were all statistically insignificant, presumably due to their 
relatively small proportion, of only half a percent of the sample. Their counterparts in 
certificate and bachelor’s pass level jobs were observed to have statistically 
significant estimates for all tenure groups. The estimated ORU earnings impacts for 
graduate certificate holders were observed to be small across the tenure groups, in 
line with the trend found for the other qualification groups thus far. The F-tests 
indicated that only the estimated coefficients for graduate certificate holders working 
in bachelor’s pass degree level jobs were statistically different, whereas the estimated 
coefficients for graduate certificate holders in diploma or certificate level jobs were 
statistically stable across tenure groups.  
 
Figure 6.7: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Graduate Certificate Graduates 
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The least overeducated graduate certificate holders in bachelor’s pass degree level 
jobs exhibit a modest decline in the earnings advantage relative to the reference 
category for the groups with higher amounts of tenure, as those in this job category 
with three years or more of tenure were observed to have an earnings premium five 
percentage points lower than those with no tenure.  
 
The findings for graduate certificate holders thus indicate that at the lower job levels, 
ORU earnings effects are stable, going from those with no tenure to those with the 
highest levels of tenure. For those working in the highest job categories requiring a 
bachelor’s pass degree, however, a smaller ORU earnings premium, by five 
percentage points, is observed for the graduates in the higher tenure groups, 
particularly for those with two years or more of tenure. Separate F-tests of equality 
confirm this, as the estimates on oru_gcert_bach were statistically the same between 
those with zero and one year of tenure, and for those with two and three or more 
years of tenure.  
 
6.4.10 Graduates with Graduate Diplomas 
The estimated ORU earnings effects for graduates with graduate diplomas are 
presented in Figure 6.8. The estimated coefficients for graduate diploma holders in 
diploma level jobs were all statistically insignificant, with the exception of those in 
the three years or more tenure group, who were observed to have a statistically 
significant, but very modest earnings penalty of two percent, relative to correctly 
matched bachelor’s pass degree holders. The F-test of equality in Table 6.4 indicates, 
that the null hypothesis that these earnings effects for graduate diploma holders 
employed in diploma level jobs are the same across the tenure groups, cannot be 
rejected. Thus, a pattern appears to be emerging here. Stable ORU earnings effects 
are typically observed for the lower job categories, across tenure groups, at all levels 
of higher qualifications discussed thus far. Statistically different estimates across 
tenure groups are found only at the bachelor’s pass degree job level. 
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Figure 6.8: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups - Graduate Diploma Graduates 
 
 
The variation in the earnings effects across tenure groups for graduate diploma 
holders in the highest job category of bachelor’s pass degree level jobs can be 
described as one of modest increases, as the analysis moves across groups with 
increasing amounts of tenure. That is, the earnings premium for graduates working in 
bachelor’s pass degree level jobs appears to be larger for those with one year of 
tenure relative to those with no tenure. However, the earnings effects for the groups 
with two and three or more years of tenure do not seem to be drastically different, 
compared to graduates with one year of tenure. Indeed, excluding those without 
tenure in the F-test of equality yields a result confirming the statistical similarity in 
estimated ORU earnings effects for the tenure groups with positive tenure. Therefore, 
for graduate diploma holders working in bachelor’s pass degree jobs, the only 
statistically important change in the estimated ORU earnings impacts occurs between 
those with zero and one year of tenure. A more detailed discussion of this will be 
offered in the concluding remarks.  
 
6.4.11 Masters Graduates 
Figure 6.9 presents the results of the ORU analysis for masters degree graduates. The 
ORU earnings effects for masters degree graduates in all three job categories are 
observed to be fairly stable across the tenure groups. Modest differences between the 
estimated ORU coefficients are observed between the zero and one year of tenure 
groups. The F-test estimates in Table 6.4 indicate that the ORU estimated 
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coefficients were statistically different between tenure groups, for masters degree 
graduates working in diploma or bachelor’s pass degree level jobs. The largest 
observed difference, of a five percentage points higher earnings penalty, occurs for 
masters degree graduates working in diploma jobs, between the groups with zero and 
one year of tenure. A separate F-test of equality which excludes the group with zero 
tenure reveals that the estimates for masters degree graduates working in diploma 
level jobs who have positive tenure are statistically the same.  
 
Figure 6.9: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Masters Graduates 
 
 
Masters degree graduates working in jobs which require a bachelor’s pass degree 
experience reasonably high earnings premiums, of around 19 percent, relative to that 
of the benchmark group of appropriately trained bachelor’s pass degree graduates, 
when those with no job tenure are considered. The group with one year of job tenure, 
however, has a slightly higher earnings premium of around 20.5 percent. A separate 
F-test which omits the masters degree graduates with one year of tenure indicates 
that the estimates for the other tenure groups are statistically different, despite their 
similarity in magnitude. Thus, there exists variability across tenure groups, for 
masters graduates working in jobs requiring a bachelor’s pass degree, although the 
economic significance of these changes is modest at best, and change is mostly 
apparent when comparing the groups with zero and one year of tenure.  
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6.4.12 Doctoral Graduates 
The estimated earnings effects for doctoral graduates are presented in Figure 6.10. 
Note that, as with the diploma and associate degree graduates, the doctoral graduates 
are a relatively small group, and the smaller numerical representation thus accounts 
for the statistical insignificance and irregularity for some of the estimates.  
 
Figure 6.10: ORU Earnings Effects by Tenure Groups, Doctoral Graduates 
 
 
The F-test estimates in Table 6.4 indicate that the ORU estimates for doctoral 
graduates in certificate and bachelor’s pass degree level jobs are statistically different 
across tenure categories. However, note that the estimates for the graduates with two 
or three or more years of tenure in the certificate level jobs category are statistically 
insignificant. When these estimates were excluded in a separate F-test, the estimated 
ORU coefficients for PhD graduates working in certificate level jobs, and who had 
zero or one year of tenure, were found to be the same, statistically speaking. The 
estimated ORU coefficients for PhD graduates working in bachelor’s pass degrees 
level jobs were, however, statistically different across the tenure groups. For the PhD 
graduates in bachelor’s pass degree level jobs, the earnings premium appears to be 
smaller when graduates with longer amounts of tenure are considered.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The discussion of results for the analyses disaggregated by tenure groups has 
revealed some general patterns. Generally speaking, the estimated ORU earnings 
-0.35
-0.25
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15
0.25
0 1 2 3 or more
Percent 
Years of Tenure 
Cert. Jobs
Dip. Jobs
Bach. Jobs
 157 
 
effects are stable for the graduates working in the lower job categories requiring a 
diploma or certificate. This is confirmed by the F-test estimates presented in Table 
6.4, where the majority of the estimates for graduates in diploma or certificate level 
jobs were statistically the same across tenure groups. This empirical finding does not 
favour any labour market theory in particular. However, where the estimates were 
found to differ statistically across tenure groups, exclusion of the estimated 
coefficients for those with zero tenure (such as for oru_mast_dip and oru_hons_cert) 
changed the result of the earlier F-tests, such that the respective estimates for those 
with one year to three years or more of tenure were statistically the same. Thus, any 
change in the ORU earnings effects takes place in the first year of tenure. This would 
be expected under the predictions of the screening hypothesis.  
 
The ORU earnings effects were found to differ across tenure groups for the graduates 
working in the highest job level requiring a bachelor’s pass degree. Two observations 
can be made as to the pattern of the ORU earnings effects at this job level. First, the 
variation in ORU earnings effects across tenure groups is very modest for all the 
different qualifications considered. Second, a decrease in the earnings premium as 
the higher tenure groups are examined is generally observed, although there are 
exceptions, such as the graduate diploma and bachelor’s honours degree graduates. 
At the same time, a decrease in the earnings disadvantage for the undereducated 
diploma graduates in the higher tenure groups is also observed. These findings 
concur with the expectations of the screening model, which predicts moderate 
changes in the ORU earnings effects as tenure increases. The theories of human 
capital and technological change, which share the prediction on the stability of the 
ORU earnings effects across tenure groups, but also allow for smaller ORU earnings 
penalties as tenure is accumulated, do not appear to be validated by the analysis in 
this section, as smaller ORU earnings penalties were not observed for the vast 
majority of the graduates. Therefore, the screening hypothesis appears to be the most 
applicable labour market theory to the Australian graduate labour market.  
 
Another interesting finding relates to the composition of those with zero tenure. As 
stated in the introduction to this chapter, this tenure group comprises of graduates 
new to the labour market, as well as relatively experienced workers who have 
obtained a new job upon obtaining their higher qualifications. The finding that 
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graduates who have tenure experience larger penalties than those with no tenure thus 
makes sense, when this quirk in the data is taken accounted of, and when the 
screening hypothesis is considered. The graduates in the zero tenure group who have 
been directed to a new and presumably higher level job upon completing their 
qualifications are those who are more able, and have come out well in the screening 
process. However, this only applies to the higher level bachelor’s pass degree jobs. 
Graduates in the lower level diploma and certificate level jobs have adverse earnings 
outcomes of the same magnitude, irrespective of tenure.   
 
Further, recall that the earlier analysis on the incidence of overeducation by tenure 
groups revealed that overeducation is more prevalent among those with greater 
amounts of tenure. Hence, the overall picture of ORU effects is not a rosy one. The 
higher incidence of overeducation amongst those with tenure suggests that job 
experience and a higher formal qualification may not be enough to compensate for 
other (unobserved) shortcomings of the graduates. This rising incidence of 
overeducation could be a sign of a very slow-adjusting labour market, which has not 
directed higher qualified graduates into a more suitable job after four months of 
completing their higher qualification.
70
 However, it is more likely that the 
overeducated graduates with tenure have had their shortcomings revealed throughout 
the course of their tenure, and notwithstanding their recent higher qualification, are 
not given the opportunity to move to a better job. This could explain the higher 
incidence of overeducation amongst those seeking another job.  
  
                                                 
70
 An increasing incidence of overeducation as tenure increases is observed when the sample is 
restricted to just bachelor’s pass degree graduates. 
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CHAPTER 7  
The Influences of University Attended and Field of Study on ORU Earnings 
Impacts 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus shifts from an examination of ORU earnings impacts by 
personal attributes, to the study of ORU earnings effects by institutional attributes. In 
particular, the roles of university quality and field of study are examined.  
 
Overeducation has been empirically shown to be associated with substantial earnings 
disadvantages, but there does not appear to be any easing in the demand for higher 
education. As set out in Chapter 1, the global trend appears to be that of increasing 
participation in higher education. Governmental policies at the federal level, such as 
the uncapping of Commonwealth supported student places in universities from 2012 
onwards, are encouraging the attainment of higher education. Under the ‘Education 
Revolution’ of the current Labor government, a target of having 40 percent of 
Australians aged 25 to 34 years attain a bachelor’s degree or above by the year 2025 
has been set. Recent estimates by the OECD suggest that Australia is well on track to 
achieving this target (The Australian 2011a; OECD 2011). 
 
On a separate but related note, Australian universities have attempted to distinguish 
themselves on the basis of quality in recent times. For example, university websites 
typically contain references to graduate outcomes, university rankings or 
accreditations and endorsements. These statements of quality can also be found on 
the websites of university groups. The website of the prestigious Group of Eight 
universities, for example, state that they are “consistently the first choice of the 
majority of highest qualified Australian school leavers” (Group of Eight 2011b). For 
some universities who have done well in the world universities rankings, 
announcements on their current ranking feature prominently on their websites. At the 
same time, it is also on the basis of ‘product differentiation’ that the Group of Eight 
universities are making their case for deregulation of student university fees (The 
Australian 2010a).
71
 
 
                                                 
71
 At present, university fees in Australia are strictly regulated and apply to all universities. 
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It is unclear, however, of the role that university quality, whether actual or perceived, 
plays in the determination and consequences of educational mismatch in the labour 
market. Accordingly, the in-depth analysis of graduate outcomes, in the 
Overeducation, Required, and Undereducation (ORU) context, in this study will be 
beneficial to policy makers of higher education, as well as to individuals in their 
decision to undertake higher education.  
 
Recall that earlier analyses looking at the incidence of educational mismatch in 
Chapter 3 found that ATN universities’ graduates were the most appropriately 
matched to their jobs, with about half of ATN graduates being in a job that requires 
their attained level of qualifications. Conversely, only a third of Go8 graduates are 
appropriately trained, while IRU and Other university graduates performed 
marginally better compared to Go8 graduates. When only bachelor’s degree 
graduates are considered, two-thirds of ATN graduates are appropriately trained, 
while the proportion of appropriately skilled graduates from the other three 
university groups improved to around 50 percent. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
studies which examine the relationship between institutional quality and earnings. 
Section 3 describes the methodology used in the analysis of graduate earnings, while 
section 4 discusses the results of the statistical analyses. Section 5 concludes.  
 
7.2 Literature Review 
A limited number of studies, usually from the US, examine the link between 
institutional quality or prestige, and graduate earnings. An even smaller number of 
studies within this literature examine the link between institutional quality and 
overeducation.  
 
These studies have used a variety of measures as indicators of quality.
72
 For instance, 
Smart (1988) used information on student entry levels, expenditure per student and 
tuition fees as indicators of institution quality. Belfield and Fielding (2001) used 
                                                 
72
 These measures can be generally categorised into either resource-related measures (student 
expenditures, for example) or prestige effects (research rankings, for example). McGuinness (2003) 
theorises that the former impacts on graduate earnings through faster accumulation of human capital 
while the latter influences earnings though peer effects, or research spillovers.  
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expenditure per student, while Birch, Li and Miller (2009) based their measure of 
university quality on another study by Valadkhani and Worthington (2006), who 
ranked Australian universities based on a number of measures, including student 
expenditure, research output, number of doctoral student completions, and other 
research measures. Robst (1995) used average aptitude test scores, expenditure per 
student, and prestige rankings as indicators of quality. 
 
While it is apparent that a range of quality measures have been used in these studies, 
they have generally come to the same conclusion. That is, institution quality has 
positive, but small impacts on graduate earnings. James et al. (1989), for instance, 
estimate that less than two percent of the variance in graduate earnings can be 
attributed to college quality effects. Similarly, Birch, Li and Miller (2009) found that 
the earnings of Australian graduates were very similar across institutions. The 
institution quality premium reported by Smart (1988) was about three percent.  
 
Thus far, only three studies have examined the link between institution quality and 
its effects on ORU.
73
 McGuinness (2003) found that for Northern Ireland graduates, 
university quality effects varied according to the degree class obtained. Specifically, 
university quality appeared to play a more important role for graduates with lower 
degree classes, and enabled these graduates to obtain better jobs and earnings 
compared to their counterparts with the same degree class from lower ranked 
institutions. These university quality effects were particularly large for graduates 
from certain faculties, such as Social Science and Medicine. Nevertheless, these 
effects could only be established for the graduates’ first job after graduation, and no 
discernible link could be found for graduates two to four years after graduation.  
 
A study of US graduates by Robst (1995) uncovered links between college quality 
and the onset of overeducation. In particular, the aforementioned three measures of 
college quality were each separately linked to decreases in overeducation. Where test 
scores were used as the indicator of college quality, 20 percent of graduates in the 
top quartile were found to be overeducated, while 44 percent of those in the lowest 
quartile were overeducated. Similar figures were found when student expenditure 
                                                 
73
 These studies were discussed in the literature review in Chapter 3, but warrant a further mention due 
to their relevance to the present chapter.  
 162 
 
was used as a proxy for quality. When the graduates were sorted by prestige ratings, 
the quality effect on overeducation was exacerbated, with 52 percent of graduates in 
the lowest quartile being overeducated, while the corresponding figure for those in 
the highest quartile was 16 percent. Moreover, Robst (1995) reported that the 
influences of college quality extended relatively far into the graduates careers, and 
overeducated graduates from higher quality institutions were much more likely to be 
correctly matched subsequently.
74
 This latter result is thus at odds with 
McGuinness’s (2003) finding that institution quality effects are short-lived. Finally, a 
study by Berggren (2010) on Swedish university graduates indicated that graduates 
from more prestigious universities were much more likely to be matched to their 
occupations in terms of educational levels.  
 
7.3 Methodology 
Prior to a discussion of the estimation model used in the analysis of graduate 
earnings, some points are offered in relation to the way institutions are categorised. 
Only broad university groupings of the institutions are used in the main set of 
analyses, as the Code of Practice for the GDS restricts the identification of individual 
institutions (AVCC-GCCA 2001). Thus, the universities are grouped according to 
their own groupings of: i) The Group of Eight (Go8); ii) Australian Technology 
Network (ATN); and, iii) Innovative Research Universities (IRU). The remaining 
universities which do not belong to any of the three groups above are categorised as 
‘Other universities’.75 A listing of the universities and their respective groups can be 
found in Appendix C. 
 
The Go8 universities are considered the most prestigious and research intensive 
universities in Australia. In a study comparing Australian universities, the Go8 
universities were typically the top-ranked in both expenditure-per-student and 
research-based measures of university quality (Valadkhani and Worthington 2006). 
At the same time, the Go8 universities are consistently the highest-ranked institutions 
in well-known rankings of world universities, such as the Shanghai Jiao Tong 
rankings and The Times Higher Education World University Rankings (ARWU 
                                                 
74
 The time periods of the data used by Robst (1995) were 1976 and 1985, one decade apart.  
75
 In a subsequent section of the present chapter, the analysis will be extended to (unnamed)  
individual institutions, so as to explore the variability of graduate earnings across institutions at a 
more detailed level.   
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2011; THE 2011). The relative quality of the other universities is less clear. While 
the Go8 maintains their leadership in rankings regardless of the measure of 
university quality used, the ranking within the ATN and IRU universities varies 
considerably, depending on the measure.
76 
Assessing the quality of other universities 
outside the Go8 is complicated by the fact that they do not appear in some rankings, 
or are ranked in a broader manner.
77
 
 
The analysis of ORU earnings impacts will utilise the Vahey (2000) model of ORU 
earnings effects.
78 
This model can be written as: 
 
(7-1)                
 
     
 
     
 
       
 
where w represents the hourly wage, used in the analysis in natural logarithmic 
format,   represents a vector of characteristics correlated with earnings, and Do, Du 
and D
r
 are dummy variables indicating if the individual is overeducated (D
o
), 
undereducated (D
u
) or correctly matched (D
r
). The proxies for experience that will be 
used in the analyses are the age of the graduate and the years of tenure in the present 
job, with both proxies entered into the estimating equation in quadratic form. 
Equation (7-1) will be estimated separately for each broad university group.  
 
7.4 Results 
The results of the analyses disaggregated by university groups are presented in Table 
7.1. Panels (i) to (iv) present the results for Go8, ATN, IRU and Other university 
graduates, in that order. As with the earlier analyses, most of the estimated 
coefficients for each university group are statistically significant at the one percent 
level. The adjusted R-squared values for each of the university groups range from 
0.176 to 0.228.   
                                                 
76
 The methodology used in university ranking differs, and while the Go8 are typically the top ranked 
universities from Australia, the rankings of other universities are more volatile.  
77
 For example, the ARWU ranking lists the top 100 universities, and the remaining institutions are 
ranked in groups such as 101-150, 151-200, and so on.  
78
 The analyses of the present chapter were also undertaken using the Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) 
model. The benefit to using the Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) approach lies in its relative brevity, 
although the tradeoff is the loss of some detail from the Vahey (2000) model. Nevertheless, the results 
are qualitatively similar. This alternative set of results provided the basis for a paper titled 
“Overeducation in the Australian Graduate Labour Market: The Role of University Attended and 
Field of Study”, presented to the 22nd Australian Labour Market Research Workshop, held at the 
University of Canberra in February 2012. 
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Table 7.1: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, by University Groups 
Variable Go8 ATN IRU Other 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Constant 2.208*** 2.259*** 2.395*** 2.375*** 
 (90.580) (79.726) (81.151) (107.682) 
Female -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.052*** 
 (17.341) (10.246) (7.894) (19.274) 
Age 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 
 (28.117) (22.317) (15.518) (25.632) 
Age squared/1000 -0.437*** -0.439*** -0.298*** -0.383*** 
 (22.272) (18.151) (12.748) (21.045) 
NESB -0.052*** -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.054*** 
 (13.940) (3.409) (4.107) (13.629) 
Non-Australian -0.197*** -0.243*** -0.144*** -0.186*** 
 (18.991) (17.840) (8.232) (19.043) 
Tenure 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (12.424) (14.902) (13.032) (19.227) 
Tenure squared/1000 -0.369*** -0.519*** -0.525*** -0330*** 
 (6.995) (10.599) (7.272) (10.551) 
Double degree 0.015*** -0.013 0.002 0.020*** 
 (3.901) (1.551) (0.206) (3.742) 
Part-time study 0.087*** 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.098*** 
 (22.138) (14.786) (13.913) (31.430) 
Further study 0.004 0.008 0.015*** 0.003 
 (0.968) (1.539) (2.639) (0.943) 
Natural and Physical Science -0.085*** -0.039*** -0.055*** -0.086*** 
 (14.185) (3.734) (6.186) (12.713) 
Information Technology -0.037*** -0.000 -0.029** -0.043*** 
 (5.172) (0.024) (2.116) (6.775) 
Engineering -0.021*** 0.018** 0.067*** -0.030*** 
 (3.262) (2.130) (5.719) (4.026) 
Architecture -0.124*** -0.067*** -0.082*** -0.107*** 
 (13.810) (7.100) (2.670) (8.134) 
Agriculture and Environment -0.174*** -0.147*** -0.066*** -0.124*** 
 (21.256) (7.132) (4.848) (15.520) 
Nursing -0.140*** -0.099*** -0.068*** -0.119*** 
 (15.651) (10.275) (7.658) (18.740) 
Medicine -0.035*** -0.030*** 0.008 -0.046*** 
 (5.389) (3.579) (1.018) (7.796) 
Education -0.102*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.065*** 
 (12.797) (4.557) (3.978) (11.984) 
Society and Culture -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.028*** -0.064*** 
 (12.856) (10.461) (4.191) (14.949) 
Creative Arts and Others -0.112*** -0.124*** -0.083*** -0.131*** 
 (15.490) (12.340) (7.375) (19.649) 
Self-employed 0.043*** 0.000 0.045*** -0.003 
 (4.148) (0.007) (2.595) (0.371) 
Private Sector -0.043*** -0.065*** -0.056*** -0.054*** 
 (10.394) (13.048) (10.465) (16.215) 
Short-term employment -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.077*** -0.102*** 
 (27.863) (18.505) (16.619) (31.872) 
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Table 7.1: OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, by University Groups (cont.) 
Variable Go8 ATN IRU Other 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
oru_dip_cert -0.241*** -0.255*** -0.160** -0.162*** 
 (10.041) (3.017) (2.063) (4.451) 
oru_dip_dip -0.053*** -0.145*** -0.077 0.001 
 (2.653) (2.784) (1.210) (0.041) 
oru_dip_bach 0.016 -0.016 0.151*** 0.041** 
 (0.858) (0.459) (3.143) (2.201) 
oru_ascdeg_cert -0.218*** -0.297*** -0.232*** -0.159*** 
 (3.578) (3.922) (2.692) (7.633) 
oru_ascdeg_dip -0.002 -0.120** -0.103 -0.062*** 
 (0.046) (2.019) (1.207) (5.417) 
oru_ascdeg_bach 0.007 -0.013 -0.077 -0.021 
 (0.161) (0.221) (0.944) (1.136) 
oru_bach_cert -0.138*** -0.162*** -0.125*** -0.168*** 
 (25.391) (23.101) (18.318) (38.449) 
oru_bach_dip -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.070*** -0.090*** 
 (14.758) (11.795) (8.094) (16.952) 
oru_hons_cert -0.089*** -0.165*** -0.104*** -0.088*** 
 (8.846) (5.608) (6.877) (6.462) 
oru_hons_dip -0.035*** -0.006 -0.020 -0.043** 
 (2.777) (0.204) (1.315) (2.302) 
oru_hons_bach 0.035*** -0.009 0.019* 0.052*** 
 (7.378) (0.814) (1.905) (6.787) 
oru_gcert_cert -0.147*** -0.028 -0.119*** -0.071*** 
 (5.227) (1.213) (3.393) (4.655) 
oru_gcert_dip -0.001 0.039** 0.048*** 0.012 
 (0.047) (1.963) (2.844) (0.721) 
oru_gcert_bach 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.137*** 0.116*** 
 (14.816) (13.352) (17.244) (21.087) 
oru_gdip_cert -0.105*** -0.176*** -0.104*** -0.095*** 
 (5.169) (7.043) (5.203) (7.754) 
oru_gdip_dip -0.060*** -0.030 0.021 0.017 
 (2.992) (1.298) (0.966) (1.478) 
oru_gdip_bach 0.106*** 0.077*** 0.098*** 0.091*** 
 (17.845) (11.183) (14.877) (20.231) 
oru_mast_cert -0.147*** -0.134*** -0.156*** -0.100*** 
 (10.090) (5.778) (4.094) (8.486) 
oru_mast_dip 0.037*** 0.104*** 0.042 0.070*** 
 (2.663) (6.406) (1.384) (5.803) 
oru_mast_bach 0.181*** 0.173*** 0.208*** 0.178*** 
 (34.957) (24.324) (22.900) (39.540) 
oru_phd_cert 0.050 0.128*** 0.064 0.064 
 (1.543) (2.580) (0.831) (1.305) 
oru_phd_dip 0.060* 0.026 0.160*** 0.116** 
 (1.926) (0.709) (6.205) (1.969) 
oru_phd_bach 0.200*** 0.161*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 
 (27.869) (9.190) (13.300) (20.067) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
     
Year of Graduation Included Included Included Included 
     
Observations 159,092 108,387 73,858 227,988 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.228 0.176 0.192 0.177 
F-statistic 619.98 313.84 285.65 694.87 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively.  
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A number of differences can be observed with regard to the determinants of graduate 
earnings across the university groups. Panels (i) and (iv), for example, indicate that 
non-English speaking graduates from Go8 and Other universities earn about five 
percent less than their English speaking counterparts. Non-English speaking ATN 
and IRU university graduates, however, have a lower earnings disadvantage, at 1.7 
and 2.7 percent, respectively. Across university groups, there is also a ten percentage 
points difference in the earnings penalty associated with being an Australian non-
resident. ATN graduates who are not Australian residents earn 24.3 percent less, 
compared to their Australian peers. IRU graduates who are non-residents have a 
lower earnings penalty, of 14.4 percent.  
 
The earnings effects of the fields of study also differ amongst the university groups. 
For instance, Science graduates from the Go8 earn 8.5 percent less than their peers 
who studied Management and Commerce, a result similar to that experienced by 
graduates from Other universities. ATN Science graduates, on the other hand, 
experience only about half that impact, with an estimated coefficient of -3.9 percent.  
 
Self-employment status also has different impacts on the earnings of graduates from 
different university groups. The self-employed Go8 and IRU graduates earn about 
4.5 percent more than their salaried counterparts, while the estimated coefficients for 
ATN and Other university graduates are very small, and also statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Another interesting difference is that Engineering graduates from the Go8 and Other 
universities have negative earnings impacts, while ATN and IRU Engineering 
graduates have positive earnings impacts, compared to the reference group of 
Management and Commerce graduates. Agriculture and Environment graduates in 
the IRU universities earn about 6.6 percent less than the benchmark group, but fare 
relatively better than the same type of graduates in the Go8, who experience almost 
three times the earnings penalty, as they have earnings 17.4 percent lower. The 
differences in the earnings impacts of the different fields of study across university 
groups could be a reflection on their comparative advantages in teaching or industry 
linkages.  
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7.4.1 Earnings Effects of ORU, by University Group 
The earnings effects of the ORU variables are discussed in this section. The ORU 
model of earnings exhibits interesting variations across the graduates of different 
university groups. In order to keep the discussion focussed and the findings apparent, 
the discussion here will once again be conducted in turn by the level of qualifications 
obtained. Further, the ORU coefficients will be graphed for each level of 
qualifications attained, with each curve showing the earnings effect for a different 
university group.  
 
To facilitate the comparisons across university groups, the estimated ORU 
coefficients from Table 7.1 are adjusted to take into account the ‘university group’ 
effects from Table 4.2 earlier. For example, the results from Chapter 4 in the earlier 
analysis for the full sample indicated that, on average, a Go8 graduate can expect to 
earn 2.6 percent more than graduates from Other universities. Thus, the ORU 
estimated coefficients for the Go8 university group will be adjusted upwards by 2.6 
percent. The ORU coefficients for graduates of the rest of the university groups are 
adjusted in the same fashion. In this way, more precise and insightful comments on 
the different impacts of the ORU variables across university groups can be offered, 
as the ‘university group’ effect would have been taken into account.  
 
Estimated coefficients which are statistically insignificant are represented by the grey 
graphed points, instead of black. The reference categories here are the correctly 
trained bachelor’s pass degree graduates, from each respective university group. 
Generally speaking, the shape of the curves accord with that reported in the 
literature, as the results here indicate that earnings penalties increase as the extent of 
overeducation increases.   
 
7.4.2 Diploma Graduates  
The earnings effects for diploma graduates are presented in Figure 7.1. As mentioned 
above, this category consists of undereducated, overeducated and correctly matched 
workers. Relative to the benchmark category of the correctly matched bachelor’s 
pass graduates from their respective university groupings, these graduates generally 
have lower earnings, which is expected, due to the lower educational attainment of 
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this group. A fair amount of variability exists across the university groups at all the 
job levels.  
 
Figure 7.1: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Diploma Graduates 
 
 
The undereducated diploma graduates working in jobs that require a bachelor’s pass 
degree tend to earn more than those working in correctly-matched diploma level 
jobs. However, again there is wide variation in the predicted earnings across the 
university groups, and two of the earnings effects (for the Go8 and ATN diploma 
graduates) are statistically insignificant. Other universities graduates, however, earn 
four percent more. Nevertheless, this earnings premium pales in comparison with 
that of the IRU graduates here, who earn a substantial 15 percent more than the 
benchmark group.
79
 In summary, the striking feature of Figure 7.1 is the apparent 
tendency for wages to follow the types of jobs held.  
 
Diploma graduates who are correctly matched in diploma-level jobs earn more than 
their over-educated counterparts employed in certificate level jobs. In several cases, 
the earnings effects for this correctly matched category are statistically 
                                                 
79
 As mentioned above, diploma graduates who are undereducated in a bachelor’s level job could be 
earning more due to having a previous higher qualification. Checking the data confirms this, as 40 
percent of the IRU graduates working in bachelor’s degree jobs have a previous qualification at a 
bachelor’s degree or above, a proportion much higher than the average of 20 percent for all diploma 
graduates. Excluding these graduates with prior higher degrees, and re-estimating equation (7-1) for 
all university groups yielded findings similar to what has been reported above. While the estimated 
coefficient for IRU diploma graduates working in bachelor’s pass level jobs decreased to 11.6 percent, 
it is still high in comparison to the corresponding category in other university groups.  
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indistinguishable from the earnings of bachelor’s pass degree graduates from their 
university group who are employed in the high earnings jobs that require bachelor’s 
pass degrees. IRU and Other universities graduates are the ones who fall into this 
category of having earnings that do not differ statistically relative to the omitted 
category. Go8 and ATN graduates, however, earn 2.7 percent and around 11 percent 
less, respectively. The spread of the data points in Figure 7.1 indicates that there is a 
substantial amount of variance in the earnings effects across university groups in this 
category, with Go8 and ATN graduates being relatively worse off in terms of 
earnings.  
 
Looking at the overeducated diploma graduates who are in a certificate level job, it is 
observed that they have quite a poor earnings outcome regardless of the institution 
attended. Nevertheless, there is also some variation in their earnings prospects across 
the groups of universities. The overeducated graduates from Go8 and ATN 
universities have earnings just over 20 percent lower than the adequately trained 
bachelor’s pass graduates from the same university group. The IRU and Other 
universities graduates in the same category, however, are a little better off, with 
earnings only about 16 percent less than the reference group. In this regard, the IRU 
and Other university groups fare better than the other two university groups, even 
after taking into account the slightly higher earnings experienced by the average 
graduates from the Go8 and ATN universities. 
 
7.4.3 Associate Degree Graduates 
Figure 7.2 presents the estimated ORU coefficients for associate degree graduates. 
Associate degree graduates who work in certificate and diploma level occupations 
are considered overeducated, while those in a bachelor’s degree level job are 
undereducated. It can be easily observed from Figure 7.2 that there are substantial 
differences in the ORU earnings effects for associate degree graduates from different 
university groups. This is particularly so for the overeducated associate degree 
graduates working in certificate and diploma level jobs, as their (undereducated) 
counterparts working in bachelor’s pass level jobs have earnings which are 
statistically indistinguishable from the bachelor’s pass degree graduates, correctly 
matched to a job requiring a bachelor’s pass degree.   
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Figure 7.2: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Associate Degree 
Graduates 
 
 
As mentioned above, the estimated coefficients for the undereducated category of 
those working in bachelor’s pass degree professions are statistically insignificant for 
all university groups, although the size of the estimated coefficients, and therefore 
the shape of the curves, accords with expectations. Again, wages tend to follow jobs, 
and the relationship in this regard is reasonably similar across the four groups of 
universities considered here.  
 
The middle category of associate degree graduates working in diploma level jobs is 
also overeducated, though to a lesser extent than those in certificate level jobs. This 
is reflected in the lesser magnitude of the earnings penalties experienced by those in 
diploma level work. The graduates from the ATN earn nine percent less, while Other 
universities graduates experience earnings penalties half of that amount, at roughly 
six percent. Go8 and IRU graduates have earnings that do not differ statistically from 
those of the reference category. In this regard, it appears that the overeducated ATN 
associate degree graduates who work in either certificate or diploma level jobs fare 
the worst, while graduates from the other three university groups have mixed 
performances.  
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For those overeducated in certificate level jobs, graduates from all four university 
groups experience lower earnings relative to the benchmark group. These earnings 
penalties range from 16 percent for graduates from Other universities, to almost 27 
percent for ATN graduates. Go8 and IRU graduates fall in the middle here, earning 
19 and 23 percent less, respectively.  
 
Thus far, the analyses of the diploma and associate degree graduates have indicated a 
pattern of earnings reasonably consistent with the ORU literature with regards to the 
ORU earnings profile. There are, however, a number of statistically insignificant 
earnings effects and one apparent outlier finding. These could be linked to the size of 
these qualifications groups, particularly when the sample is disaggregated by 
university group. Those with diploma or associate degree level qualifications are 
each less than 0.7 of one percent of the total sample, and represent as little as 0.07 of 
one percent of the sample within specific types of universities. In comparison, 
bachelor’s pass degree graduates make up 60 percent of the entire sample, and those 
correctly matched in this category are the largest ORU category, comprising 37 
percent of the entire sample. There are relatively fewer graduates with higher 
qualifications, compared to the number of graduates with bachelor’s degrees. 
However, those with higher degrees are still a sizable group, even for the 
disaggregated university groups. Masters graduates account for almost 15 percent of 
the sample, and even the smaller higher degree groups, such as the doctoral 
graduates, make up for around 2.7 percent of the total sample, and number in excess 
of 15,000 graduates. The following analyses on these relatively larger groups of 
graduates arguably provide sounder findings.  
 
7.4.4 Bachelor’s Pass Degree Graduates 
The estimated ORU coefficients for bachelor’s pass degree graduates are presented 
in Figure 7.3. The plotted points in Figure 6.3 indicate that there is some variation in 
earnings for the overeducated bachelor’s pass degree graduates (working in jobs 
requiring only a diploma or certificate level qualification) of different university 
groups, although these variations are narrower than those observed in other degree 
types.  
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Figure 7.3: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Bachelor’s Pass Graduates 
 
 
Overeducated graduates from Other universities working in diploma level jobs earn 
nine percent less than the omitted category, although this is a considerable 
improvement compared to those in certificate level jobs. For the other graduates in 
this category, the university grouping does not seem to make much of a difference, as 
the plotted coefficients are all ‘clustered’ around the minus seven percent point. 
Hence, for graduates with bachelor’s pass degrees, university groups seem to play 
very small roles, and there are only minute differences in the ORU effects on 
earnings. Thus, taking into account the estimated effects on university groups, 
bachelor’s pass graduates are a very homogeneous group in terms of earnings, and 
have very similar ORU earnings effects. Graduates from the Other universities 
generally fare the worst, but earn only roughly three percent lower in comparison to 
graduates from other university groups. 
 
For those overeducated in a certificate level job, Go8 graduates have the least 
earnings penalties of 11 percent, relative to their well-matched counterparts in a job 
requiring a bachelor’s degree. IRU and ATN graduates are a little worse off, earning 
about 13 percent less than the benchmark group, while Other universities graduates 
have earnings around 17 percent lower.  
 
Thus, there are two clear conclusions from the study of the bachelor’s pass degree 
graduates, where there are numerous graduates for each university group in each of 
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the job match/mismatch categories. First, the central message from the aggregate 
level analyses, that wages tend to follow jobs, carries over to the analyses for each 
university group. Second, and related to the first finding, no university group is able 
to offer its graduates protection from the adverse consequences of failing to find a 
job that matches the graduates’ level of qualifications. In other words, the Australian 
job market is largely blind to institutional quality differences - or these do not exist in 
terms of differences that can realistically be expected to impact earnings.  
 
7.4.5 Bachelor’s Honours Degree Graduates 
Figure 7.4 plots the estimated ORU coefficients for graduates with an honours 
degree. Those with this level of educational attainment are considered overeducated 
in all three job categories, as are the other graduates in the rest of the discussion. 
Generally, the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are similar to those 
in the bachelor’s pass degree category above. Further, the estimated ORU effects for 
the diploma and bachelor degree job levels do not differ much across university 
groups.  
 
Figure 7.4: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Bachelor’s Honours 
Graduates 
 
 
Graduates who work in a bachelor’s pass level job have very small positive earnings 
impacts, of up to five percent. These small positive effects, of two to five percent 
across university groups, can also be interpreted as estimates of the ‘honours’ 
premium. The small premium associated with a bachelor’s honours qualification is 
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consistent with that found in earlier studies, such as Chia and Miller (2008), who 
found no honours premium in the case of graduates from one of the Go8 universities, 
and Birch, Li and Miller (2009), who found a small premium of five percent for 
Australian graduates. There is, thus, little observed earnings variation between 
university groups for this category. As noted above, for bachelor’s pass graduates, 
those who have an undergraduate qualification experience very similar ORU 
earnings effects, regardless of university group. 
 
Graduates from all university groups have very small negative earnings impacts for 
being overeducated in a diploma level job. For graduates from the ATN, the very 
small negative earnings effect of being overeducated at this level was offset by the 
positive earnings effect associated with their university group. Graduates from the 
Go8 and IRU university groups have negligible ORU earnings effects, while 
graduates from Other universities are the worst off in this category, as they earn 
around four percent less.  
 
For the overeducated graduates in certificate level jobs, a spread of earnings can be 
observed. Go8 graduates experience the least detriment associated with their 
overeducation, as lower earnings of around six percent are estimated for this group. 
The ATN graduates in this category are much worse off, as they have an earnings 
penalty of over double this amount, at 13 percent.  
 
7.4.6 Graduates with Graduate Certificates 
The estimated ORU coefficients for graduates with graduate certificates are 
presented in Figure 7.5. Figure 7.5 indicates that the overeducated graduates perform 
very differently in terms of earnings for jobs which require a certificate level 
qualification, depending on the university group they come from. These differences 
become narrower for these graduates overeducated in diploma level jobs, and there 
are very minor differences across institution types for those who are the least 
overeducated in jobs requiring a bachelor’s degree. These findings seem to indicate 
that a larger variability in earnings across university groups occurs when jobs that 
require lower levels of qualifications are considered, or at the highest extent of 
overeducation.  
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Figure 7.5: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Graduate Certificate 
Graduates 
 
 
There are only minor earnings differences across university groups for the graduates 
working in bachelor’s degree jobs, who all earn roughly 12 to 14 percent more than 
their peers in the reference group. However, a relatively higher amount of variability 
in graduate earnings across the university groups can be seen for graduate certificate 
graduates overeducated in diploma level jobs. Small positive earnings effects of up to 
seven percent are observed for the overeducated graduate certificate holders from 
ATN universities, while IRU graduates earn five percent more than the benchmark 
group. Graduates from the two other university groups, however, have earnings that 
do not differ significantly from the earnings of the relevant benchmark groups.  
 
For the graduates who are the most overeducated in certificate level jobs, earnings 
penalties ranging from seven percent for Other universities graduates, to around 12 
percent for Go8 and IRU graduates, are observed. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
university group that performs the worst in this category is the Go8, while those from 
Other universities have less than half the earnings penalty. ATN graduates have 
earnings that do not differ statistically from the benchmark group of adequately 
trained bachelor’s degree students.  
 
Thus, the main message that emerges from the study of the graduate certificate level 
qualifications is that those employed in the modal job category of bachelor’s pass 
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degree earn very much the same regardless of the type of university they attended. 
Greater differences in earnings arise when the more atypical job types, of diploma 
and certificate levels, are considered.  
 
7.4.7 Graduates with Graduate Diplomas 
The estimated ORU coefficients for graduate diploma holders are plotted in Figure 
7.6. The shape of the curves for ATN, IRU and Other universities graduates are 
consistent with expectations. However, the curve for the Go8 graduates is strikingly 
different in shape, as it indicates an increasing return to overeducation.  
 
Figure 7.6: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Graduate Diploma 
Graduates 
 
 
From Figure 7.6, it can be seen that the shape of the curves for the ATN, IRU and 
Other universities graduates are very similar, particularly for the latter two groups. 
Amongst these three universities, ATN graduates appear to fare the worst, as its 
curve is the lowest on the graph.  
 
The overeducated graduates working in jobs at the bachelor’s degree level 
experience an earnings premium, regardless of the type of institution attended. There 
is only a small difference, of up to four percent, in the earnings premium across 
university groups, as the estimated earnings effects range from nine percent, for 
Other universities graduates, to 13 percent, for Go8 graduates. The ATN and IRU 
graduates have very similar earnings impacts to those of the graduates from the Other 
universities. This homogeneity in the earnings effects of overeducation for jobs 
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requiring a bachelor’s pass degree follows on from the discussion of the lower 
qualifications earlier.  
 
Graduate diploma graduates, who are overeducated in jobs requiring a diploma, 
mostly have earnings that are not statistically different from those of the bachelor’s 
pass degree graduates who are correctly matched to jobs that require the same level 
of education. Graduates from only one university group, the Go8, earn about three 
percent less than the benchmark group of bachelor’s pass degree holders. In contrast, 
graduates from the other university groups have earnings that do not differ 
statistically from the reference category.  
 
For jobs requiring a certificate, the overeducated graduate diploma holders from the 
ATN have substantially lower earnings compared to the benchmark group of 
correctly matched bachelor’s pass degree graduates, as they earn 15 percent less. 
Graduates from the other three university groups also experience earnings penalties 
compared to the reference group. Specifically, the graduates from the other 
university groups who are overeducated by the same extent have similar earnings 
penalties, of roughly eight to ten percent. The ATN graduates, thus, lag behind by up 
to five percent, even after the ‘ATN premium’ is taken into consideration.  
 
As mentioned above, the curve for Go8 graduates is of a different shape compared to 
the other three university groups, and also departs from the stylised shape in the 
empirical literature. This, however, appears to be influenced heavily by the graduates 
in the diploma level jobs category. The estimated coefficients for Go8 graduates in 
the other two categories do not vary much from the other university groups. 
However, for those in diploma level jobs, the size of the estimated coefficient is 
markedly lower, and is the only statistically significant earnings effect in this job 
category.  
 
The other feature of Figure 7.6 is the broad similarity of the findings with those in 
Figure 7.5 for the graduate certificate graduates. That is, there are modest differences 
across types of universities for the modal job category of bachelor’s pass degree, and 
greater variation in earnings outcomes when the more atypical jobs, characterised by 
far greater levels of overeducation, are considered.  
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7.4.8 Masters Graduates 
The curves in Figure 7.7, which plots the estimated ORU coefficients for masters 
graduates, tell a slightly different story. It seems that, with the exception of the ATN 
university group, the penalties to being overeducated are linear, and do not exhibit 
any of the accelerated decline in earnings associated with being more overeducated.  
 
Figure 7.7: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Masters Graduates 
 
 
All the holders of masters degrees are overeducated, but only those working in jobs 
requiring either a bachelor’s pass degree or a diploma actually earn more than the 
benchmark group of bachelor’s pass degree graduates working in a (correctly 
matched) job requiring a bachelor’s pass degree. Masters graduates who end up in 
jobs that require only a certificate level qualification fare far worse in terms of 
earnings than this benchmark group. 
 
The earnings gains to masters graduates in jobs requiring a bachelor’s pass degree, 
compared to bachelor’s pass degree graduates, are evident for all the university 
groups. These premiums are high, and are all roughly around the 21 percent mark, 
for graduates of three out of the four university groups. Graduates from the Other 
universities do not do as well, but still earn 18 percent more than the reference group 
of well-matched bachelor’s pass graduates.  
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The positive earnings effects for overeducated masters graduates who work in 
diploma level jobs are characterised by a modest amount of variability across 
university groups. Go8 masters graduates, for instance, earn six percent more than 
their appropriately matched counterparts with a bachelor’s degree. ATN graduates, 
however, earn more than twice that, with earnings estimated to be higher by 14 
percent. Graduates from the Other university group earn seven percent more than the 
benchmark group, while IRU graduates have earnings that do not differ statistically 
from the reference group. In other words, the theme of the analyses for the lower-
level qualifications, of there being greater variability in earnings across types of 
universities the more extensive the level of overeducation, carries over to the masters 
graduates.  
 
The substantial penalties to being overeducated in a job requiring a certificate for 
masters graduates arise for each type of university. These earnings penalties differ by 
university group, however, ranging from around ten percent in the case of ATN and 
Other universities graduates, to around 16 percent for the IRU graduates. Go8 
graduates are in the middle, earning 12 percent less than the base category. Certainly, 
Other and ATN universities’ masters graduates perform better than their counterparts 
from the Go8 and the IRU in this category.  
 
7.4.9 Doctoral Graduates  
The doctoral graduates have curves which have rather different shapes to the general 
pattern observed for the other graduates, as illustrated in Figure 7.8. In particular, for 
the ATN, Go8 and Other universities graduates, the curves are slightly ‘bowed’ at the 
diploma level job category. This implies that graduates with a PhD fare relatively 
badly at this level of overeducation. For ATN graduates with a PhD, the curve dips 
sharply for those in diploma level jobs. However, the estimated earnings coefficient 
for that category is statistically insignificant.  
 
All doctoral graduates are overeducated. In contrast to the masters level degree 
graduates, all doctoral graduates earn more than the benchmark group from their 
university of bachelor’s pass degree graduates working in jobs that require only a 
bachelor’s degree. The extent of these advantages dissipates, however, the more 
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extensive is the level of overeducation. Moreover, while the earnings effects 
associated with this modal category of jobs requiring only a bachelor’s degree are in 
a fairly narrow band, those for the jobs requiring lower level qualifications, and 
particularly those for the diploma level jobs, exhibit greater variability.  
 
Figure 7.8: ORU Earnings Effects by University Groups, Doctoral Graduates 
 
 
The substantial earnings premium to overeducated doctoral graduates in bachelor’s 
degree level jobs occurs within each group of universities. Graduates from the ATN, 
IRU and Other university groups have an earnings premium of about 19 percent here, 
relative to their counterparts who have a bachelor’s pass degree and who are in jobs 
categorised as appropriate for this level of qualification. PhD graduates from the Go8 
have marginally higher earnings premiums, and earn 23 percent more.  
  
The doctoral graduates who are employed in diploma level jobs earn less than their 
counterparts from the same type of university who work in jobs that require a 
bachelor’s pass degree. Moreover, as noted above, a larger amount of variability 
across the earnings of PhD graduates from different university groups is observed for 
those in diploma level jobs. Go8 graduates have a modest return to overeducation of 
nine percent, relative to the benchmark group. Graduates from Other universities 
experience a premium almost twice that of Go8 graduates, at around 12 percent. IRU 
graduates have the highest earnings returns, of 16 percent, in this category.  
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For occupations requiring a certificate, doctoral graduates from the ATN have 
earnings premiums of 13 percent relative to their appropriately matched peers who 
have bachelor’s pass degrees. Doctoral graduates who work in the same sort of jobs, 
but are from the other university groups, have earnings that do not differ statistically 
from their respective undergraduate counterparts.  
 
7.4.10 Summary of Results  
The findings from the analysis of ORU earnings effects for the various university 
groups can thus be summarised as follows. First, the tendency for wages to follow 
jobs, which was found in Chapter 4, is reinforced by the findings of the analysis in 
the present chapter. Specifically, graduates with higher qualifications experience 
earnings premiums compared to their peers with lower qualifications. These earnings 
premiums, however, decline with overeducation status. Second, a comparison of 
ORU earnings effects across institution groups indicates that no university group 
emerges as a dominant leader in terms of graduate earnings, and that there are 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in each qualification category. Further, large disparities in 
ORU earnings effects occur at the atypical job categories requiring a certificate or 
diploma. Smaller differences in ORU earnings effects across institution groups are 
observed for graduates who are in jobs requiring a bachelor’s pass degree.  
 
7.5 A Further Analysis of Institutional Earnings Effects 
7.5.1 Institutional Earnings Effects at a Detailed Level 
This section examines the institutional earnings effects in greater detail, through the 
use of a more detailed specification of the dummy variables for the universities. 
Recall, that in Chapter 4, the earnings effects observed for the various university 
groups were very small. Specifically, graduates from the Go8 and ATN university 
groups were observed to have earnings advantages of 2.6 and 3.1 percent, 
respectively, relative to the benchmark group of Other universities. IRU graduates 
had a positive but negligible earnings premium of 0.4 percent.  
 
These small institutional effects indicate that the labour market treats university 
graduates homogeneously, and that institutional quality or reputation plays a very 
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minor role in the labour market.
80
 A way to explore this issue further would be to 
disaggregate the university groups and estimate the earnings effects for individual 
institutions in a pooled regression. This will allow for the separating out of the 
variability in institutional earnings effects that might be hidden within the current 
aggregation by university groups. 
 
Thus, equation (7-1) is estimated for the full sample, but with added controls for 
individual institutions. Note that the data description in Chapter 2 highlighted that 
one of the rules in the Code of Practice for the GDS dataset prohibits the 
undermining of the reputation and standing of individual institutions. Thus, to 
preserve anonymity of the institutions, the institution dummy variables are named in 
such a way that indicates their identity in a certain university group, but does not 
specifically identify the institution. For example, Go8 institutions are coded as 
go8_1, go8_2, …, go8_8 universities. 
 
The results from this analysis are presented in panel (i) of Table 7.2. As the variables 
of interest here are those for the individual institutions, only those results are 
presented, although it should be noted that the estimated effects on the other 
variables were very similar to those presented in Table 4.2 in terms of sign and 
magnitude. The results in Table 7.2 clearly indicate that there is a large amount of 
variability in institutional earnings effects, relative to the benchmark case of one of 
the Other universities (oth_15).
81
 To illustrate this further, the individual institutional 
effects are also shown in the form of a scatter plot in Figure 7.9. Further, the 
institutional effects are grouped vertically based on their university group affiliation. 
The first ‘line’ of plotted effects are those for the Go8 universities, the second ‘line’ 
for ATN universities, the third ‘line’ for IRU universities, and the last ‘line’ for 
Other universities.  
 
Two main points can be made with reference to Figure 7.9. First, as mentioned 
above, individual universities have markedly different university earnings effects. 
One of the Other universities fared the worst, with an earnings disadvantage of 
                                                 
80
 An alternative explanation would be that graduates acquire similar amounts of human capital 
through their degrees. Given the diversity of universities and degree programs, this is unlikely.  
81
 The benchmark university for the analysis in this section was chosen at random.   
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around 18 percent. In contrast, one of the ATN universities had the highest earnings 
advantage, of nearly 15 percent. There is thus a substantial earnings disparity of 
nearly 33 percentage points between graduates of these two universities.  
 
Table 7.2: Selected Results from the OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, Detailed 
Dummy Variables for Institutions 
Variable Full Bach. Variable Full Bach. 
 (i) (ii)  (i) (ii) 
go8_1 -0.088*** -0.080*** oth_1 -0.002 0.036*** 
 (10.306) (6.985)  (0.271) (4.129) 
go8_2 0.017** 0.035*** oth_2 -0.084*** -0.080*** 
 (2.083) (3.163)  (8.933) (5.735) 
go8_3 -0.030*** -0.024*** oth_3 -0.132*** -0.156*** 
 (4.952) (2.776)  (11.677) (8.844) 
go8_4 -0.063*** -0.062*** oth_4 0.028*** 0.096*** 
 (10.568) (7.256)  (4.138) (9.996) 
go8_5 0.052*** 0.046*** oth_5 -0.085*** -0.075*** 
 (8.189) (5.112)  (11.465) (6.236) 
go8_6 -0.046*** -0.024*** oth_6 -0.076*** -0.065*** 
 (7.378) (2.785)  (11.203) (6.206) 
go8_7 -0.019*** 0.000 oth_7 -0.159*** -0.033 
 (2.814) (0.054)  (4.934) (0.712) 
go8_8 -0.040*** -0.021** oth_8 -0.043*** -0.018 
 (5.228) (2.050)  (4.909) (1.411) 
atn_1 -0.118*** -0.094*** oth_9 -0.013 0.012 
 (14.431) (8.192)  (0.941) (0.591) 
atn_2 -0.038*** 0.002 oth_10 -0.026*** 0.002 
 (6.349) (0.176)  (3.836) (0.184) 
atn_3 -0.060*** -0.027*** oth_11 -0.029*** -0.057*** 
 (8.366) (2.729)  (4.558) (5.368) 
atn_4 0.141*** 0.164*** oth_12 -0.040*** -0.011 
 (19.631) (15.457)  (5.873) (1.142) 
atn_5 -0.066*** -0.033*** oth_13 -0.039*** 0.005 
 (10.829) (3.900)  (5.820) (0.559) 
iru_1 -0.076*** -0.049*** oth_14 -0.102*** -0.074*** 
 (11.346) (4.930)  (11.998) (6.282) 
iru_2 -0.104*** -0.062*** oth_16 -0.075*** -0.085*** 
 (14.841) (6.153)  (10.834) (8.566) 
iru_3 -0.036*** -0.002 oth_17 -0.093*** -0.104*** 
 (5.989) (0.281)  (9.349) (6.203) 
iru_4 -0.072*** -0.049*** oth_18 -0.042*** -0.045*** 
 (9.317) (4.303)  (6.369) (3.570) 
iru_5 -0.067*** -0.037*** oth_19 -0.142*** -0.136*** 
 (8.918) (3.731)  (9.467) (6.407) 
iru_6 -0.031*** -0.006 oth_20 -0.174*** -0.103*** 
 (4.451) (0.638)  (7.811) (3.372) 
iru_7 -0.065*** -0.035 Observations 569,325 253,899 
 (5.647) (1.265) Adjusted R-
squared 
0.195 0.098 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** 
and *** indicate significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. The model included 
controls for other personal, employment, schooling, and ORU characteristics (see equation (7-1)).  
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Figure 7.9: Individual Institutional Earnings Effects by University Groups 
 
 
Second, a large amount of variability exists within university groups as well. Going 
across the plotted coefficients for the various university groups clearly indicates no 
‘clustering’ effect. In fact, a large amount of disparity in earnings effects can be 
observed for the ATN universities, although this university group had the lowest 
number of institutions in its membership. Admittedly, one of the ATN universities 
(atn_4) is clearly well ahead of the pack compared to its fellow ATN peers, thus 
accounting for the huge disparity in earnings within the ATN universities. However, 
the disparity in earnings amongst the other ATN universities is still moderately large, 
at roughly ten percentage points. The elite Go8 institutions exhibited the same 
earnings trait, with a disparity of roughly 13 percentage points between the best and 
worst performing Go8 universities. Two Go8 universities were observed to have 
positive earnings effects relative to the reference Other university (oth_15), while the 
remaining eight had earnings disadvantages of up to nine percent. The Other 
university group, which comprises 20 member institutions, have a 20 percentage 
points gap between its highest and lowest performing universities. It is thus apparent 
that the earlier estimates on university groups conceal a large amount of variability 
among individual institutions. On this basis, it can also be said that no individual 
university group comes across as being superior. That is, there is a reasonable spread 
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of estimated earnings effects within all university groups, and no university groups 
trend towards higher or lower estimated earnings effects.  
 
Note that the analysis thus far extends to all levels of qualifications. It would, 
therefore, be interesting to see if the same conclusions can be drawn for only 
bachelor’s degree graduates, and particularly those of limited work experience, so as 
to capture ‘purer’ effects of institutional quality. Thus, the model was re-estimated 
for bachelor’s degree graduates no more than 25 years old. These results are 
presented in panel (ii) of Table 7.2.  
 
The majority of the estimated institutional earnings effects for young bachelor’s 
degree graduates in panel (ii) are very similar to those estimated for the full sample 
in panel (i). The magnitude and sign of the estimated institutional effects are 
consistent across the two sets of estimates in most cases, with only one or two 
percentage points shifts in the estimated earnings impacts. In the case of some 
institutions, however, there are reasonably large changes in the estimated earnings 
effects. For instance, graduates from the oth_4 university were shown in the results 
of panel (i) of Table 7.2 for all graduates to have an earnings premium of around 
three percent relative to graduates from the benchmark university of oth_15. When 
only young bachelor’s degree graduates are considered, this earnings premium 
widens to nearly ten percent. Another example would be that of oth_20 university 
graduates, who experienced an 17 percent earnings disadvantage relative to the 
reference group where all qualifications are considered. The corresponding estimate 
for the restricted sample of bachelor’s degree graduates indicates a reduced earnings 
disadvantage of ten percent. Despite these differences, however, the observations 
made from studying Figure 7.9 holds. Expressing the estimates from panel (ii) of 
Table 7.2 in the form of a scatter plot (Figure 7.10) makes this clear, as the overall 
patterns in Figure 7.10 are very similar to that of Figure 7.9.  
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Figure 7.10: Individual Institutional Earnings Effects by University Groups 
(Bachelor’s Degree Graduates, Aged 25 Years and Below) 
 
 
7.5.2 Institutional Earnings Effects - Persistence Across Time 
To explore the persistence of these institutional graduate earnings effects across 
years, equation (7-1) was estimated for the bachelor’s degree graduates, separated by 
year-groups.
82
 Specifically, the sample was split into the 1999-2001, 2002-2004, 
2005-2007 and 2008-2009 groups. Selected results from these analyses are presented 
in Table 7.3. Panels (i) to (iv) presents the estimates on the individual institutional 
earnings effects for the four year-groups, in chronological order.  
 
  
                                                 
82
 As the Vahey (2000) model for ORU earnings effects is ‘observations-intensive’, conducting the 
analysis for individual years is not feasible, especially as the model is specified for individual 
institutions.  
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Table 7.3: Selected Results from the OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, Detailed 
Dummy Variables for Institutions, by Year-groups 
Variables 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 
go8_1 -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.144*** 0.038 
 (5.870) (5.078) (7.065) (1.350) 
go8_2 -0.014 0.009 -0.060*** 0.194*** 
 (0.960) (0.573) (2.972) (7.439) 
go8_3 -0.038*** -0.050*** -0.061*** 0.078*** 
 (3.752) (4.443) (5.121) (3.178) 
go8_4 -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.111*** 0.116*** 
 (8.935) (7.429) (8.330) (4.833) 
go8_5 -0.007 0.007 0.026** 0.181*** 
 (0.600) (0.538) (2.002) (7.280) 
go8_6 -0.057*** -0.072*** -0.075*** 0.129*** 
 (4.498) (5.924) (6.207) (5.600) 
go8_7 -0.053*** -0.008 -0.064*** 0.121*** 
 (5.269) (0.648) (4.680) (5.021) 
go8_8 -0.088*** -0.063*** -0.093*** 0.146*** 
 (7.787) (4.574) (5.260) (5.496) 
atn_1 -0.113*** -0.047*** -0.184*** 0.017 
 (9.475) (3.660) (11.429) (0.603) 
atn_2 -0.089*** -0.055*** -0.042*** 0.171*** 
 (8.695) (4.725) (3.659) (7.552) 
atn_3 -0.046*** -0.021* -0.054*** -0.001 
 (4.377) (1.754) (4.339) (0.028) 
atn_4 0.004 0.353*** 0.046** 0.268*** 
 (0.373) (19.126) (2.364) (11.440) 
atn_5 -0.110*** -0.072*** -0.061*** 0.104*** 
 (13.342) (6.009) (5.024) (4.402) 
iru_1 -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.116*** 0.103*** 
 (8.101) (6.242) (7.566) (4.193) 
iru_2 -0.082*** -0.041*** -0.170*** 0.052** 
 (8.336) (3.373) (11.960) (2.032) 
iru_3 -0.047*** -0.030*** -0.015 0.033 
 (4.904) (2.655) (1.250) (1.270) 
iru_4 -0.136*** -0.117*** -0.116*** 0.171*** 
 (9.349) (6.616) (7.036) (6.652) 
iru_5 -0.049*** -0.027** -0.147*** 0.075*** 
 (4.860) (2.135) (9.172) (2.863) 
iru_6 -0.091*** -0.047*** -0.071*** 0.149*** 
 (6.504) (3.586) (5.422) (6.247) 
iru_7 -0.044*** -0.049** -0.107*** 0.082 
 (3.240) (2.268) (4.089) (1.151) 
oth_1 -0.039*** 0.008 -0.018 0.174*** 
 (3.572) (0.656) (1.399) (7.362) 
oth_2 -0.105*** -0.081*** -0.187*** 0.124*** 
 (7.619) (3.356) (8.353) (3.768) 
oth_3 -0.094*** -0.045*** -0.157*** -0.401*** 
 (7.496) (2.890) (7.179) (6.392) 
oth_4 -0.181*** 0.000 0.014 0.208*** 
 (3.150) (0.004) (1.220) (8.869) 
oth_5 -0.084*** -0.052*** -0.132*** 0.058* 
 (7.999) (3.821) (8.322) (1.677) 
oth_6 -0.123*** -0.059*** -0.154*** 0.150*** 
 (11.468) (4.553) (10.652) (5.961) 
oth_7 -0.113* 0.049 -0.066 -0.090 
 (1.865) (1.020) (0.964) (1.034) 
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Table 7.3: Selected Results from the OLS Estimates of the ORU Model, Detailed 
Dummy Variables for Institutions, by Year-groups (cont.) 
Variables 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 
oth_8 -0.037*** -0.018 -0.075*** 0.078** 
 (2.809) (1.306) (3.856) (2.007) 
oth_9 -0.056 -0.071** -0.041 0.201*** 
 (1.631) (2.254) (1.281) (4.759) 
oth_10 -0.052*** 0.006 -0.051*** 0.075*** 
 (5.328) (0.501) (3.224) (2.952) 
oth_11 -0.036*** -0.010 -0.059*** 0.034 
 (3.566) (0.887) (4.555) (1.278) 
oth_12 -0.056*** -0.035*** -0.074*** 0.132*** 
 (5.275) (2.807) (4.962) (4.714) 
oth_13 -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.044*** 0.130*** 
 (5.026) (3.609) (3.230) (5.040) 
oth_14 -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.139*** 0.013 
 (6.145) (5.055) (7.380) (0.399) 
oth_16 -0.077*** -0.043*** -0.238*** 0.071*** 
 (7.806) (3.468) (12.365) (2.910) 
oth_17 -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.171*** -0.008 
 (4.475) (3.814) (8.021) (0.219) 
oth_18 -0.060*** -0.046*** -0.114*** 0.157*** 
 (4.794) (3.120) (7.453) (5.757) 
oth_19 -0.181*** -0.120*** -0.158*** -0.049 
 (4.862) (5.240) (6.275) (1.140) 
oth_20 -0.072 -0.067* -0.124*** -0.108* 
 (1.283) (1.728) (3.686) (1.759) 
Observations 80,597 91,971 105,182 78,937 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.157 0.102 0.101 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively.  
 
The results of the year-group analyses reveal a moderate amount of variability in 
institutional earnings effects in the first three time periods, and varied by a large 
amount going from the third to fourth time period. This variability in institutional 
earnings effects can be observed for nearly all institutions. For example, the go8_4 
university’s graduates earned eight percent less than the benchmark oth_15 
university graduates in 1999-2001. This earnings disadvantage widened slightly to 
around eight percent in 2002-2004, and increased yet again to 11 percent in 2005-
2007. However, go8_4 graduates experienced an earnings advantage of 12 percent 
relative to oth_15 graduates in the final time period of 2008-2009. This finding can 
be generalised to most of the other individual institutions, with few exceptions.  
 
In order to determine whether the estimated institutional earnings effects are 
statistically persistent over the four time periods, a Spearman test of correlation was 
conducted for the institutional coefficients sets. The results of this test are presented 
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in Table 7.4.
83
 The correlation coefficients in Table 7.4 indicate that statistical 
associations of a modest scale can be found between institutional earnings effects for 
the first three time periods, at a magnitude of around 0.5. The institutional earnings 
effects for the final period are not correlated with those from the first two time 
periods, but are correlated with those from the third time period. There is, therefore, 
some observed persistence in the institutional earnings effects across years, although 
the results from Table 7.4 are indicative of there being an evolving pattern over time.  
 
Table 7.4: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients for the Institutional Earnings Effects 
Across Time Periods 
Time Period 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 
1999-2001 1.0000    
2002-2004 0.5397*** 1.0000   
2005-2007 0.5060*** 0.5240*** 1.0000  
2008-2009 0.1501 0.1397 0.5148*** 1.0000 
Note: *** denotes significance at the one percent level 
 
7.5.3 ORU Earnings Effects for Individual Institutions 
The results from the two preceding sections indicate a fair amount of variability 
across institutions in terms of earnings effects. Further, the Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients computed for the analyses by year-groups and the institutional earnings 
effects estimates from Table 7.3 indicate a fair amount of variability across time 
periods, although it appears that this could reflect the evolving nature of the 
institutional wage effects. It would therefore be of interest to see if ORU earnings 
effects differ across individual institutions as well.  
 
Therefore, the ORU model of earnings specified in equation (7-1) was estimated for 
bachelor’s degree graduates from the five ATN institutions, to assess the variability 
in ORU earnings effects across institutions within this university grouping. The 
results from these analyses are presented in Table 7.5.  
 
The results in Table 7.5 indicate that ORU earnings effects differ in magnitude 
across institutions. For instance, bachelor’s honours degree graduates from the atn_3 
university, and who are overeducated in a bachelor’s pass degree level job, 
experience an earnings premium of nine percent relative to the correctly matched 
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 A Pearson test of correlation was also conducted, and the correlation coefficients obtained are very 
similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance to those from the Spearman test.  
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bachelor’s pass degree graduates from the same university. Honours graduates from 
the other four ATN institutions, however, have earnings that do not differ statistically 
from their respective benchmark category of correctly matched bachelor’s pass 
degree graduates. Another example of the institutional differences in ORU earnings 
effects can be seen from the overeducated honours degree graduates who are 
working in certificate level jobs. Across the five ATN institutions, the earnings 
penalty associated with being overeducated for these graduates ranges from ten to 31 
percent.  
 
Table 7.5: Selected Results from the ORU Model of Earnings, ATN Institutions 
Variables atn_1 atn _2 atn _3 atn _4 atn _5 
oru_bach_cert -0.188*** -0.241*** -0.102*** -0.122*** -0.094*** 
 (7.412) (22.441) (6.025) (6.256) (8.091) 
oru_bach_dip -0.145*** -0.140*** -0.040** -0.070*** -0.064*** 
 (4.462) (12.010) (1.974) (3.419) (5.297) 
oru_hons_cert -0.102* -0.150*** -0.181*** -0.306*** -0.109 
 (1.917) (3.165) (2.609) (3.664) (1.148) 
oru_hons_dip -0.049 -0.086* 0.072 0.052 -0.117* 
 (0.741) (1.728) (1.194) (0.796) (1.695) 
oru_hons_bach -0.025 -0.040 0.086*** -0.025 0.040 
 (1.400) (1.592) (2.610) (0.710) (1.224) 
      
Observations 11,176 16,143 10,904 13,333 18,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.175 0.0924 0.0529 0.119 
Notes: Absolute values of heteroscedasticity consistent ‘t’-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively.  
 
To confirm the variability in ORU earnings effects across these institutions, F-tests 
were conducted for each of the ORU estimates from these analyses. These are 
presented in Table 7.6.  
 
Table 7.6: F-tests Estimates for ORU Coefficients, ATN Institutions 
Variables χ2 Prob > χ2 
oru_bach_cert*** 106.23 0.0000 
oru_bach_dip*** 33.22 0.0000 
oru_hons_cert 4.65 0.3252 
oru_hons_dip 7.39 0.1166 
oru_hons_bach** 13.08 0.0109 
Notes: ** and *** denote significance at the five and one percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
The F-tests estimates in Table 7.6 indicate that three out of the five ORU coefficient 
sets differed. That is, estimated ORU earnings effects for bachelor’s pass degree 
graduates working in certificate or diploma level jobs, as well as honours degree 
graduates working in bachelor’s pass degree level jobs, differed across the five ATN 
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institutions. Further, Spearman’s correlation coefficients were computed for the ORU 
coefficients for the ATN institutions. These are presented in Table 7.7. The 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients had some values of zero, and in some cases were 
negative. In most cases, the correlation coefficients were statistically insignificant. 
This further reflects that ORU earnings effects vary substantially amongst individual 
institutions, and that institutions do not play a key role in determining earnings 
outcomes in the labour market.  
 
Table 7.7: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients for the ORU Earnings Effects Across 
ATN Institutions 
Institution atn_1 atn_2 atn_3 atn_4 atn_5 
atn_1 1.0000     
atn_2 0.8000 1.0000    
atn_3 -0.1000 -0.5000 1.0000   
atn_4 0.0000 0.3000 -0.6000 1.0000  
atn_5 0.8721* 0.8208* -0.1026 0.3591 1.0000 
Note: * denotes significance at the ten percent level 
 
Certainly, the main finding in these sections is that of very small and reasonably 
variable institutional earnings effects in Australia. At the same time, there appears to 
be no particular pattern discerned when the various earnings advantages and 
disadvantages associated with ORU status were linked to institutional prestige. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Go8 universities are the highest ranked 
institutions in Australia, across an array of measures and rankings. However, 
graduates from these elite universities do not experience a clear advantage in 
earnings over graduates from other universities (or university groups). Clearly, 
university prestige is not a main conduit of wage determination in the Australian 
graduate labour market.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of the ORU model of graduates’ earnings disaggregated by university 
groups has revealed a number of findings. Particularly, three main conclusions can 
be drawn. First, there are generally earnings advantages associated with the 
acquisition of a higher level qualification, even if it means being classified as 
overeducated. The ranking by type of university in terms of these earnings 
advantages varies by qualification, and by the extent of any overeducation with a 
specific qualification.  
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Second, within any level of qualification, earnings are lower the greater the extent of 
any overeducation. These earnings differentials are generally statistically significant. 
This shows that wages follow jobs and are not exclusively determined by the supply 
side factors captured by a person’s qualifications. Of course, qualifications also 
matter, as within any type of job, the better qualified earn more. Importantly, this 
pattern, of earnings being inversely related to the extent of overeducation, holds for 
each group of universities considered here. In other words, no group of university is 
able to protect its graduates from the adverse earnings consequences of being 
overeducated.
 84
 
 
Third, there are only relatively minor differences across the groups of universities in 
the earnings effects in the modal job category that requires a bachelor’s pass degree. 
Greater differences emerge when more atypical jobs characterised by more extensive 
overeducation are considered, although a number of the earnings effects in these 
atypical jobs were statistically insignificant. This suggests that the labour market 
handles ‘normal job assignments’ routinely (e.g. pays a graduate entry level salary), 
but a more individualistic approach is applied when dealing with the atypical job 
assignments, such as the doctoral graduate working in a job that requires only a 
certificate level qualification. But even with such an individualistic approach in 
operation, there does not appear to be any advantage to one type of institution over 
the others. One interpretation of this is that institutional quality is not part of the 
screening mechanisms that are used in these atypical job assignments.  
 
The estimated ORU impacts on earnings have been shown to differ greatly by the 
extent of overeducation. One good example would be that of the associate degree 
graduates, who are penalised by up to 27 percent when they are severely 
overeducated in a certificate level job, but have earnings that do not differ 
statistically from the earnings of (correctly matched) workers with bachelor’s pass 
degrees employed in jobs that require a bachelor’s pass degree if they are 
undereducated in a bachelor’s level job.  
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 Nevertheless, note that this finding needs to be considered together with the findings in Chapter 3. 
Graduates from the Go8 and ATN groups were less likely to be overeducated. Thus, institutions do 
influence overeducation status, but are not able to insulate overeducated graduates from adverse 
earnings effects.  
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The estimated ORU impacts differ by university groups as well. For instance, the 
earnings penalties for diploma holders in a bachelor’s degree level job range from 
four percent for Other universities graduates, to 15 percent for IRU graduates. A 
number of other trends are observed. With the exception of PhD holders, graduates 
with other types of degrees all experience earnings penalties if they work in a 
certificate level job. Hence, for the majority of higher education graduates, it is 
undesirable to be overeducated to that extent. For graduates working in a diploma 
level job, having postgraduate or higher qualifications is associated with positive 
earnings effects. However, in the case of graduate certificate and graduate diploma 
graduates, these positive earnings effects are rather low, and still reflect the adverse 
earnings impact of being overeducated.  
 
Securing employment which requires the training of a bachelor’s degree is associated 
with positive earnings impacts. These can go up to a large 21 percent, in the case of 
masters graduates from the IRU. These findings are largely consistent with the 
literature on overeducation. Vahey (2000) has a similar spread of the ORU earnings 
effects, ranging from an earnings disadvantage of 18 percentage points for those who 
have only some education to an earnings advantage of 15 percentage points for those 
with a degree. However, given that the present study is focussed on only the higher 
education labour market, the finding that large penalties and premiums are associated 
with ORU sends a stark reminder that ‘wages follows jobs, and not the individuals’. 
It is, therefore, not enough to simply obtain higher qualifications, and a graduate 
must also attempt to ensure that the requirements of the job are matched to the level 
of qualifications. The finding that the ORU effects differ across university type 
suggests that the choice of institution plays an important role in determining 
earnings. However, the results of subsequent analyses reveal a large amount of 
earnings variability across individual institutions. There is no clear pattern, however, 
and it is unclear at this stage if it is the institutions who bring their graduates higher 
wages, or if the type of graduates who typically enrol in those institutions are 
generally high or low wage earners anyway. The institutional earnings effects were 
also found to vary across time periods, and estimated ORU effects differ 
substantially across individual institutions. On the whole, it appears that university 
groups conceal large amounts of variability in institutional earnings effects, and that 
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institutions do not play a significant role in determining graduate earnings outcomes 
in the labour market. 
 
Furthermore, the ‘university group’ effects differ for the various levels of 
qualifications, and no university group comes across as a strong or weak performer 
on the whole.
 
It might be that each university group has its own comparative 
advantage, or more plausibly, that the ORU effects differ substantially for each 
university. In reality, it would be expected that individual institutions have their own 
strengths and weakness, and the performance of graduates in the labour market 
would differ across qualifications type and field of study, even within institutions. 
Thus, for individuals making the decision to engage in higher education, it would be 
prudent to wisely select a field of study that is in demand (based on the findings of 
Chapter 3), and then select an institution which has clear advantages in that field of 
study.  
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CHAPTER 8  
Overeducation in the Australian Graduate Labour Market - What do We 
Know, and Where do We Go?
85
 
8.1 What Do We Know? 
The issue of education-job mismatch has attracted considerable attention from 
academic researchers, policy makers, and individuals alike. Since the beginning of 
this literature in the 1970s, a number of studies have been devoted to quantifying the 
extent and impact of educational mismatch in the labour market. In recent years, this 
issue has become more pertinent due to the expansion of higher education, in 
Australia and overseas. In Australia, the ‘Education Revolution’ of the federal Labor 
Government commenced in 2007, and has been associated with a large expansion in 
university degree attainment thereon. At the same time, the ‘demand driven system’ 
of determining undergraduate places at university commenced in 2012 (Department 
of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2012b). Under this system, 
undergraduate student places are guaranteed funding. As expected, the number of 
undergraduate enrolments in Australian universities has increased for the first intake 
of 2012 (The Sydney Morning Herald 2012).
86
 While the longer term impacts of 
these shifts in education policy remain to be seen, the study of education-job 
mismatch in the Australian labour market in this thesis will be useful in adding to the 
debate. 
 
Several issues relating to the central theme of education-job mismatch in the 
Australian labour market have been explored in this thesis. Chapter 3 examined the 
incidence and determinants of the education-job mismatch for Australian university 
graduates, from 1999 to 2009. It has been revealed that there is a high incidence of 
overeducation, of around 60 percent, in the Australian graduate labour market. Only 
39 percent of graduates are correctly matched to their jobs, and less than one percent 
are undereducated. Further, these figures, obtained using the ‘job analysis’ approach, 
are very similar to those obtained using the alternative realised matches approach in 
Chapter 5. While the incidence of educational mismatch uncovered here is higher 
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 The title of this concluding chapter is adopted, in part, from Hartog’s (2000) paper which has been 
influential in the overeducation literature. 
86
 In addition, an article titled ‘Unis Lowering the Bar for Top Courses’ observed that a number of 
Australian universities have accepted large proportions of students who do not meet their advertised 
cut-off university entry scores, into university courses such as law, or biomedicine (The Australian 
2012c).  
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than that found in the overseas literature, it should be borne in mind that the higher 
incidence is to be expected, due to the focus on the higher educated segment of the 
labour market. Indeed, another study of the Australian graduate labour market by 
Kler (2005) reports a similar extent of overeducation. 
 
Furthermore, analysing the incidence of overeducation by year suggests that the high 
prevalence of overeducated Australian university graduates is not a recent 
phenomenon. The incidences of overeducation in the Australian graduate labour 
market are high throughout the period of study, with a slight worsening after the 
global financial crisis in 2007.  
 
The impacts of educational-job mismatch on graduate earnings have also been 
assessed. Chapter 4 explored this issue, using the Vahey (2000) model of ORU 
earnings determination. A number of findings pertaining to the graduate population 
have been uncovered, using this detailed dummy variable model. First, the 
undereducated experienced earnings which are statistically insignificant, or mildly 
positive, relative to the correctly matched bachelor’s degree graduates. Second, the 
overeducated graduates who were employed in lower level certificate or diploma 
jobs experience substantial earnings penalties. In the case of masters degree 
graduates who work in certificate level jobs, for example, a substantial earnings 
penalty of 12 percent was observed. Third, the returns to higher qualifications were 
positive for those in a bachelor’s degree level job, although the marginal returns to 
the higher qualification decreased rapidly the more extensive the level of 
overeducation. These findings highlight the tendency for wages to follow jobs, and 
not qualifications. Higher education policy should thus be more focused on areas of 
demand or need, rather than a blanket approach to expanding qualification 
attainment.  
 
The logit models of overeducation have also identified determinants of 
overeducation in the Australian graduate labour market. The field of study and 
industry of employment were found to be important in determining overeducation. 
Graduates from fields of study such as Natural and Physical Science were much 
more likely to be overeducated compared to Management and Commerce graduates, 
while graduates in Nursing, or Education, were much more likely to be correctly 
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matched. One issue that arises here relates to the funding structure of university 
courses in Australia. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are different ‘bands’ to which 
courses are allocated, with different levels of subsidies being allocated to each 
respective band. Courses which fall within the fields of Natural and Physical Science 
or Agriculture and Environment attract the highest levels of subsidies, but have been 
revealed to be fields where graduates are most likely to be overeducated (Department 
of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2011a). Certainly, the level of 
high subsidies in these courses can be argued to have the unwanted effect of 
encouraging enrolment in courses for which there is insufficient labour market 
demand.  
 
These have not gone unnoticed in the mainstream media. On the one hand, 
Australia’s Chief Scientist, Professor Ian Chubb, called for additional government 
funding to provide scholarships to encourage more studies in science at university 
(The Australian 2011c). On the other hand, a recent news article in The Australian 
(2012a) titled “Grads Struggle for Jobs in Science” highlights the bleak employment 
prospects for science graduates. This article reports that jobs for science graduates 
are scarce, and that science graduates have difficulty securing employment, even four 
years after graduation. Another article from The Australian (2012b), titled “Science 
Boom is a Job Non-Starter”, points to the recent spike in enrolments for 
undergraduate science courses, by 40 percent between 2008 and 2011. The same 
article, by Andrew Norton of the Grattan Institute, states that lower proportions of 
science graduates reported that their degree was required or even important for their 
jobs, in comparison with health or education graduates. These reports reinforce the 
findings in this thesis, and emphasise the need to utilise a more targeted approach in 
linking education policy and labour market demand, or, equivalently, using a more 
labour market neutral model for funding university places.
87
  
 
A double degree has been found to diminish the chances of being overeducated, 
probably due to the diversity in career options it offers. Nevertheless, a double 
degree program has also been found to offer no earnings advantage over single 
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 It is noted that aside from employment outcomes, other indirect (and perhaps, positive) 
consequences of higher education could arise. This is discussed in a bit more detail in the following 
section.  
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degree programs. Thus, prospective students should weigh up these findings against 
the additional time and monetary investments that are required to complete a double 
degree. Older graduates, meanwhile, are more likely to be overeducated. However, 
this is likely to be due to the increased propensity to possess a postgraduate 
qualification amongst older graduates. When only undergraduates are considered, 
however, older graduates were found to be less likely to be overeducated. This 
finding thus favours mature-aged individuals who plan to or are currently 
undertaking a higher qualification. In other words, mature-aged students are not 
disadvantaged in the graduate labour market.  
 
Gender, in contrast, did not play a significant role in determining overeducation. 
While females were more likely to be overeducated than males, the size of the effect 
was miniscule, at less than one percent. This finding is particularly interesting, as 
females have a larger representation in the graduate population. Thus, these results 
suggest that there is no apparent labour market bias against females in the allocation 
of jobs. Further, the analysis of ORU and the gender wage gap in Chapter 5 indicates 
that ORU earnings effects do not play a substantial role in explaining the (small) 
gender wage gap in the graduate labour market. Specifically, the majority of ORU 
earnings effects do not differ substantially between males and females, and a 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition reveals that ORU earnings effects account for a 
negligible portion of the gender wage gap. Furthermore, the former finding does not 
support the job search hypothesis in the Australian graduate labour market, as it runs 
contrary to the theorised finding of greater ORU penalties being incurred by females 
under the job search hypothesis.  
 
This finding is reinforced by an alternate set of analyses using the realised matches 
approach with Census data. The addition of broad occupational controls in the 
estimating equation reveals greater job mobility across occupations for females 
compared to males. This, again, invalidates the job search hypothesis for the 
Australian graduate labour market. As there is greater representation of females in 
the graduate population, at 60 percent, these estimated ORU earnings effects suggest 
that the increasing female attainment of university qualifications will not 
disadvantage females. Nevertheless, analyses by age reveal a larger gender wage gap 
among older graduates. It is unknown if this can be attributed to a ‘glass ceiling’ 
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effect, or if it is due to the inadequacies of the measure of work experience included 
in the estimating equation, as highlighted by Rummery (1992). Thus, the collection 
of detailed work histories will be useful in shedding light on this issue. Nevertheless, 
the findings of this thesis favour education as a way to close the gender wage gap.   
 
The type of institution attended was found to have modest impacts on the likelihood 
of overeducation status. The universities were categorised according to their own 
institutional consortium groupings. Amongst these institutional groups, the Go8 
universities stand out as the university group whose member universities consistently 
perform the best in international university rankings and league tables, which use an 
array of measures to assess university performance. However, graduates from the 
elite Go8 universities were found to be eight percentage points more likely to be 
overeducated, relative to graduates from Other universities. This, however, can likely 
be attributed to the higher amounts of postgraduates in the research intensive Go8 
universities. When considering only undergraduates, Go8 and ATN graduates were 
seven and eight percentage points, respectively, less likely to be overeducated in 
comparison to Other university graduates. There are, therefore, differences across 
institutions in the determination of overeducation status.  
 
The analysis of ORU earnings effects across institution type in Chapter 7, however, 
reveals that no university group comes across as a strong performer, and the relative 
performance of graduates from the various university groups differs by qualification 
type. Further, entering individual dummy variables for each institution into the 
estimating model reveals large differences in institution earnings effects, of up to 
around 30 percentage points. There are large differences even within each university 
group, including the elite Go8 universities, who dominate world university rankings. 
These factors, presumably, account for the weak aggregate-level institutional effects 
found in Chapter 4.  
 
Further, across all institution types, penalties associated with overeducation were 
found, and these increased with the extent of overeducation. This reinforces the 
finding of Chapter 4 - that wages follows jobs - and the institution attended does not 
serve as a shield against the adverse labour market consequences of being 
overeducated. This is particularly true for graduates employed in higher level jobs 
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that require a bachelor’s pass degree. Relatively larger differences exist for graduates 
in certificate or diploma level jobs. On the whole, there appears to be no clear 
earnings advantage or disadvantage to attending universities from any group, and it is 
likely that each university has their own strength and differences across faculties or 
qualification levels.  
 
These findings suggest that university rankings are poor indicators of graduate 
outcomes. It is acknowledged that there is no compelling reason to expect so, 
particularly when the measures used to assess university performances frequently 
relate to research performance.
88
 Nevertheless, in the absence of better information, 
university rankings are a source which prospective students base their enrolment 
decisions on. At the same time, forming university groups, while ostensibly done to 
link common interests and focus across institutions, might be simply a branding 
exercise. Certainly, Australian universities are diverse in their graduates’ outcomes. 
The recent release of the MyUniversity website in early 2012, which contains 
information on Australian universities, by the federal government may potentially aid 
in the release of more meaningful information to prospective students (MyUniversity 
2012). This website contains information such as graduate outcomes, student 
satisfaction scores, staff-to-student ratios and qualifications of staff members, for 
individual institutions and courses. Prospective students may therefore make a more 
informed decision on which institution to enrol with, based, at the very least, on these 
indicators. The research in this thesis suggests that the information currently made 
available should be augmented through the provision of an index of overeducation, 
which could be quite easily generated. The annual GradStats and GradFiles 
publications by Graduate Careers Australia, which report on graduate outcomes and 
trends in the Australian labour market, and which are already in the public domain, 
will also add value to the MyUniversity website.  
 
A separate issue that is related to the findings for institution type is with the call by 
the Go8 universities for autonomy in university fee setting. In their ‘Submission to 
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 Whether or not research performance has positive effects on teaching quality is, by itself, a 
contentious topic. For instance, Hattie and Marsh (1996), in a meta-analysis of 28 studies, find no 
statistical relationship between measures of research performance and teaching quality, while Smeby 
(1998), drawing on surveys of academics and students, reports strong beliefs in the research-teaching 
nexus. Barrett and Milbourne (2011) analyse this issue in the Australian context.  
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the Review of Higher Education Base Funding’, the Go8 universities argue that 
funding gaps of up to 30 percent exist, and that base funding provided by the 
government is not enough to cover the costs of the universities’ core activities 
(Group of Eight 2011a). Further, it is argued that the funding shortfall will be 
exacerbated under the new demand-driven system, and that without additional funds 
being secured under increases in university tuition fees, teaching infrastructure will 
deteriorate and staff-to-student ratios will inevitably decrease. Given the large 
amounts of variability across institutions in graduate outcomes found in Chapters 3 
and 7, a one-size-fits-all approach in regulating fees might not be ideal in the 
university sector.  
 
The analysis by tenure groups suggests that the labour market is slow to move 
graduates into more suitable jobs when they become better qualified. This is reflected 
in the higher incidences of the overeducated among the groups with higher levels of 
tenure. Further, the estimated ORU effects across tenure groups lend credence to the 
screening hypothesis, out of the five labour market frameworks considered. 
Specifically, the stable earnings effects across tenure groups for graduates in lower 
level jobs, as well as the declining earnings premiums for the overeducated graduates 
in bachelor’s degree level jobs, suggests that these graduates have been screened and 
are not getting rewarded for their higher qualification due to their ‘lesser’ ability. F-
tests results for the estimated ORU earnings effects across tenure groups confirm that 
they are generally statistically the same, reinforcing the screening hypothesis and the 
point made above, that graduates of ‘lesser’ ability are getting left behind in their 
career. Where only graduates with positive levels of tenure are considered, nearly all 
estimated earnings effects were statistically similar across tenure groups. This once 
again highlights the perils of assuming that the attainment of a higher education 
qualification is a guaranteed ticket to greater earnings and success. The observed 
ORU earnings effects, specifically, that of stable earnings (or even decreasing 
earnings premiums) across tenure groups, might be indicative of a discerning labour 
market that looks beyond paper qualifications, and offers increased earnings only to 
individuals who have distinguished themselves while on-the-job. Thus, it might be 
prudent to abandon a blind chase for paper qualifications, and instead target areas of 
need or skill shortages, as stated above.  
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8.2 Where Do We Go? 
A number of limitations exist in the analyses contained in the thesis. As a result, a 
few issues remained unaddressed, and future research could be directed to the 
addressing of these issues. These limitations are primarily linked to the unavailability 
of information in the dataset used. The first relates to the fact that the GDS survey is 
conducted four months after graduation. Thus, a possible criticism of this study is 
that the time frame is too short for graduates to have found suitable employment. It 
can be argued, however, that the time frame is reasonable, given that 70 percent of 
employed graduates have found long-term employment at that stage. In addition, 
studies such as Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2000) that have examined issues 
pertaining to overeducation several years after graduation reveal a high level of 
persistence in both the incidence and earnings effects. Thus, the findings reported 
above should have considerable value.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be of interest to extend the findings of this study using the 
Beyond Graduation Surveys (BGS) collected by Graduate Careers Australia. The 
Beyond Graduation Surveys follow up with graduates from the GDS three years after 
graduation. The analysis of ORU trends and effects in the longer-term would add 
value to the discussion in this thesis. Research using these alternative data will need 
to be mindful of the select nature of the follow-up surveys: the response rate to the 
2010 BGS (which followed up on the 2007 GDS) was 15 percent, and not all 
institutions participated in the BGS (Carroll and Tani 2011). Further, the findings of 
this thesis would be well complemented by research which draws on demand-side 
perspectives of the labour market, such as surveys of employers. These employer-
based surveys will give valuable insights into the reasons behind hiring decisions, as 
well as other issues which will help shed more light on the issue of education-job 
mismatch and the pathways by which it affects outcomes in the labour market.
89
 
However, it is recognised that such research would be better done using linked 
employer-employee datasets, which would be expensive to obtain. An alternative 
would be to conduct case studies with firms which employ large numbers of 
graduates, and focus on specific universities or local labour markets. 
 
                                                 
89
 For example, it would be interesting to know why graduates are hired, even if they are overeducated 
for the job.  
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As mentioned earlier in this concluding chapter, non-monetary outcomes of ORU in 
the graduate labour market are not addressed. However, this is due to data 
availability, and most studies on ORU express outcomes in monetary terms. 
Exceptions do exist, such as Fleming and Kler’s (2008) study, which also looks at 
job satisfaction amongst the overeducated. This study found that overeducated 
workers tend to report lower levels of work satisfaction relative to their non-
overeducated peers. Other studies in the economics of happiness literature indicate 
that the university educated report lower levels of happiness or well-being, compared 
to their peers with lower levels of education (see, for example, Hickson and Dockery 
2008; Dockery 2010). There is thus some evidence to suggest that some externalities 
associated with (over)education are negative. The inclusion of a question in the GDS 
and BGS asking respondents to report their state of well-being and job satisfaction 
would be of use in future research in this area.  
 
There have also been other studies which assess the monetary externalities associated 
with a higher education degree in Australia (Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations 2012a). This report, written by Bruce Chapman and 
Kiatanantha Lounkaew from the Australian National University, found that the 
average public benefit from each year of a university degree ranges from $6,000 to 
$10,000.
90
 Note, however, that the upper bound of $10,000 is equivalent to only 60 
percent of the average expenditure that goes into a Commonwealth Supported Place 
at university (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
2012d). In another study by Andrew Norton, presented at a seminar held by The 
University of Melbourne’s Centre for the Study of Higher Education (and aimed at 
discussing the results of the Base Funding Review for higher education in Australia), 
it was found that from a tax revenue perspective, funding of university places should 
not be open to all fields, as a number of graduates in certain fields of study, such as 
humanities or creative arts, decreased rather than increased fiscal revenue, compared 
to the median individual who entered the workforce with a Year 12 education.
91, 92
 
The results of the studies by Chapman and Lounkaew, as well as Norton, indicate 
that the benefits associated with the positive externalities of higher education are 
                                                 
90
 The main externality used in the analysis by Chapman and Lounkaew is that of fiscal revenue 
generated due to increases in the graduates’ earnings.  
91
 This was observed even for male humanities graduates at the 40
th
 percentile of earnings.  
92
 The author is grateful to Andrew Norton for the provision of figures from this research.  
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insufficient to offset the public costs. Certainly, Norton’s findings appear to be in 
line with those of the present thesis, and advocate the restriction of higher education 
subsidies to fields in demand rather than all higher degree courses. Note, however, 
that this view arises on purely monetary grounds. As stated earlier, non-monetary 
public benefits can and may arise from higher education. While these are beyond the 
scope of the present thesis, accounting for non-monetary public benefits may prove 
that subsidising higher education is a worthwhile exercise, even if poorer 
employment outcomes are experienced by some graduates.  
 
Finally, the use of the Vahey (2000) model in this thesis has shown that this model is 
useful in the analysis of ORU, particularly in the study of graduate outcomes, where 
the years of schooling measure is not meaningful. Further, the Vahey (2000) model 
captures more detail relating to ORU earnings effects, compared to the Verdugo and 
Verdugo (1989) specification. Where the dataset supports the use of the Vahey 
(2000) model, it should be utilised, and support the building up of a comparable 
literature over time.  
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Appendix A: Occupation Categories in the Study 
No. Occupation No. Occupation 
1 Managers and Admin/General 43 Chiropractor/Osteopath 
2 Specialist Manager 44 Podiatrist 
3 Chemist 45 Medical Imaging Prof. 
4 Geologists/Geophysicist 46 Veterinarian 
5 Life Scientist 47 Dietician 
6 Environment/Agriculture/Science Prof. 48 Natural Therapist 
7 Medical Science Prof. 49 Audiologist 
8 Other Natural/Physical Science Prof. 50 Other Health Prof. 
9 Architect/Landscape 51 Pre-primary School Teacher 
10 Quantitative Surveyor 52 Primary School Teacher 
11 Cartographer/Surveyor 53 Sec School Teacher 
12 Chemical Engineer 54 Spec Ed Teacher 
13 Civil Engineer 55 University Lecturer/Tutor 
14 Electrical/Electronic Engineer 56 Vocational Education Teacher 
15 Mechanical/Production/Plant Engineer 57 Extra-Systemic Teacher 
16 Mining Engineer/Metallurgist/Material 
Surveyor 
58 Education Officer/other Education 
Professional 
17 Other Engineer or Related 59 Social/Community Worker 
18 Accountants/Auditors 60 Counsellor 
19 Sales Specialist 61 Psychologist 
20 Marketing Specialist 62 Lawyer/Legal Prof. 
21 Advertising Specialist 63 Minister of Religion 
22 Market Research Specialist 64 Urban/Regional Planner 
23 Technical Sales Representative 65 Economist 
24 Computing Professional 66 Interpreter/Translator 
25 Personnel Specialist 67 Other Social Prof. 
26 Training Officer 68 Visual Arts/Crafts Prof. 
27 Librarian/Archivist 69 Photographer 
28 Mathematician/Statistician 70 Designer/Illustrator 
29 Actuary 71 Journalist/Related Prof. 
30 Business Organisations Analyst 72 Author/Related Prof. 
31 Policy Analyst 73 Film/TV/Radio/Stage Director 
32 Medical Record Administrator 74 Musician/Composer/Related Prof. 
33 Other Business/IT Prof. 75 Actor/Dancer/Related Prof. 
34 General Medical Practitioner 76 
Media 
Presenter/Announcer/Commentator 
35 Specialist Medical Practitioner 77 Air/Sea Transport Prof. 
36 Registered Nurse 78 Occupational Safety Prof. 
37 Dental Practitioner 79 Recreation Officer 
38 Pharmacist 80 Other Prof. 
39 Occupational/Recreation Therapist 81 Medical Technical Officer 
40 Optometrist 82 Science Technical Officer 
41 Physiotherapist 83 Electrical/Electronic Technician 
42 Speech Pathologist 84 Civil Engineering Technician 
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Appendix A: Occupation Categories in the Study (cont.) 
No. Occupation 
85 Mechanical Technician 
86 Building/Architectural Technician 
87 Other Technician 
88 Admin Associate Prof. 
89 Finance Associate Prof. 
90 Biz/Admin Associate Prof. 
91 Farm Manager 
92 Managing Supervisor/Sales/Service 
93 Police 
94 Ambulance Officer 
95 Fire Fighter/Defence 
96 Other Health/Welfare Associate Prof. 
97 Other Tech/ Associate Prof. 
98 Tradesperson 
99 Advanced Clerical/Service Worker 
100 Intermediate/Elementary Clerical Worker 
101 Intermediate /Elementary Sales Worker 
102 Intermediate /Elementary Service Worker 
103 Production/Transport/Labourer 
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Appendix B: Occupational Categories and Required Level of Qualifications 
Requires Certificates Requires Diplomas Requires Bachelor's Pass 
Degree 
Civil Eng Tech Other Technician  Associate 
Professional 
Medical Imaging Professional 
Tradesperson Building or Architectural 
Technician 
Secondary School Teacher 
Intermediate or Elementary 
Service Worker 
Business or Administrative  
Associate Professional 
Architect or Landscape 
Professional 
Mechanical Engineering 
Technician 
Medical Technician  or 
Technical Officer 
Speech Pathologist 
Intermediate or Elementary 
Sales Worker 
Police Occupational or Recreation 
Therapist 
Intermediate or Elementary 
Clerical Worker 
Finance Associate Professional Audiologist 
Advanced Clerical or Service 
Worker 
Other Health Welfare 
Associate Professional  
Special Education Teacher 
Fire Fighter or Defence 
Worker 
Managing or Sales or Service 
Supervisor 
Training Officer 
Farm Manager Administrative Associate 
Professional 
Accountants or Auditors 
Production or Transport 
Labourer 
Science Technician or 
Technician Officer 
Electrical or Electronic 
Engineer 
Other Technician Air or Sea Transport 
Professional 
Specialist Medical Practitioner 
Electrical or Electronic 
Engineering Technician 
Ambulance Officer Occupational Safety 
Professional 
  Policy Analyst 
  Urban or Regional Planner 
  Media Presenter or Announcer 
or Commentator 
  Quantity Surveyor 
  Journalist or Related 
Professional 
  Medical Science Professional 
  Education Officer or other 
Education Professional 
  Designer or Illustrator 
  Extra-Systemic Teacher 
  Medical Record Administrator 
  Life Scientists 
  Mechanical or Production or 
Plant Engineer 
  Computing Professional 
  Primary School Teacher 
  Specialist Managers 
  Pre-primary School Teacher 
  Mathematician or Statistician 
or Actuary 
  Other Health Professional 
  Pharmacist 
  Psychologist 
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Appendix B: Occupational Categories and Required Level of Qualifications 
(cont.) 
Requires Certificates Requires Diplomas Requires Bachelor's Pass 
Degree 
  Photographer 
  Librarian or Archivist 
  Other Professional 
  Actor or Dancer or Related 
Professional 
  Natural Therapist 
  Environment or Agriculture or 
Science Professional 
  Musician or Composer or 
Related Professional 
  Interpreter or Translator 
  Podiatrist 
  General Medical Practitioner 
  Personnel Specialist 
  Vocational Education Teacher 
  Other Business or IT 
Professional 
  Other Engineer or Related 
  Physiotherapist 
  Recreation Officer 
  Registered Nurse 
  Author or Related Professional 
  Counsellor 
  Visual Arts or Crafts 
Professional 
  Civil Engineer 
  Chemist 
  Cartographer or Surveyor 
  Geologist or Geophysicist 
  Dietician 
  Minister of Religion 
  University Lecturer or Tutor 
  Mining Engineer or 
Metallurgist or Material 
Specialist 
  Sales or Marketing or 
Advertising Specialist 
  Other Social Professional 
  Economist 
  Optometrist 
  Managers and Administrative 
or General 
  Lawyer or Legal Professional 
  Business Organisations 
Analyst 
  Social or Community Worker 
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Appendix B: Occupational Categories and Required Level of Qualifications 
(cont.) 
Requires Certificates Requires Diplomas Requires Bachelor's Pass 
Degree 
  Dental Practitioner 
  Veterinarian 
  Other Natural or Physical 
Science Professional 
  Chiropractor or Osteopath 
  Film or TV or Radio or Stage 
Director 
  Chemical Engineer 
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Appendix C: Australian Universities and Groups 
Group of Eight The University of Adelaide 
The Australian National University 
The University of Melbourne 
Monash University 
The University of New South Wales 
The University of Queensland 
The University of Sydney 
The University of Western Australia 
Australian Technology Network Curtin University 
University of South Australia 
RMIT University 
University of Technology Sydney 
Queensland University of Technology 
Innovative Research Universities 
Australia 
Flinders University 
Griffith University 
La Trobe University 
Murdoch University 
University of Newcastle 
James Cook University 
Charles Darwin University 
Other Universities Australian Catholic University 
Bond University 
Central Queensland University 
Charles Sturt University 
Deakin University 
Edith Cowan University 
Macquarie University 
Southern Cross University 
Swinburne University of Technology 
The University of New England 
The University of Newcastle 
The University of Notre Dame Australia 
University of Ballarat 
University of Canberra 
University of Southern Queensland 
University of Tasmania 
University of the Sunshine Coast 
University of Western Sydney 
University of Wollongong 
Victoria University 
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in the following papers, which have been accepted for publication in academic 
journals. 
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Graduate Labour Market”, in The Australian Journal of Labour Economics 
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